

Foundation and Philosophical-Epistemological Characteristics of Rationality in the Thoughts of Shahid Motahhari

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Abstract

Rationality has a special place in the thoughts of Shahid Motahhari. The breadth of components and the multiplicity of characteristics of rationality in Shahid Motahhari's thoughts, along with its comprehensiveness, have led to its capability, finesse and accuracy. Thus, the major aim of this article is to present the characteristics of rationality in the Shahid Motahhari's ideas. This research is a qualitative study using note-taking for data collection and descriptive-analytical methods for data analysis. In this research, by highlighting the terminology of reason and thought, the initial stage and characteristics of rationality are described to determine its work and function. This article intends to explain the main dignity and position of rationality for application in various philosophical, social and political issues. This article signifies the radical differences between Shahid Motahhari's thoughts and the ideas of Aristotle and Plato as well as the intellectual currents of sensuality and rationalism.

Keywords: Wisdom, Thought, Reason, Thinking, Rationality, Sensuality, Rationalism

Statement of the problem

The first discussion regarding the reason is the question of the validity and originality of rational knowledge (authority, authenticity and validity of reason). That is, the human reasoning is seen as a means to discover the truths of this world, and rational knowledge is regarded as reliable and valid knowledge; however, many schools do not give such credit to reason.

Rationality is the fake source of reason. That is, when the reason puts into action and reaches a conclusion, it is called rationality. Therefore, rationality is the main function of reason. Using, applying, and exercising power of reason for desired attainments is rationality.

In general, humans have a set of abilities that other living things do not have. Human being is

equipped with the power of "reason" and "will" enabling him or her to resist desires and "rule" over them, stop overvaluing any desire, and thereby, gain spiritual freedom. And, this is the characteristic that makes man "worthy" of duty, gives man the right to "choose" and makes him a free, selective, and authorized being. In general, the power of reason and will is an inner force manifesting the real personality of man. It is through reason and will that human "owns himself" and strengthens his personality. These are the main goals of Islamic education. The goal of such education is "spiritual freedom" (Motahhari, 1997: 26).

On the subject of rationality, apart from the approach of Sadra's philosophy, two other macro approaches can be recognized. The first approach is the sensualist approach, proposing

that the work of reason is limited to the abstraction, generalization, decomposition, and synthesis of perceptible forms. The second approach is the rationalists' approach, assumed that the reason has the inherent property to invent some concepts by itself, without the mediation and intervention of any other power. (Motahari, 1375: 24). Thus, it is necessary to know that philosophy is responsible for the existential and ontological issues of science. Philosophy, as opposed to sophistry, protects the various sciences from the relativity of understanding and truth, and provides the thematic principles of logic and other sciences, accordingly, paves the way for the attainment of certainty.

I- Meanings of Reason

Reason is "the center of thought, thinking, and accounting" (Motahari, 1383: 146). It means that the act of perception and reasonable itself is perceived. Here, *reasonable* means the existence of reason in the mind, like the existence of the concept of space in the mind (Motahari, 1375: 65).

In terminology, however, many meanings have been quoted for reason, showing the complexity of this concept. Generally, in all sciences, terms are always derived from a basic customary meaning. The ancient philosophers believed that the power of human reason is an "abstract power" (Motahari, 2001: 261), meaning "not belonging to matter" (Motahari, 1381: 260). Since they have no other words for this power, the word "reason" has been opted. So, every creature that possess these properties is called "reason". The reason of man is one of the powers of the soul, certainly the domain of his reason and awareness of himself and other objects. But, because of that similarity, they use this word (Motahari, 2001: 261). Although the word reason is commonly used to refer to the force of human thought, the scholars consider every abstract conscious force as "reason" (Motahari, 1376: 119). Therefore, the power that is abstract from matter and perceives rationality is the actual reason (Ibid., P. 105). So, the meaning of reason is not thought, although this is customary. Thought is thinking, it is a kind of action that is found among thoughts, ideas and affirmations. So, if we use the term "reason" or "pure reason" in the case of abstractions or in the essential

nature of transcendence, the source should not be mistaken. As if, these errors are common in modern interpretations and translations. (Motahari, 2001: 261).

Therefore, the meaning of the word "pure reason" in some philosophers' views, saying that the existence of pure reason is obligatory, is an abstract and aware being definitely aware of the essence (Motahari, 1381: 260). As much as something is not material, it knows itself. Every being abstracted from matter is rational, that is, it is self-conscious, and every rational and every self-conscious is abstract. On the other hand, any rational object is impossible to be rational unless it is abstract from matter. Since matter is matter, it is never rational, but matter must find a rational existence in a mind in order to be rational in that mind (ibid., P. 285).

Also, "reasonable" is equal to "general" – something that is reasonable and partial has no meaning anymore. In general, as long as you think of this pencil, for example, this idea is not rational. This is a sensory perception. It is rational when you only reason a pencil without taking this or that pencil into account. That's what we call reasonable. In addition, the meaning of "reasonable" is that it is inferred rationally, and the reason rules its necessity (Motahari, 1381: 521).

Technically, reason is a source for cognition and reasoning is its tool. (Motahari, 1375: 50). It seems that where reason and reasoning are discussed against science and learning, the state of intellectual development and intellectual independence are intended, showing that man has the power of inference (Motahari, 1395: 17). People who do not have a clear reason do not have much power of discernment. To become wiser means "to be able to analyze the problem" (ibid. 1393, p. 232).

In sum, reason is the focal point of the human soul and the source of kinds of spiritual activities and manifestations. Thought, foresight, calculus, logic, reasoning, science and philosophy are the manifestations of reason. Guidance and light arise from the center of reason, unlike the center of the heart from which heat and movement arise. He who is deprived of the power of reason, is like a lightless car moving in the dark night (Motahari, 1381: 104).

2. The meaning of "Thought"

"Thinking" is brining together several known to obtain a new known and attempting to transform an unknown into a known. Sometimes it has been said that "Thought is the movement of the mind from the preliminaries to the results." (Motahari, 2007, 24). That's why, in logical terms, thought is the highest mental activity (Motahari, 1375, 168).

Another point is that reason precedes thinking, though, in some places, the two have been used interchangeably. Thinking is a power of man due to having reason. Since man is a rational being, he is a thinking being having the power of thinking about issues. Man discovers the truths through his thinking in matters, whether it is reasoning and inferential thinking or empirical thinking (Motahari, 2006: 294 and 295).

3- The Beginning of Thinking

Before explaining how thinking and rationality begin, the quality of acquiring knowledge and science should be explained. In general, there are three main currents of thought in this area.

A group called rationalists believe that mental perceptions and simple basic elements of reason are of two types: the one that enters the mind directly through one of the external or internal senses, and the power of reason with the force of "abstraction" makes a general and reasonable form from them. The second type is that reason has already invented them, and they are innate and inherent in the reason. They believe that those perceptions have nothing to do with the senses. This theory was first developed by Descartes.

According to another group called sensualists, innate and inherent imaginations are meaningless. The mind is initially a blank slate. The work of reason is nothing but abstraction and generalization or disintegration and synthesis of what enters the mind through one of the senses. All mental imaginations, without exception, are the forms from which the mind photographs. This practice is done by the sensual means of an external phenomenon such as whiteness, blackness, etc., or of a carnal phenomenon such as pleasure, will, etc. Finally, the mind, through the power of abstraction and generalization, creates general meanings for

these forms and provides various sub-forms with the power of decomposition and synthesis. The head of this group is John Locke who states that "nothing is in the intellect that was not in the senses" (Motahari, 1375: 23, 24, 25 and 26).

The third current is the later current of Islamic philosophy. In Asfar, Mulla Sadra says: in childhood, the human soul is in pure power and talent. It looks like a clear tablet only potential of accepting designs, without any actual known or sensible qualifications. The senses are different spies reporting from different areas aiming to benefit soul. These sensory perceptions, then, prepare the soul for the initial axioms of the imagination and the initial axioms of affirmation. Therefore, the first effects of sensations, potentially sensible and integrated in the imaginary treasury (memory), are the axioms including the principles and experiences. Therefore, all the obvious conceptions of reason are abstract things that reason has abstracted from the meanings of sensations. But, there is a difference between the abstraction of general concepts such as man or tree, obtained directly by abstracting and generalizing perceptible details, called "primary intellects", and the abstraction of primary axioms and general concepts such as existence, non-existence, unity, plurality, etc., called "second intellects". These second philosophical intellects are the basic axioms of logic constituting the issues of the first philosophy. In any case, both primary and secondary intellects precede the detailed perceptions of the senses (ibid., Pp. 20 and 21).

Of course, this issue is rooted in the discussions of potential and actual intellect, i.e., as potentiality equals materiality, anti-intellect, and celibacy, then, how a material object is potentially an abstract object (Motahari, 1376: 108). There are several theories to answer this question:

A well-known Platonic thought, claiming that the soul became aware of the truths in a world of "forms" implying that what now prevents the soul from paying attention to its information and reason is the veil of the body, and every new knowledge acquired for the soul is not new, but it is a reminder of something it already knew.

The opposite of this Platonic thought is the occurrence of soul. Through the occurrence of the body, the soul has not already been in another world to be aware of the truths, every

truth to which the soul is aware is in this world (Motahari, 1376: 107).

The Aristotelians believe that as soon as the body has the talent to have a soul, in a moment, the soul occurs and they find an inherent identity with each other. (Ibid: 109). On the other hand, reason is nothing but the passivity of the body or the soul. It makes no difference whether a person thinks about something or draws a picture on a piece of paper or a wall; Just as we draw a picture on a wall or write a line on a piece of paper, there is no change in the wall or the paper, but only a borrowed role is accepted. When we reason, the only thing that happens is that a formal role appears in our brain or in our soul. In general, in the case of the soul and the body, they have not been able to adequately explain how a matter (body) and an abstract (soul) find inherent coincidence (Ibid: 107).

Contrary to the above two theories, Sadra solved this problem by proving the motion of matter on the one hand and the principle of rational unity on the other. According to him, just as water, air, light and soil are a series of equipment for apples to grow from one stage to another, the senses of appearance and senses are the tools of the intellect to be promoted to the status of actuality. Without these tools, it is impossible for the soul to pass from the stage of potential to the stage of actuality. The state of the soul, when it thinks, is the state of an apple that turns red or sweet, i.e., the apple finds a state within itself that we say "it was not and became". The soul acts the same in the stage of the intellect – this is the root of the idea of potential intellect and actual intellect (Ibid., P. 108).

In Sadra's philosophy, the soul occurs from the body and is the so-called "physicality of occurrence and spirituality of survival." Matter in its substantive transformations gradually and serially goes to perfection until it reaches the limit of abstraction. They have not drawn a wall between the material and the abstract, and they have not set a boundary. This flow of going from a defect to the perfection is a continuous flow, not a discrete one. It is not a type of disconnection and connection or dismantling and dressing, but it is the type of continuous intensification/completion and continuous wearing. According to Sadra, the truth, today the soul, is thought, thinking, intellect and rational. One day it was bread, the other day it was blood, semen, love, or chewing. After describing the

evolution of the fetus in the womb from the sperm to the level of physical perfection, Sadra quotes the Qur'an as saying, "Then We made 'him' something else." This expresses the transformation of "matter" into "meaning" (Ibid: 109).

So, the main issue is "what kinds of relationships between logical cognition and superficial and emotional cognition – the relationship between reason and sense – exist which the nature of cognition does not change but the nature itself has expanded. This is where Sadra presented his theory, called the "theory of transcendence." He has explained how the mind can move from the stage of feeling to the higher stage without having changed the nature of the evidence and, in a word, turned quantity into quality. This problem is solved based on the issue of soul levels and soul level matching. Without the use of self-abstraction, problems of cognition are impossible to be solved (Motahari, 1375: p. 120).

Also, once it has been proved that matter and spirit are two degrees of one truth, there is no problem if the material object of the intellect is potential and become the actual intellect. In the discussions of "wise and reasonable" in Asfar, Sadra claims that the issue of turning potential intellect into actual intellect cannot be justified except by the union of the reason and the reasonable. If we assume the wise as one thing and the reasonable as something else having been inflicted on him, reason does not make sense. (Motahari, 1997: pp. 110 and 111).

It is in this way that the practical repetition of the senses gradually realizes the power of reason, at its potential. So, the body is not the veil of the soul to pay attention to the contemplative sciences and information, but, it is the instrument of the soul to acquire information and contemplative sciences, because, as said, the beginning of the perception of the soul is through the senses, and the senses are the bodily means of the soul. (Ibid., P. 107).

Therefore, the action of the senses is the key to elementary superficial cognition, i.e., the key to collecting the raw materials of cognition is in the mind. If we do not want to work with this key, there will not be a turn for the second key at all. The second key is what Qur'an interprets as "Fouad" and philosophers calls "intellect". It must work and be used. So, if we consider action

as thinking and reasoning, action is always the key to cognition. It is a mistake to limit action to "objective action" – observation. Whereas, objective action (observation and examination) is the first key to cognition, the second action (if we call it action) is a kind of mental action with which we perform the second stage of cognition, i.e., the logical stage (Motahari, 2007: 490).

The issue of inherent and experiential reasoning is the same. Experiential knowledge is not enough if it is not attached to the inherent. That is, man must connect what he takes from the outside with the inward force to make something valuable. That is, the intellect must be accompanied by knowledge, i.e., first, man must be a scientist and provide raw materials, and then the intellect initiate analyzing. (Motahari, 1395: 191 and 192).

With these preliminaries, we move to the subject, the beginning of thought and rationality. One of the properties of intellect is learning, which is not important. In fact, when reason begins to analyze and distinguish good from bad and makes critical decisions, its true sense is foregrounded (Motahari, 2016: 107).

Therefore, everyone who lacks a sense, he neither has the power of partial feeling of a series of sensations related to that sense, nor does have the power of rational and general perception and scientific conception of it. The statement "He who has lost his sense of knowledge has lost his senses" is a related point. But that argument and this experiment were only about ideas and concepts applicable to the sensibilities, such as the concept of man, tree, quantity, color, and shape. Surely, there are some exceptions, because, later, the human mind necessarily has a series of other ideas not being justified by any of the senses and inevitably enters the mind in other ways and orders, which, after attaining a series of sensory perceptions, attains them in special order, described as follows:

First, the mind is like a tabula rasa and has no primary image of anything. It only has the talent of accepting the role. Our soul lacks mind at the beginning of evolution (Motahari, 1375: 40). Second, ideas and concepts that are applicable to the senses have entered the mind only through the senses. Third, human mental imagery is not limited to what is perceived by individuals and has entered the mind directly through the

external or internal senses – there are many other ideas and concepts that have entered the mind in other ways and orders. Fourth, every concept that the mind makes happens after it finds a reality of facts in person and with knowledge of presence. Fifth, the beginning of soul's perceptual activity is through the senses.

Sadra also argues through the simplicity of the soul noting that the perceptual activity of the soul begins through the senses and each of the information and intellects is obtained either directly through the senses or the accumulation of sensory perceptions leads the mind. He is predisposed to achieve it, and the soul by its very nature cannot instinctively perceive foreign objects and reason with them. Although the soul is simple, it is very capable of reasoning by stating that: The only correct way to justify the multiplicity of information is the multiplicity of sensory devices. The multiplicity of sensory devices, on the one hand, and the multiplicity of partial emotions, found over time due to different states, conditions, movements and efforts human beings make for different purposes and ends, on the other hand, make many perceptible forms gathered in mind. This community and density of sensory perceptions predisposes the soul to the emergence of imaginary and affirmative axioms. After the emergence of axioms, the multiplicity of information begins in a different way, in which the mind combines them with different shapes and forms, makes limits and analogies, and achieves various results. Through this process, mind acquires theoretical sciences and finds the power to move forward to infinity (Ibid., Pp. 41 and 42).

In general, the reason recognizes levels in objects that, while these levels are true, they do not have the sensible capability. The inherent primacy of cause over effect can be a related example (Motahari 1988: 157). The rulings of the mind about the necessity, possibility, and the refusals are rational not sensory. Inevitably, one might be completely silent about such rulings and does not speak about the predestination and necessity of the being system as well as the transformation and refusal of things. Or, he should make a precise rational analysis and recognize the different credentials of the mind from each other (Motahari, 1393: 99). Therefore, it is the reason that discovers something and abstracts it. All we feel is what

we call "accidents"; we only discover the existence of something in these accidents (Motahari, 1987: 223 and 224).

Another point having received less attention is finding a solution to the problem of transforming emotional and superficial identification into logical identification. Accordingly, we come to a valuable point in the matter of identification – in the midst of every empirical-logical identification, there is a purely deductive and rational cognition which is the fulcrum of empirical identification. Therefore, intellect takes precedence over experience, that is, if there is no identification for rational arguments relying on basic axioms, empirical-logical identification would not have been possible (Motahari: 1375: 125). Additionally, the general improvised principles, which are the first foundations of human thought and their correctness is guaranteed by the immediate intellect, guarantee the correctness of experience. (Motahari, 1393: 196).

Of course, that the mind can expand cognition is a precise action. What is even more astonishing is that the mind has the power to expand cognition not only in length and width, but also in another dimension, which we call "deep cognition" or "inferential cognition." The issue of theology is justified by this dimension of cognition (Motahari: 1375: 127).

4- Common sense criteria

It should be noted that thought is a kind of mental action that will not be determined until the mind and its actions are determined. The mind performs several actions, which we list in order to clarify the action of "thinking" and its definition in the mind.

The first action of the mind is to visualize the outside world. It communicates with foreign objects through the senses and gathers their forms. The mind is merely "passive" in this work. The action of the mind in this sense is merely "acceptance." Another action of the mind is reminder. In psychologists' words, they "associate" each other's meanings. Its next action is decomposition and synthesis. Abstraction and generalization are the other actions of the mind (Motahari, 2007: 91, 92 and 93).

The human faculty performs another activity, a special kind of abstraction called "credibility". The "validity" or "abstraction" actions create the basic axioms of the concept of logic and the predominant general concepts of philosophy for the mind. These series of abstract concepts is called "general concepts" because they are the most general and public imaginations that has entered the human mind in a way that no more general imaginations are possible, such as the imagination of existence, non-existence, unity, plurality, and the like. These general concepts, in terms of being found for the mind, are later than special concepts and especially from external sensations, and in this respect, they are in the second degree (second intellects). But logically, they are "first improvisations". That is, in terms of philosophy and psychology they are second and in terms of logic they are first (Motahari, 1375: 25).

Other actions of the mind are thinking and reasoning, our main purpose. The difference between the empiricists and the sensuous on the one hand, and the rationalists and analogists on the other, is that the empiricists see direct contact with objects through the senses as the only way to obtain new information, but rationalists and analogists claim that experience is a way to obtain new information – a new set of information can be obtained by relating the previous information. Relating information to obtain other information is what is interpreted as "limit" and "analogy" or "argument" (Motahari, 2007: pp. 91 and 92).

4-1 The first criterion of rationality

The acquisition of information either is through direct observation that the practical mind does not do because it merely receives the products of the senses or is through thinking about previous acquisitions that the mind acts in some ways. Logic has nothing to do with the first type. Therefore, the necessity of the multiplicity of information as well as the necessity of a comprehensive existence and common ground between the information (i.e., the previous information is not purely foreign to each other) provide the ground for the act of thinking. If just one of these two conditions is met, the mind is unable to act and transform, even incorrectly. But there are a series of other conditions, which are the "correct conditions for the movement of thought." Logic expresses the conditions that the

mind does not fall into error while thinking (Ibid., P. 77).

4-2 The second criterion of rationality

Now, knowing how real perceptions are productively related is up to know what the mind really wants when it is in motion and attempts to reveal the unknown to itself. What is that "thing" causing the unknown to become known? It should be noted that the mind, under the influence of the truth-seeking instinct or another factor, compares the two concepts with each other and wants to understand their real relationship regarding "coherence", "opposition", "induction", or "equality". In this comparison, sometimes no problem or mistake happens and without any efforts and movements, the mind finds a relationship (such as basic axioms, sensations, and consciences); however, sometimes it faces some problems and requires efforts and movements. In logic, this movement and effort to pursue a mediator is called "mediation". In order to find the average, the mind examines its previous information and data. If it finds something among them competent to be mediator, it will get the desired result. The mediator has a clear and obvious relation with both concepts and, due to its mediation role, connects the two. For example, a man, jumping over a water stream, puts a stone in the middle of the stream, sets his foot on it, and crosses.

So, when the mind is striving to make an unknown a known, in fact, it aims to find a real relationship between the two concepts, and finally the desired result is achieved through the mediation of a third concept. The productive relations of the perceptions are in this order: From the perception of the relationship of "mediation" with one concept and the perception of its relationship with another concept, the perception of the relationship of those two concepts is produced. Accordingly, it becomes clear that the intellectual advancement of the mind is based on the understanding of relations, and those relations are real and self-evident. That is, although "thought" is a kind of activity, this activity is not arbitrary and free, but it is self-command and a function of reality. If the mind directly or indirectly rules coherence, opposition, induction, or equality, it is because the mind itself is so.

4-3. The Third Criterion of Rationality

Researchers have mentioned some conditions regarding the relationship between the subject and the predicate in order to enable the mind to discover a real and self-actual relationship – to be able to discover the "truth". The most important conditions are: "essence, necessity, and totality", and of course, each of these conditions has a special meaning.

4-4. The Fourth Criterion of Rationality

What we need to know is that logical thinking and argumentative behavior are based on the real relations of the contents of the mind, and the ground for intellectual and thoughtful activities, having logical values, are provided where there is a relationship between the concepts of reality and the self (Ibid., Pp. 171 and 172).

Logicians say that the sum of what man wants and seeks to understand about things, is summarized in a few general parts. Actually, all scientific and philosophical discussions are around these few general parts:

- a. The question of "what" or the nature of the object; human beings stand in the position of defining things and try to mention the complete definition (comprehensive and preventative) for everything. The subject of "identifier" in logic is a guide to this.
- b. The question of "being" or the existence of an object; that is, the question of whether what I am thinking about really exists. Only philosophy can answer this question.
- c. The question of "how" – the conditions and characteristics of the object. That is, what are the conditions, features and characteristics of that object? "Science" is in charge of leading this direction. Each science answers questions related to the subject being searched for its states and modes.
- d. The question of "why" and the reason of its existence. These questions are sometimes answered by either philosophy or sciences. These questions are not for the human mind all at once, but in order (ibid., Pp. 95 and 96).

4-5. The Fifth Criterion of Rationality

The mind may act correctly and may err when it thinks and puts things first. The source of the error may have been:

1. The underlying and presupposed premises are wrong. That is, the premises forming our reasoning are corrupted.

2. The order and form given to the premises are incorrect. That is, although the material of our argument is correct, the form of our argument is incorrect.

So, an argument in the mind is like a building. A building is complete when both its materials are flawless and its shape is based on the correct building principles (Motahari, 2007: 25). As regards, logic is merely a "measuring instrument" not a "tool for acquiring science." It is a tool for measuring the form and shape of the thought, not its ingredients and materials. Therefore, it has been compared to the plumb line of a builder. The plumb line is not a means of acquiring bricks, cement, etc., nor a means of measuring the correctness and incorrectness of materials. The means of acquiring intellectual materials i.e., analogy, induction, and allegory do not belong to logic. The logic expresses their rules and confirms their value. At the same time, logic recognizes analogy as one of the means of acquiring science and does not deny the value of experience. Although experience like analogy is not a part of logic, it involves some kinds of analogy. All logicians have stated that experience is one of the principles of certainty and one of the six principles of argument (*ibid.*, Pp. 101, 102 and 103).

4-5. The Fifth Criterion of Rationality

Another issue is related to the analyses made by the intellect within the container of mind. For example, if you say that man is an eloquent animal, it does not mean that half of it is animalism and the other half is eloquence, but this is the analysis made by intellect (Motahari, 1987: 326). Another example is the well-known partial and general example. In logic, we are dealing with a partial and general concept, not with the concepts of man, horse, etc. This is where one of the masterpieces of Islamic philosophy, the discussion of intelligibility, occurs (*ibid.*, Pp. 345, 346 and 347).

So, there is only one thing outside, not two things. This multiplicity is created only by our minds. Hence, we cannot say that the criterion for the truth of all propositions is only conformity with the object (*ibid.*, Pp. 404 and 405).

Analysis and synthesis are of two types: practical and theoretical (mental). Practical analysis and synthesis is the act of disintegrating or combining foreign matters, such as

disassembling or rebuilding a natural or industrial compound (such as a machine) into its original components. This practical analysis and synthesis is the most important condition for obtaining the laws of nature. From the beginning, the natural sciences owed their progress to careful observations, experiments, and practical analysis and synthesis. Theoretical or mental analysis reveals that man compares and analyzes his mental evidence and information. "Thinking", the highest action of the mind, is nothing but mental analysis (Motahari, 1375: 99).

Also, mental analysis and synthesis could be sensory, imaginary, or rational. (1) Sensory analysis and synthesis is that the mind captures a perceptible form sensing in the presence. Such possessions in perceptible forms are made, firstly, freely and arbitrarily, secondly, they are done only with the intervention of mental factors, and there is no need for man to make changes in the way he looks. (2) Rational analysis and synthesis is that the mind discards the carnal desires and considers the conformity with the soul of the matter. To do so, it analyzes and combines rational forms of two types: imaginative and affirmative. The "imaginative" is that reason dissolves a general concept into its common and specific aspects. Usually, the definitions given to objects, expressing the common and specific aspects of the object, are a kind of rational imaginative analysis of the meaning and nature of the object. For example, in the definition of "line" we say "it is a connected quantity that has no more than one dimension". In this definition, we have understood that firstly, the line is of the quantity type, not of the quality type, and secondly, the quantity is connected – not of the discrete quantities (numbers). This analysis is not a practical analysis because the line, in its external existence, is not composed of quantity, connection, and a single dimension. Rather, these few concepts exist outside of a single existence. That's why, these kinds of components, which are the components of the concept and nature of the object and not the components of existence, are called "analytical components" in terms of logic and philosophy (*ibid.*, Pp. 99, 100, 101).

Affirmative analysis and synthesis is a special action of reasoning and inference with special arrangements that the "analogy" of logic is

responsible for expressing them. The special talent of the mind to analyze and synthesize is called "possessive power" by the sages. The possessive power operating freely among the partial senses or imaginary forms is called the "imaginative power". And when, for doing real research, it acts among the rational meanings, it is called "the power of thought" (Ibid., P. 101).

The "imaginative power" is free in its action. It connects and disconnects any form in any way as desires. But the "power of thought" does not have that freedom. It must follow a certain law, that is, it must possess reason in a way that corresponds to reality and the matter itself. That's why, sensory and imaginary analyses and combinations have no logical value, but rational analysis and combinations done with the power of thought have a logical value. This rational analysis and composition is called "analysis and composition" in logic. Therefore, "analysis and composition" means the analysis and composition of reason, done by the power of thought and has a logical value. What primarily important are the logical and philosophical issues and the expression of the logical value of analysis and composition of affirmations. The path of rational logic and empirical logic, and consequently, the path of rational philosophy and empirical philosophy, are completely separated here. Rational logic has a logical value for the analysis and synthesis of affirmations, interpreted by the method of "rational inference and reasoning", but empirical logic has no value except for induction, observation, experience, and practical analysis (ibid., P. 102).

Regarding the discussion of how the first imaginations formed, the difference between "sensory" and "intellectual" is related to "perceptions", not affirmations. This issue has a "psychological" aspect and led to the multiplicity of ideas causing separation of sages. But the issue of "affirmations" is related to the "judgments" in which the mind is merely "logical" established on the ideas found in one sense or another. The difference between empirical logic and rational logic is not in the necessity of experience or reason. Neither rational logic denies the effect of experience on scientific research, nor does the empirical logic deny the reason and thought, as two mental activities. Differences are in the basic rules and scales of thinking as well as the way the mind works in thoughts.

Basically, logic means the science of "measure" and "scale". Logic scholars want to attain the main measures of the correctness of ideas. Empiricists introduce the main scale as experience and do not believe in the existence of another scale. Rationalists, believe that experience is a reliable scale for measuring many problems, but as a second-grade scale not a first one. It means, we have a series of principles independent of experience which are the main "measure", "scale" and "measuring instrument" of thought. We reach many issue, including the scale of experience, by those main scales (ibid., Pp. 103 and 104).

5. The Dignity and Position of Reason

The truth is that just as the error of the senses does not cause man to turn a blind eye to sensations, and by repetition and experience the error of the senses can be avoided, the error of some arguments does not cause man to turn a blind eye to rational reasoning altogether and declare them invalid (Motahari, 1375: 47).

On the other hand, although mystics believe that the heart and the innate feelings of the heart should be nurtured and its obstacles should be removed in order to achieve intuitive knowledge, philosophers and theologians want to reach God through reason and reasoning. Of course, these two ways are not a barrier to aggregation. According to Sadra, rational behavior and heart behavior must necessarily be combined (Ibid., P. 91). Because the knowledge of the argument that the sage seeks does not exceed the limits of mental imaginations, mental concepts, and the persuasion of the intellect. But the ephemeral knowledge that the mystic is looking for is a kind of reaching and tasting. In reasoning knowledge (knowledge of the argument), the intellect is satisfied and persuaded inside. But in ephemeral knowledge, in addition to satisfying the conscience, the whole human being becomes excited and moves closer to him (Ibid., P. 13). Wisdom is a lamp whose oil is science. Whoever understands, the end of his work is decency (Motahari, 1361: 22).

Another property of reason is to consider the future. It is to consider the consequences and the final results of the work referred to as "the ultimate" (Motahari, 1395: 35). Another point is that sometimes reason has been called "internal science" and science has been called "external

reason". External intellect and acquired knowledge are useful when science and internal intellect along with that innate knowledge works. That is, humans who are just receivers are like a barn. These people have been severely abandoned (ibid., P. 191).

Revelation, meanwhile, to the extent that the intellect is imperfect, compensates and complements the intellect. It should be known that the Prophet did not come to suspend all the forces of human existence or to say that you should not think or reach the highest theological rank. This is against the order of the universe. Rather, man must do what is within the bounds of reason and argument. What abilities are beyond his power are provided by revelation. However, the things in which human beings need revelation have been limited from the beginning to the end of the universe. Therefore, the maximum amount that human beings need for revelation is induced to them when, firstly, they have the power and ability to receive it and, secondly, they can maintain it (Motahari, 2005: 219 and 220). Another important aspect of reason is that it is one of the most important sources of our jurisprudence. Finally, along with the Qur'an and the successive tradition, reason is one of the intellectual purification factors in the Islamic world.

Conclusion

According to Shahid Motahari's, none of the existing schools of thought can claim to discover all the facts concerning the concept of rationality. Rationality in the thoughts of Shahid Motahhari is based on purely argumentative principles, distinct from other rationalities. And by using it, the aspects of distinction and validity of other rationalities can be explained. The foundations of this rationality are based on Sadra's philosophy, which can provide the sound principles of other sciences and thus pave the way to attain certainty.

This rationality has all-round tools such as sense, experience, certainty, instinct, narration and revelation. Because different levels of knowledge and insights require different tools and attitudes. This argumentative rationality, which is both empirical and abstract, also values practical, theoretical and sacred reason.

Although some humanity issues are certainly empirical, some of them are abstract and related to the field of theoretical reason. Sensory and intellectual knowledge must be combined to achieve science; therefore, science is not necessarily only rational, but depending on the subject, sometimes experience, sometimes reason and, of course, sometimes religious narration is knowledgeable and plays a role in organizing science. Therefore, and on this basis, rationality, which is deductive-argumentative, is prescribed because it can be a comprehensive and useful certainty. The result is that rationality in Shahid Motahhari's thoughts is related to rationality in the intellectual and sensualist currents like a man in public and private statuses.

The truth is that this kind of rationality in methodology does not seek to reject all methods, just as it does not reject experimental methods or methods and tools such as questionnaires, sampling and statistics. But it does not accept their monopoly and put them under the rules and regulations such as non-community of contradictions.

The purpose of this article was to present the principles and frameworks of rationality and its characteristics, as well as the correct conditions for the movement of thought. Although "thought" is a kind of activity, but this activity is not arbitrary and free because the intellectual progress of the mind is based on the understanding of real and self-evident relationships. And, if the mind directly or indirectly decides to co-exist, oppose, equate, or induce, it is because this is the case in fact and in itself. Researchers believe that there must be a relationship between the subject and the predicate in order to lead the mind to discover a real and self-actual relationship, that is, to be able to really discover the "truth". It is a necessity and totality.

Logicians also say that the sum of questions is about the nature, existence, and properties of an object. The reasons beyond the existence of an object are the things that man wants to understand, and all scientific and philosophical arguments are the answers given to these few general parts – the so-called intellectual questions.

This kind of rationality believes in a series of principles and rational foundations independent

of experience, considered as the main "measurement", "scale" and "measuring instrument" of thoughts. Although experience is a scale and a tool for measuring many issues, it is not a first scale but a secondary scale, that is, we have a series of major scales through which we have obtained many achievements, including the scale of experience.

The importance of this article is in the fact that any rationality leads to a specific type of knowledge and not every knowledge is obtained from every rationality. Therefore, rationality is also one of the things that is involved in the determination of knowledge. It is clear from what has been said that just as science finds different definitions based on epistemological and metaphysical foundations, and these definitions affect the meaning and identity of political philosophy, synonymous with political science, rationalities do the same. That is why we can have a kind of rationality that plays a role in understanding religion.

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