

Problems In Providing Human Resources In The Industrial Sector Of Uzbekistan In 1925-1940 Years

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Abstract. The implementation of the industrialization policy by the Union made it possible to create many new industrial centers in the republic, their entry into a single economic space, and distributed the population between cities and villages, changing the structure of the urban population, and finally, the growth of the working class. In fact, the working class was the main social force of the Soviet government. The increase in the number of workers played a large role in the migration of all republics. In the pre-war period in Uzbekistan, as in other republics, the intervention of the population in the territory led to an increase in the number of unskilled specialist workers, but allowed the formation and growth of a national group of the working class. Inter-republican migration caused not only numerical, but also qualitative growth of the working class of the republic. Workers sent by the union were used to train local skilled workers. This was necessary for the formation of a proletarian class during the transition of supposedly “backward” peoples from capitalism to socialism.

Key words: USSR, Soviet government, Bolsheviks, Central Asian, industrial enterprises.

Introduction

The years 1925-40 were a period of strengthening the political and economic positions of Soviet power. The policy of the Soviet government aimed at “eliminating illiteracy” was also connected with the issue of personnel serving the interests of the country. This led to the idea that in the future, in the training of personnel, class people, from the “working” strata of the population, should be selected. In addition, the leading cadres sent from the center to different regions of the Soviet Union acted reluctantly, did not try to understand the mentality of the republics, and acted on the basis of indifference to the national values of the population. They blindly followed the political guidelines of the Soviet government and constituted a category of leaders.

In 1927, there were 1,500 employees in the state apparatus and central institutions, of which only 317 were natives. In the 1930s, out of 97 members of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, only 43 were indigenous; In the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, 21 out of 75 employees and 5 out of 63 employees in People's Commissariat for Enlightenment (Narkompros; Russian) were local. There were no representatives of local nationalities among the 50 people on the general staff of the republican State Planning Commission[1].

Also, all employees of the Uzbek Purchasing Trust were of European origin [2]. The involvement of indigenous peoples in public administration and related organizations was not in line with the center's political goals.

It can be seen that the employees sent from the center worked more in the public administration system. It was natural for such leaders to defend the interests of the center. In Uzbekistan, refresher courses are being organized for industrial workers, which were an important tool in the implementation of the party program to not form the political and legal consciousness of local leaders and workers. That is why the bolsheviks, through their propaganda and administrative-command methods, sought to increase the share of local national workers in the Soviets, and not of leading cadres.

It should be noted that the implementation of the allied industrialization policy made it possible for many new industrial centers to appear in the country, merge into a single economic space, distribute the population between urban and rural areas, and change the composition of cities and, finally, the growth of the working class. In fact, the working class was the main social force of the Soviet government. The increase in the number of workers played a large role in the migration of all republics. In pre-war Uzbekistan, as in other republics, the intervention of the population within the region led to an increase in unskilled labor, but allowed

the formation and growth of a national group of the working class. Inter-republican migration led not only to quantitative, but also to qualitative growth of the working class of the republic. Workers sent from the union were used to train local skilled workers. This was necessary for the formation of a proletarian class during the transition of supposedly “backward” peoples from capitalism to socialism.

Method

The article effectively uses such methods as logic, structure, analysis, modeling, as well as research by a number of scientists.

Discussion

As a result of the efforts of the Uzbek government, the local population began to produce workers. For example, from the 1925/26 business year to the 1928/1929 business year, the number of industrial workers in Uzbekistan more than doubled from 11,408 to 23,842. During the same period, the number of indigenous workers rose from 3,343 to 12,422. In 1927, 79 local workers worked in the Kyzylshark workshop, and by 1931 their number had increased to 718 people.

The total number of workers and farm laborers in the national economy of Uzbekistan in 1926 was 148 thousand, in 1928 - 173 thousand, in 1940 - 756 thousand people[3]. Although the development of industry led to the rapid growth of the working class, there was a shortage of qualified personnel[4].

If in 1927-1928 the proportion of heavy industry workers was 1,841, by 1932 it had risen to 5,516. Among these, indigenous peoples rose to 32% in 1929 and 44% in 1933. During the construction of the Tashkent textile factory, there was nowhere to supply it with qualified specialists[5].

From 1928-1929, the need for specialists at newly built industrial enterprises was as follows: 1131 highly qualified people, 4485 people of medium qualification, and the need for ordinary workers amounted to 9498 people[6]. It should be noted that the curricula and educational work in educational institutions, and textbooks were highly politicized, aimed at alienating the people from the centuries-old cultural heritage. This method of training was based on the principles of educating performers who did not care about the interests of the nation and did not leave the reins of the Soviet political leadership.

Data on the movement of the population in 1928-1932 and 1933-1937 show that the working class has grown at the expense of the collective farmers. The involvement of local peasant farms in the industrial branches of the national economy also contributed to the strengthening of the social base of the dictatorship of the local proletariat, the strengthening of the working class and the peasant union. Therefore, the detachments of workers in industry also replenished due to the influx of people with a certain amount of private land.

The transition of farm laborers to large industrial enterprises became widespread in the early 1930s. The party and the Soviet government took this very seriously. In 1931, the Sredazburo (Central Asian Bureau) decided to transfer about 11,000 laborers to various sectors of the Central Asian economy[7]. By the end of 1932, the number of workers in the cities of the republic increased due to the rural population, which was a construction specialty. Since the construction industry has long served as a kind of industrial school for seasonal workers, these workers began to participate in the construction of new plants and factories. The basis of the working class was also made up of housewives and minors, also mostly from families of workers and collective farmers. By October 1928, the number of adolescents among the entire working-age population of Central Asia was 2%.

By the end of 1932, the number of students from among indigenous peoples in the working faculties of universities, educational institutions, communist universities and Soviet party schools reached 38.5 thousand people. By the end of 1933, their number was to reach 47,293, including 1,103 in higher educational institutions, 732 in workers' schools, 1,723 in educational institutions, 334 in a worker. Universities, 119 in communist universities, 277 in Soviet party schools[8].

By 1934, the focus was on involving the local population and on large-scale education. As a result of the promulgation of the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR “On admission to higher educational institutions and technical schools” dated December 29, 1935, admission was previously limited by social origin and now officially the entire population had the opportunity to receive higher education[9].

However, in the five pre-war years, the migration of the local population to the cities

of the republic did not fully satisfy the needs for workers in the conditions of the growth of industry in the national economy. In addition to socio-economic factors, the involvement of Uzbeks in industrial production was negatively affected by the slow pace of urbanization of the cultural and local population, the transition from traditional rural life to urban life, the transition from seasonal agricultural to permanent employment in industrial enterprises.

Knowing these factors, the center and the Communist Party from the first years focused on the effective use of the deficit of the working class, its distribution in different sectors of the economy and in different regions in accordance with the interests of the center. Recognizing the "impossibility" of replenishing the working class at the expense of the local population in the implementation of new industrial construction in Uzbekistan, it is planned to send workers to the republic from the densely populated regions of the Union, the central regions. On a national scale, the systematic organizational deployment of labor resources in the regions of Central Asia led to a significant increase in migration flows during the years of economic recovery.

It is known that almost all Union republics took part in the process of industrialization of Uzbekistan, as well as other regions. Skilled workers, engineers, and scientists from Europe came to Uzbekistan from the central cities of the USSR to study new industries. More than 170 companies from Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Donbas, Kyiv, Baku, and Minsk took part in the construction of the Chirchik Electrochemical Plant[10]. The participation of Russian workers in the emergence of new industrial centers is indisputable. They helped improve the skills of Uzbek workers by providing them with work experience. This led to the emergence of a young working-class in Uzbekistan.

In 1924, about 600 workers arrived in Uzbekistan, and this figure grew from year to year. In 1926, 40 Uzbek men were sent to Uzbekistan from the central regions of the Union, including from two factories in Reutovsk and Zaraysk, to study at each of the two factories, which should have been a "thank you" to the center in those years. In addition, the industrial enterprises of Moscow trained and sent 100 spinners and 100 seamstresses from the local population of Uzbekistan to the Krasny Vostok factory[11], which in those years was supposed to be a "thank you" from the center.

However, they were ordinary industrial workers.

Also in July 1930, 300 skilled weavers were sent from the central regions. At the end of 1931, 140 qualified engineers and technicians arrived at the Ferghana Textile Plant from Moscow and Ivanovo, and 40 qualified metallurgists were sent from Leningrad to work at the Toshkishlok mash plant[12]. 300 Uzbek workers and students were sent to Zaraisky, Menyukovsky, and Ivanovo-Voznesensky factories by the Trust of the Red East of the USSR for a three-year study[13].

At the same time, the center accelerated the training of technical engineers. In particular, as of October 1, 1929, 232 technical engineers worked in industry, 94 of them with higher and 95 with secondary specialized education. The rest were experienced students. It should be noted that no more than 1% of these specialists are local residents. However, the need for technical engineers in the industry amounted to 7,249 people[14]. There was only one in Central Asia - the Central Asian State University, which trained personnel for all industries. The need for personnel was so high that the government of Uzbekistan demanded that the Fergana factory send 1 civil engineer, 1 sewing engineer, 1 electrician with higher education, and 2 chemists from the Moscow Textile Institute. In addition, in 1928/29, many specialists from the Leningrad Mining Institute and the Moscow Mining Academy were invited to Uzbekneft[15]. The Central Asian Electrotechnical Institute, the Institute of Civil Engineering, the Central Asian Geological Institute, and the Industrial Academy, which have been operating since 1931, has trained highly qualified specialists, and a number of educational institutions train highly qualified specialists. In 1928, each student studied at an educational institution for 300 rubles, in special schools for 250 rubles, and in training and production workshops for 200 rubles[16].

However, the overcrowding of conventional jobs and the influx of indigenous people also led to the departure of some workers due to the lack of housing for new arrivals and skilled workers[17].

In the 1930s, four universities trained workers in Samarkand, Bukhara, Kokand, and Fergana. From 1930-1932 years were created 13 higher educational institutions of various profiles, and by the end of 1934 - 12 higher technical educational institutions were created,

the largest of which was the Central Asian Industrial Institute. At the end of 1934, 2983 people were studying in 5 functioning universities[18].

On the “initiative” of the Soviet government, the number of representatives of indigenous peoples in the universities of the republic was to increase. Accordingly, on October 6, 1930, at a meeting of the Production and Educational Council under the Council of People's Commissars of the Uzbek SSR, it was considered that 75% of the mechanics admitted to the Kokand School should be indigenous people, consisting of representatives. As such, the principal is instructed to dissolve admissions and form a new admissions committee and ensure that 75% of admissions are from local nationalities[19].

The center also carried out a lot of work to train managers and engineers for universities and technical schools in Moscow, Leningrad, Saratov, Omsk, Sverdlovsk, and other cities of the Central Asian republics. For example, with the construction of the Tashkent Textile Plant, specialized weavers were trained in Moscow. They were educated at the Institute of Light Industry and schools of the FZU of the Khalturina plant in Leningrad, the Proletarka trust in Tver, and the Krasny Vostok trust in Zaraysk, Moscow Region. In particular, in 1933-35, Tashkent textile enterprises sent 1,000 workers from the Middle Volga region, 449 from Moscow and Leningrad, and 178 from the Klimov factory[20]. In addition, in 1934/35, 424 qualified specialists arrived at the Tashkent textile enterprises for industrial training[21]. In addition, 127 workers were sent to the textile enterprises of Uzbekistan from the Moscow plant named after[22]. Frunze and the Malakhov Plant were named after the October Revolution.

Only in 1933-35, 10 thousand workers from the RSFSR were sent to Uzbekistan[23]. In 1933-1934, out of 900 workers sent from Uzbekistan to study in Moscow and Leningrad, 60% were indigenous youth. In total, from 1928-193, 15,514 people were sent to Uzbekistan on the basis of contractual obligations in the direction of “international armored brigades”[24]. Also in 1928, the Uzbekneft trust sent 12 people to Moscow, Leningrad, and Orenburg universities, including 10 Russians and 2 Uzbeks[25]. In 1935, 29 students graduated from the Leningrad and Moscow universities of light industry of Uzbekistan, 11 of them were Uzbeks[26].

The universities operating in the Union in the field of light industry were: Leningrad, Moscow, Ivanovo, Kostroma, Tashkent textile institutes, and Ivanovo and Leningrad industrial academies[27].

In general, as a result of the influx of workers from the central regions of the Union, the number of light industry workers increased from 7500 to 41371 people during the period from 1927 to 1937[28]. Also, the number of local workers in key industries increased from 35% to 70%. In total, in 1925-30, about 10 thousand skilled workers were trained on the basis of Russian production centers for the light industry of Uzbekistan[29]. During the second five-year plan, 3,062 workers were sent to the industrial facilities of Uzbekistan from the central regions of the RSFSR in 1933, 3,500 in 1934, and 3,000 in 1935[30]. Only with the beginning of the construction of the Ferghana textile factory, 205 qualified managers and workers from Zaraysk, 71 from Venyukovsk, and a total of 371 people were trained[31]. The Uzbek government also demanded that these experienced workers and skilled industrialists be sent to the country for a fixed period, but most of the newcomers remained in the country.

Due to the constant business trips of workers from the central cities of the Union, little attention was paid to the training of personnel in the republic. As a result, production declined and plans were not met on time. In addition, failure to select the right workers often led to negative consequences. Because not all the workers sent from the center were “skilled”. As a result, such workers were dismissed for not fulfilling their duties, including 7,963 of the 8,094 workers of the Khilkovo plant[32]. Due to the lack of attention to the workers and the lack of housing, there were almost no qualified specialists at the printing, brick, and Khilkovo factories.

At the same time, teaching in most educational institutions is in an unsatisfactory state, curricula have not been developed in many places, and there are no live contacts with organizations. In many places, there were no educational buildings. In addition, most of the workers were aged 50-60, housewives, and persons with incomplete secondary education. It was very difficult to teach them new tricks. The lack of literature in the Uzbek language had a more negative impact on the learning process. Shop managers and factory foremen did not come to class on time[33].

To put an end to this situation, the Soviet government was forced to pay at least

some attention to the training of local leaders. As a result, the number of engineering and technical managers in the industry of Uzbekistan increased from 574 in 1928-1929 to 2443 in 1932-1933, that is almost four times. Most of the university and college graduates were experienced industrial production managers, designers, and scientists. Among them were H.M.Abdullaev, M.T.Urazbaev, M.Z.Khamudkhanov.

The share of indigenous workers in the industry also increased: in 1933 it was 37% in heavy industry and 57.3% in light industry[34]. But the heads of industrial enterprises were still Europeans, and if you look at the ethnicity of the leading cadres of heavy industries, then 1 out of 16 was Uzbek[35]. In 1935, none of the 39 employees of the Central Asian Industrial Academy was Uzbek[36].

As noted above, in the second five-year plan, simultaneously with the construction of new industrial enterprises, the Stakhanov movement and the movement of socialist emulation intensified throughout the Union. For example, Stakhanovite Abdusalomov, who worked as a stonemason in Chirchikkurilish, produced 19,344 bricks a day instead of 1,200. A. Kozov from the silk factory fulfilled the plan by 202%. D. Abdurazakov produced 4395 tons of flour per month instead of 2950 tons at the Soyuzmuk plant and so on[37].

However, the lack of a clear wage rate for workers, as well as the lack of a clear indication that the salary of one foreman of an enterprise is different from the salary of another foreman, also led to abuse of power by enterprise managers.

By the 1930s, a new technical intelligentsia began to take shape. The proportion of engineering and technical workers has increased. Whereas in 1928 the number of engineers and technicians in all branches of industry was 1,400, by the second five-year plan their number had risen to 6,000. 42% of them were indigenous. The number of workers in the industry increased from 80,000 to 136,000[38].

Although the Soviet government tries to "pay attention" to the training of local workers, engineers and managers, in practice we see the opposite: it was all made up of people of European origin. For example, the personnel department is Barsukov, the head of the planning and economic department is Vashkov, the head of metal and woodworking production is Konstantinov and the chief engineer is Dementiev, the director of the Kuvasay cement and lime plant is Abramov, the heads of the

Bekabad (Khilkovsky) cement plant are Gilman and Tarnovsky, chairman of the Cement and Lime Department - Panchenko, director of the Plant of New Building Materials - Kogan, director of the Jizzakh Lime Plant - Ulyanov, heads of the Mining Trust - Chistyakov and Devushkina, head of the brick production department - Svetakov and Pullo, director of the Uzpolygraph Combine - Voronin, assistant Arkhang, Khloponina, Deputy Head of the Department of the Flour and Rice Industry, and Titov, Director of the Scientific Research Institute at the People's Commissariat of Industry. Only in some workshops and workshops of factories were representatives of the local ethnic group in charge[39].

The industrialization of the republic was accompanied by the formation of the working class and the growth of its numbers. By 1940, there were 756 thousand workers and employees in the national economy of the republic[40].

The number of workers in industry increased from 10.8 thousand in 1926, 69 thousand in 1933, and from 131 thousand in 1937 to 140 thousand in 1940[41] or 36.2% of the total number of employees in the metalworking industry.

In 1931-1932, only 27 out of 1,052 workers at the Krasno-Vostochny Locomotive Repair Plant were Uzbek workers; by 1935, out of 4,000 workers, 1,363 people were highly skilled Uzbeks, of which 177 were locksmiths, 27 boilermakers, and 85 turners. We also see that in 1935, 15.7% of Uzbek workers worked at the Kyzyl Tong garment factory, and by 1937 this figure had increased to 23.3%[42].

In recent years, it has become clear that the center's focus on increasing the working class among the local population underpins the union's notion of "illiteracy and backwardness". In 1939, compared with 1925, the number of workers in industry increased by 130,000 people. Indigenous workers made up 52%.

The given data show that the needs of industrial enterprises of the Republic of Uzbekistan in qualified personnel are practically satisfied at the expense of foreign workers (mainly Europeans). However, during this period, the local population was involved only in "dirty work", i.e., in the construction of railways, industrial enterprises, bricks and cement, mineral fertilizers, collective farms, etc. If you pay attention to the situation before the industrialization policy of the republic, then the need for industrial personnel in our region will be satisfied when small artisans become

masters of their craft and are invited to work in newly created textile enterprises. It is also natural that the experience of new hires will be low and it will take time to prepare them as mature industry professionals. But the Soviet government, as in the days of tsarist Russia, provided an artificial mass influx of people from the central regions. It was not a matter of the "concern" of the Union for the formation of the national economy in the republic, but of a political goal.

We see that a sharp turn in the allied industrialization policy in the republic in the period under study began after the adoption of the resolution "On work among women" at the 1st Congress of the Communist Party (b) of Uzbekistan in Bukhara (February 8, 2010). 1925). It is based on the motto "No organization, no enterprise should be without women". The goal was to increase the involvement of indigenous women in the production process, that is, on the labor front, since the main task was to strengthen the material and economic base of Soviet power, which was formed in 1925.

In addition, many short-term training courses were organized to further accelerate the training of "socio-politically active" women to advance communist policies. However, it should be noted that under the leadership of the center, the task of training active women leaders on the basis of a class approach was carried out at the expense of the illiterate, unskilled, as well as women from poor families. As of January 1, 1926, 1600 Uzbek women worked at the Tashkent garment factory and the Fergana weaving mill. By the end of 1926, 814 local women were members of 16 large women's cooperatives across the country, and by 1929, 4,258 women had joined 50 cooperatives[43].

In order to increase the activity of women in industrial production, Uzbek women graduate from various educational institutions to receive secondary specialized specialties in various sectors of the economy. In 1937, 76 students graduated from the Tashkent Industrial College, 39 of them were women. By 1930, the industry of the republic needed 3845 female workers. If in 1928 it was 15.1% of the total number of 2194 women or workers in the industry of Uzbekistan, then by January 1, 1933 this figure had increased to 11063 or 28.2% [44].

In connection with the growth of the share of women in industry, socialist competitions were emphasized for a more productive use of their labor, the forced promotion of Stakhanov schools, and the

expansion of the rights and opportunities of women in production. As a result of the involvement of women in industry, by 1940, 40.7% of local workers in industry were women. All 20,000 workers (including 16,000 Uzbeks) at the industrial enterprises of Uzbekistan mastered the industry and worked as qualified specialists[45].

Many social problems for women have arisen as a result of the fact that industry is based on a certain amount of physical labor and women are not able to fully meet the needs of industrial production. There were cases of mass exodus from industrial enterprises due to the occurrence of various diseases and the unsatisfactory level of needs of working women. For example, in the silk industry, the share of women in 1927 was 80.3%, and by 1929 - 63.3%. However, in the textile industry, it decreased from 38% in 1927 to 32.9% in 1929. In the clothing industry, it also decreased from 32.2% to 30.7%, in the confectionery industry - from 53.3% to 52% [46].

The Communist Party, striving to realize the five-year plans for the development of the national economy through the effective use of women's labor, lowered their position in the family. The fact that their wages are 25-30% lower than men's, and they are equal in work with men, is a confirmation of what has been said.

In 1933, 2.2 thousand women were nominated for leadership positions, and by 1934 their number had increased to 17.7 thousand[47], and by 1937 there were 30 thousand women in leadership positions in Uzbekistan[48]. At the end of the second five-year plan, only 20 Uzbek women remained with higher education in the field of industrial production[49].

As a result of the politicization of women's participation in all spheres, certain shortcomings have been revealed. First of all, this led to a violation of the family traditions of the Uzbek people, and alienation from the national, traditional way of life. As a result of the priority given to the idea of "equality" of women with men in society, large families in Uzbek families were ignored.

At the XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, it was noted that the industrial facilities of Uzbekistan are being built with the economic support of the Russian working class. The idea was instilled into the minds of the party and government by leaders and local representatives that "without the help of the Union, Uzbekistan cannot be

industrialized in such a short time, the growth in the number of industrial workers, the material and spiritual life of the population cannot change radically”.

It should be noted that, given that Uzbekistan has long been an agrarian territory, mainly due to the use of manual labor, the absence of large industrial enterprises, and the absence of a working class, the center's help in this regard is undeniable. However, the extreme politicization, centralization and command-and-control nature of the process, the one-sided socio-economic policy of the indigenous peoples led the Soviet Union to follow the path of the “big brother” empire in this country. This is the result of his work for the benefit of Moscow.

As the international situation worsened towards the end of the 1930s, the third five-year plan focused on labor discipline and productivity. The government of the Soviet Union mobilized all its forces to prevent a military threat and put on the agenda the task of preparing industry to adapt to a military situation with the full use of all forces and the working day. For this purpose, a resolution was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of December 28, 1938 “Regulations on labor discipline, improving the practice of state social insurance and measures to combat violators” and a ban on the voluntary dismissal of workers and employees from enterprises and institutions. With these decisions, the Soviet government tied workers, employees and unskilled workers to their jobs and forced them to resign or be subject to various administrative penalties (fines, etc.) for minor mistakes (lateness to work, illness, etc.).

“In the Central Asian republics, Russians held the most responsible positions,” said Kolraz, an American journalist. They rule in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the State Security Committees, in the Prosecutor's Office, he manages the state banks, he plans the economy of each republic”. Unfortunately, this was a specific principle of the imperial system.

The rapid growth in quantity as a result of the one-sided personnel policy of the industrial sector has led to deterioration in quality. In the same way that the Soviet government artificially forced industrial construction in Uzbekistan, it pursued a similar policy of regionalization of the working class in accordance with the interests of the center.

There were also internal contradictions in the personnel policy pursued by the center.

Conclusions

The process of forming industrial workers could be more rational and economical if the demand for skilled workers in the republic were organized on a large scale, not from abroad, but locally. However, under Soviet rule, ideology prevailed over economics. The center was interested in creating a social stratum - the proletarian class, which was the backbone of the imperial system in the national territories. It was an important instrument of the Russification policy of the Stalinist administration. There were certain obstacles in the training of qualified leaders, workers and engineers from the local population. Nevertheless, a peculiar division of labor was established between the local population and the population of the central regions.

It should be noted that the local population was mainly engaged in agriculture and as a result of the excessive centralization of the sector by the Soviet Union, agriculture suffered from the cotton monopoly, as well as becoming a labor-intensive and low-paid sector. Representatives of the European population, on the other hand, worked in important industries and in the field of knowledge and services, that is, in industries that paid more than the agricultural sector and had corresponding favorable conditions. The principle of such a one-sided policy would naturally hamper the development of society and open the way to a further deterioration of interethnic relations.

The personnel policy of the Soviet government and its national aspects clearly reflected the colonial aspirations of the center. True, in the 1920s the introduction of European workers and specialists met the economic interests of the republic, that is, during the years of industrialization in Uzbekistan, the foundation was laid for the preparation of a national working class. Much attention was also paid to attracting representatives of local nationalities, in particular Uzbek women, to industrial production. However, due attention was not paid to the quality of professional training of workers and their social and living conditions. This led to high staff turnover. The excessive attraction of workers from the central regions of the Soviet Union to the republic was also a serious obstacle to the quantitative and qualitative growth of the national working collective of Uzbekistan. The failure to

introduce modern production methods into industry, the low level of equipment, administrative management according to the laws of a planned economy, the level and incompetence of personnel are mostly unsatisfactory, violence in production and the widespread use of administrative measures - all this had a negative impact not only on industry, but also on the economy as whole.

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