Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy And Its Family Resemblance To Neo-Pyrrhonism

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Abstract

In this paper I wish to explore how Wittgenstein's pyrronism can be understood. I do not want to get into discussion with authors who supporting or rejecting this appellation for Wittgenstein. My intention is considering the conflict of opinions, the suspension of judgment, ataraxy and philosophy as ethic and then analyzing whether through these concepts some kind of similarity can be established between Wittgenstein and pyrronism. In the same way, I consider it useful if the text serves to show that all the similarities between the way Wittgenstein's philosophy is conceived and the pyrrhonics can serve to defend Wittgenstein's neopyrrhonism as something more than a simple family resemblance.

Key Words. Philosophy, ataraxia, conflict of opinions, suspension of judgment, pyrronism, family resemblance

Introduction

At present there is a discussion that wants to show Wittgenstein's philosophical reflections as a variant of Pyrrhonian skepticism, which is widely called neo-pyrrhonism[1]. According to this tendency, Wittgenstein's later philosophy, starting with The Philosophical Investigations 2009, would be close in many similarities to the style and method of Pyrrhonian skepticism. This means that there are some common features between the Pyrrhonists and Wittgenstein, but there are also marked differences, since there are features of Wittgenstein's philosophy that are far removed from Pyrrhonism and that make it difficult to characterize Wittgenstein as a total neo-Pyrrhonian[2]. In this exercise of reflection, I want to assume an affirmative approach in order to show that a thorough reading of some perspectives of Wittgenstein's later philosophy is perfectly defensible and remarkable with some Pyrrhonian features, especially the way of doing and understanding philosophy as a way of life, instead of philosophy as a theoretical discourse. The pedagogical and expository attempt will then be from texts of Wittgenstein and Sextus Empiricus, to show some features of Pyrrhonian skepticism in Sextus' version and to expose how those elements have their similarity, which constitutes more than a family resemblance with Wittgenstein.

The exercise to be carried out consists in gathering distinctive and characteristic features of Pyrrhonian skepticism in order to show how Wittgenstein's methodology and

way of conceiving philosophy is committed to, can be related to and come close to some of them; these elements are taken arbitrarily and are considered as an exercise of analysis. It is openly known that Wittgenstein does not engage directly or indirectly with postulates of Pyrrhonian skepticism, although in his methodological procedure it is possible to show a closeness of Wittgenstein with Pyrrhonian skepticism. The characteristic elements of Pyrrhonian skepticism that I am going to compare and point out that possess some kind of closeness to Wittgenstein are namely: The conflict of opinions, the suspension of judgment, the ataraxia and the philosophical as ethics. It should be made clear that, although a comparative reading of the work of Sextus Empiricus and Wittgenstein reveals a closeness and the interpreters of Wittgenstein's work are divided, since some reject and others emphasize this closeness, in no way will this debate be mediated here; What we intend to do is to highlight all the elements and points of encounter that allow us to show strong elements of kinship of Sextian Pyrrhonism in Wittgenstein's work, a kinship that allows us to call some aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy as neo-Pyrrhonian. The characteristic elements of Pyrrhonian skepticism that I am going to compare and point out that possess some kind of closeness to Wittgenstein are namely: The conflict of opinions, the suspension of judgment, the ataraxia and the philosophical as ethics. It should be made clear that, although a comparative reading of the work of Sextus Empiricus and Wittgenstein reveals a closeness and the interpreters of Wittgenstein's work are divided, since some reject and others emphasize this closeness, in no way will this debate be mediated here; What we intend to do is to highlight all the elements and points of encounter that allow us to show strong elements of resemblance of Sextian Pyrrhonism in Wittgenstein's work, a resemblance that allows us to call some aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy as neo-Pyrrhonian.

In order to approach the present elucidation, I will proceed as follows: first, I will characterize four of the characteristic elements of Sextian Pyrrhonism: the conflict of opinions, the suspension of judgment, the ataraxia, the conception of philosophy, as they appear in Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1996. Second, I will show some reflections on Wittgenstein's so-called neo-pyrrhonism by relying on known Investigations (Reinoso 2019, Smith 2019 y Pritchard 2011), and incidentally raise some questions to the conclusions of these interpretations. Third, I will try to present and follow up on the ethical character of Pyrrhonic ataraxia and philosophy as an activity in Wittgenstein. Fourth, I will present a concluding assessment of whether it is consistent to call Wittgenstein's philosophy a current version of neopyrrhonism.

1. Characterization of pyrrhonian skepticism.

A Pyrrhonian skeptic does not commit himself to something, such as whether a phenomenon or a fact is apprehensible or ungraspable, or whether knowledge is achievable or not; what he does is to maintain the inquiry as a dialectical exercise of opposing assertions. By means of this anti-dogmatic attitude, the Pyrrhonian skeptic does not allow himself to affirm that truth is attainable or not, or that something is bad or good, but, on the contrary, he conceives philosophy as an open and to some extent endless inquiry; this open inquiry sticks to what is manifest, evident and actual.

> "We say that they not hold beliefs in the sense in which some say that belief is assent to some unclear objet of investigation in the sciences; for Pyrrhonists do not assent anything unclear" (HP I, 13-14)

The Pyrrhonian skeptic accepts that something is given, that something is manifest in perception: faced with a circumstance of heat, the Pyrrhonian skeptic would concede that the expression "it seems to me that such an object

manifests itself as hot", that is, "it seems to me that coffee manifests itself as hot", but the principle of following the manifest is broken when I affirm that coffee is hot, or that coffee is not hot, or that drinking coffee is good or bad. The problem with epistemic judgments is that they go from the manifest to the unmanifest, they go from seeming to being, they prioritize essence over appearance, and that step is unacceptable to a Pyrrhonian skeptic. This tendency of not assenting to the non-manifest, turns the Pyrrhonist into a careful and serious investigator who, before assuming any certainty in a dogmatic way, prefers to maintain the investigation, because he finds it suspicious that a whole accumulation of perspectives and perceptions can be synthesized in a dogmatic judgment.

The problem raised by epistemic judgments, insofar as they attempt to go from the evident to the non-evident, is undecidable and irresolvable for a Pyrrhonian skeptic, since by its very nature, the transition from the evident to the non-evident allows multiple conflicts of opinions or antitheses to arise, which, once weighed, do not give any margin for a decision. If the criterion of action is the evident and actual, how to justify that the fact was the same in the past and will remain identical in the future: to consider that honey is sweet, implies that it was sweet in the past and will remain sweet in the future. The Pyrrhonian, in accounting for the present phenomenon, does not accept a causalist position to explain its origin in the past, nor an inductivist one to express its consequences in the future. Epistemic judgments as theoretical statements present phenomena as something unmanifested, they move from considering "such an object seems hot to me", to saying "such an object is hot"; what the object was, is, and will be is subsumed in a lapidary dogmatic sentence. This movement shows a step that is not justified and breaks the manifest of the phenomenon and this break gives rise to multiple assumptions that leave the Pyrrhonian skeptic inhibited to make any decision, since he requires a new criterion,

since the criterion he has is no longer sufficient.

It is coherent to say that a new criterion is required, the criterion of following the appearance of Pyrrhonism is not sufficient, and the criterion of the certainty or truth of the dogmatist is unacceptable, since it is not evident. This makes the conflict of opinions inescapable.

> "The chief constitutive principles of scepticism is the claim that to every account and equal account is opposed; for it is from this, we think, that we come to hold no beliefs" HP I, 12-13

Now, this contraposition of propositions manifests an equivalence and upon analyzing them shows an equality of weight in their credibility or non-credibility. This equivalence and the lack of a criterion make the propositions undecidable and therefore the Pyrrhonian skeptic suspends judgment, that is, he does not pronounce on any part of the antithesis and the investigation continues. Consequently, to make a decision for any of the conflicting propositions would be tantamount to dogmatizing and leaving aside his basic scheme of life, which gives him peace and tranquility.

The suspension of judgment becomes manifest because there is no criterion to break the equivalence of opinions and in the face of the abandonment of the evident, the skeptic would no longer have a principle that would allow him to elucidate how that phenomenon manifests itself in the face of non-evidence; it would seem then that epistemic judgments annul the actual presence of the phenomenon by proposing a non-evident principle or cause. I can decide whether a present object manifests itself as hot or not, but I could not decide whether it is indeed hot, or whether I will be able to perceive it in the same way in a future event. The suspension of judgment highlights an ethical perspective of Pyrrhonian skepticism, since it does not rush to assent and

gives priority to acting, to being calm over theorizing. This trait is ataraxia or tranquility of mind, which is expressed as follows:

> "Up to we say the aim of scepticism is tranquility in matters opinions and moderation of feeling forced upon us. For sceptics began to do philosophy in order to decide among appearances and to apprehend which are true which false so as to become tranquil; but they came upon equipollent dispute, and being unable to decide this they judgement". HP I, 25-26

Tranquility of mind emphasizes an ethical feature of Pyrrhonian skepticism: it is the result of the suspension of judgment, since there is no criterion to dissolve the conflict of opinions. The Pyrrhonian skeptic plays along with the dogmatist and does not assume a refutational posture, but rather, with great skill, contrasts all the alternatives and opinions that the dogmatist presents in order to force a decision on any phenomenon; Once all the possibilities that the dogmatist has presented have been exhausted, the pyrrhonist would show how opposed are the different alternatives and when he points out that there is no criterion to decide for any of them, he suspends the judgment and that period of silence, of aphasia, the tranquility of spirit comes to him, which comes by chance, because it is not something he is looking for.

Tranquility is the result of not voluntary assenting, of not going beyond appearance, and of following communitarian criteria. Here it is worth noting that the Pyrrhonian skeptic neither denies nor annuls phenomena, in fact, he accepts that phenomena occur; what the skeptic does not decide upon and suspends judgment, is what is said beyond phenomena at the causalist or inductivist level

> "When we investigated weather existing thing such as they appear, we grand they appear, and what we

investigate is not what is apparent but what is said about what is apparent, and this is different from investigating what is apparent itself." HP I, 19-20

The ethical sense of Pyrrhonian skepticism manifests itself in the tendency to live without dogmatizing, to follow the demands of life and, consequently, to maintain a peace of mind. Dogmatizing implies assenting in order to make discourse and propose theory. What is the point of trying to show that honey is sweet, instead of accepting that it seems sweet to me? How to turn a seeming sweet into a being sweet? The criterion of "it seems to me" is epistemically neutral, and it implies and prevents us from accepting that behind a phenomenon there is something hidden that causes it. Assuming a dogmatic position implies commitment and concern. Being in search of something, for example: what is good, there is excitement when one has what is good or concern for preserving what is good. By not following dogmatic positions we will not be affirming or denying the non-evident about any phenomenon and this would not generate any disturbance of mood.

> "But that who make no determination about what is good and bad by nature neither avoid nor pursue anything with intensity; and hence they are tranquil" HP I, 27-29

The ethical sense of skeptical philosophy is based on maintaining coherence with the basic principles of life, which entails a prudence that avoids assent beyond appearance, which translates into a calm and happy life. The skeptic does not affirm that something is good, since he would be worried about looking for it, nor that it is bad, since he would be uneasy about avoiding it. Philosophy as a way of life should lead to living, keeping away worries and sufferings.

2. family resemblance between neo-pyrrhonism and Wittgenstein

Considerations on Wittgenstein's neo-pyrrhonism can be followed in several authors (Reinoso (2018), (2019)), Smith (2019), Pritchard (2011). who, although they are authorities in studies of Wittgenstein's work, fall a bit short in their conclusions on the similarities between Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonists; the similarity between Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonists is oriented to the urban interpretation that delimits the suspension of judgments to philosophical dogmas. This implies looking askance at the conception of philosophy as a theoretical discourse. This appreciation of the urban interpretation of Pyrrhonism coincides with the reflection that Wittgenstein makes on philosophy, and the meeting point is in the defense that both Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonists make of the beliefs of common sense and in both cases, philosophy is assumed as a practical activity that must be connected with the common life of the human being. Here it is worth noting that the Pyrrhonian suspends judgment, because an attempt is made to make a dogmatic epistemic evaluation of the beliefs and opinions of common sense and the criteria presented to dissolve the equipollence that generates that evaluation are questionable. In Wittgenstein's case, nonsense and puzzles arise because words and beliefs are extracted from the contexts where they are meaningful and subjected to an external and general epistemic evaluation. What is questioned in philosophical discourse in both cases is that, instead of being at the service of ways of living, what it does is to create a permanent tension and questioning that generates anguish and anxiety by questioning a basic system of beliefs that constitute the worldview.

Disagreements are present in human life, and under normal conditions should not cause concern, since they constitute a human condition that manifests itself in multiple ways and in different forms, these disagreements are resolved. The human being, according to his culture and way of life, has efficient mechanisms to settle and solve disagreements;

a situation is anomalous and incomprehensible, if he wants to maintain a continuous and perpetual disagreement. To get out of this mess, Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonists have a practical philosophical exercise that shows a way out. There is, so to speak, a disagreement about which it is not possible to reach a consensus for a decision in both philosophers and ordinary people; this kind of disagreement is about beliefs related to common sense.

> "The one base on disagreement is that according to which find that, both in the ordinary life and among to philosophers whir regard to a given topic there has reached and resolvable impasse on account of the which we are unable to reach a verdict one way or the other, and we end up with suspension judgment" HP I, 65-66

A pyrrhonist would have the criterion of evidence and the guidelines of action to settle it and in disagreements in relation to philosophical disputes, he would weigh and confront the dogmatic affirmations or negations and suspend the judgment; in Wittgenstein the conditions to settle the agreements are the criteria given in the language games and shared in the forms of life and the disagreements that occur in that same context must be resolved. The same dynamics of the language games have the normativity and the criteria to solve the disagreements that arise, there would not be in principle a problem in this as long as they are related to common sense beliefs. However, and as long as disagreements arise in relation to metaphysical questions, I would say that there would not be a mess either, since there must be an exercise of clarification and dissolution. The supposed philosophical problems manifest a difficulty that is not dissolved with explanations and justifications, because they reach a point where they are inoffensive and unnecessary. It is when a dispute arises and the possibility of giving reasons is exhausted that the therapeutic approach of the Wittgensteinian

philosopher acquires its full meaning. As philosophical disagreement is nonsense and what must be done is to dissolve and clarify the difficulty, since the root of the misunderstanding is the wrong use of some expression

> "For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. And then we may indeed imagine naming to be some remarkable mental act, as it were the baptism of an object. And we can also say the word "this" to the object, as it were address the object as "this" – a strange use of this word, which perhaps occurs only when philosophizing". IF 38

> "Our inquiry is therefore a grammatical one. And this inquiry sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, brought about, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of our language. - Some of them can be removed by substituting one form of expression for another; this may be called 'analysing' our forms of expression, for sometimes this procedure resembles taking a thing apart". IF 90

By considering how the Pyrrhonian and Wittgenstein deal with philosophical disagreements, a characterization can be made of how each of them proceeded. In the face of the difficulty Wittgenstein enunciates a process of clarification and the Pyrrhonian counterclaims to reach equipollence and suspend judgment.

> "The skeptical way is a disposition to oppose phenomena and noumena one to anther in anyway whatever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence among things and statements thus opposed, we are brought first to

epoché and then to ataraxia" (HP 1, 8-9)

As is evident in the previous quotation, the Pyrrhonist does not take sides with any of the arguments presented to him but, on the contrary, he contrasts them, once the equipollence is generated, he suspends the judgment, which means that the work of contrasting has come to an end. It should be noted that the Pyrrhonian is only using the argumentation of the dogmatist against himself, so that everything he says is returned against him, once again, the fish dies by his mouth. Wittgenstein's procedure at this point is radically different, and when some philosophical difficulty or puzzle arises, an exercise of investigation and grammatical clarification will be initiated in order to disarticulate the problematic. One could think that in every context, language users have the criteria to make this therapeutic exercise of disarming misunderstandings, and this work is endless as long as there are grammatical confusions and philosophical disagreements. Sextian Pyrrhonism and Wittgenstein constitute philosophical therapeutics with a differentiated treatment of disagreement and the way they conceive the suspension of judgment and persuasion. The ethical sense that underlies these two therapeutics shows a closeness that is maintained even in the midst of difference.

> "Finally, if we understand skepticism in a general way not as a denial of knowledge in its modern variant but as a philosophical orientation that combats dogmatism, Wittgenstein and Sexto can be approximated." Translation mine

The references and considerations that bring Wittgenstein closer to Pyrrhonism are highlighted by several authors, although they are very careful in categorizing Wittgenstein as a neo-Pyrrhonist. It is worth noting a few examples: "that the philosophy of the second

Wittgenstein can be read as close to Pyrrhonism". for both Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonists share and accept that there are certain basic agreements for which reasons and justifications cannot be required, they are also beyond doubt (cf. Reinoso 2018, p. 99).

These basic agreements are related to the self-evident and the criteria of action that the Pyrrhonists accept, in the case of Wittgenstein they would be the grammatical propositions and the commitments to the hinges on which language games rest and sustain the forms of life. There are marked similarities between Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonists that are evident in the therapeutic approach to dogmatic disease, both in Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonists, although they differ in the way they diagnose the disease and in the drugs they recommend to be used as a cure. For the Pyrrhonist the disease is the dogmatic attitude of assenting beyond the appearance of phenomena, assuming causalist and inductivist positions, and the Pyrrhonist remedy is equipollence and suspension of judgment. In Wittgenstein, on the other hand, it is the philosophical tendency to make more use of certain expressions of language, taking them out of their meaningful context, and therapy is a profound exercise of grammatical clarification that should dissolve the difficulty. Here a number of differences are highlighted and a greater emphasis on similarities is neglected, especially the ethical connotations that the therapeutic procedure has for Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonists. This therapy protects the Pyrrhonist from falling into the disease of dogmatism by using some of the tropes and Wittgenstein from the spell of the theoretical activity of philosophy by proposing grammatical analysis.

> "For the Pyrrhonists the medical metaphor serves to point out, among other things, that the main disease of dogmatism is arrogance and precipitation in the affirmation of that

which is beyond the phenomenal; a disease that can be treated through argumentative equipollence and subsequent suspension of judgment. In the case of Wittgenstein, the philosophical disease that he proposes to combat is that which derives from the seduction or fascination that certain images influence us, which is manifested in certain "deviant" uses of language and which can be treated through the grammatical analysis that allows us to dissolve metaphysical questions".[3] Translation mine

It is to emphasize the importance in Pyrrhonism between equipollence and suspension of judgment. Equipollence is presented to weigh and balance all the arguments that a dogmatist could adduce in favor of a thesis, which then remains as undecided and indeterminate. Once the equipollence is ratified, the Pyrrhonist would accept all the mechanisms to dissolve it, for we must remember that the Pyrrhonist still investigates before suspending the judgment. But how to end an investigation with the Pyrrhonian? One possibility would be to present a criterion of truth to make a decision and break the equipollence. The question that arises is how to present such a criterion, if the Pyrrhonian only accepts the self-evident of the phenomenon, and the criterion of truth implies going beyond appearance and moving from the self-evident to the non-evident? Of course it follows that appearance and the evident would not conform to criteria of truth, hence a Pyrrhonist will not require criteria of truth in order to live and act. Note that this criterion of truth puts Wittgenstein in relation to the Pyrrhonian skeptic. It is to emphasize the importance in Pyrrhonism between equipollence and suspension of judgment. Equipollence is presented to weigh and balance all the arguments that a dogmatist

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> "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?" - What is true or false is what human beings say; and - it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life". IF 241

> "But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false". OC 94

> "In certain circumstances a man cannot make a mistake. ("Can" is here used logically, and the proposition does not mean that a man cannot say anything false in those circumstances.) If Moore were to pronounce the opposite of those propositions which he declares certain, we should not just not share

his opinion: we should regard him as demented". OC 155

> "If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false" OC 205

It is to be noted that the criteria of truth, what is false and true underlie language games, are basic constitutive agreements of language games and the way of life. Should any metaphysical dispute arise, it would be of no use to try to adduce a criterion of truth, first, because those criteria are prior and second, because if the dispute arose it is possible that there is an inappropriate use of linguistic expressions in that language game; what should be done is not to add more theory and propose more dogmatic arguments, but rather to initiate a therapeutic process of clarification which is what happens in common life. In the language games of everyday life, people resolve their disagreements and questions, either through access or through the authoritative judgment of an expert such as a teacher, judge or other person.

Wittgenstein's philosophical exercise is an open dialogue with traditional philosophy, which has based its development on a dogmatic methodology with a strong tendency to theorize. This discussion mania seeks to generate a theory that puts an end to disagreements and lays the foundations of a conclusive and sufficient explanation of phenomena; Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is a practical activity and is based on the clarification of disagreements. In Wittgenstein's works, after the Philosophical Investigations 2009, there is an abundance of examples, clarifications, description with the uses of expressions and concepts in multiple language games. This kind of exercise brings to light the disagreements, or rather the conflicting philosophical theses; the next step is not to suspend judgment, but to show that the conflict is diluted if one returns to the different contexts in which these expressions are used by the speakers. Wittgenstein's

mediation in the conflict over private language is to show a number of situations where it is not possible to conceive of the use of linguistic expressions as private, due to the difficulties and nonsense they produce. For example, when conceiving language as private, how do we describe human communication without falling into nonsense? how do we describe the learning of a private language? When Wittgenstein reflects on private language, he neither defends nor rejects it, but rather exposes all the arbitrariness of those who support his theories of private language. Linguistic expressions may have a private use, but it is not consistent to call signs understood by only one language user a language. The private language argument is a good example to show how a clarification process is carried out to resolve misunderstandings.

> "For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. And then we may indeed imagine naming to be some remarkable mental act, as it were the baptism of an object. And we can also say the word "this" to the object, as it were address the object as "this" - a strange use of this word, which perhaps occurs only when philosophizing". FI 38

> "All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light - that is to say, its purpose - from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; but they are solved through an insight into the workings of our language, and that in such a way that these workings are recognized - despite an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long been familiar with. Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language". FI 38

In much the same way as the idealist and the solipsist, the same thing happens with the foundationalist and the skeptic. Where Wittgenstein might say, gentlemen the use of the expressions you propose is not consistent with any language game, it is time to be silent because you are babbling and talking nonsense.

In the suspension of judgment, in one sense a difference is marked between Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonists: Wittgesntein dissolves and clarifies and attains tranquility after dissolving the misunderstanding, while the Pyrrhonist elaborates equipollence, keeps silent, and then rests and enjoys. But I would like to refer to the Tractarian statement that can be considered to have Pyrrhonian implications. (Meade, 2010), who accepts that there is a pyrrhonic tone in le Tractatus 2001. At the beginning and end of the Tractatus there is an invitation by Wittgenstein to keep silent when one cannot speak clearly.

The foreword to the Tractatus 2001 indicates the silence

> "The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence". (Wittgesntein, 2001, 3)

Then in the last paragraph the book is presented with a very clear sentence inviting to be silent when it is not possible to speak clearly.

> "Tractatus 7 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence".

Now, what is Wittgenstein inviting us to be silent about? Does this silence have a similarity with the Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment? The set of Tractarian propositions constitute a nonsense, they themselves say nothing about the world, they constitute a showing by presenting the conditions for

saying something meaningful, i.e., the propositions fulfilled their purpose and must be discarded. The game fulfilled the purpose of consuming the material and is consumed with the material, the purgative fulfilled the purpose of eliminating evil and is thrown away at the end with it. The suppression, the abandonment of discourse is categorical and definitive as long as one does not speak clearly, one must be silent. Now, if one succeeds in saying all that can be said clearly, if all philosophical problems are solved, if the cause of fatigue and anguish is eliminated, it is defensible that calm survives. The aphasia demanded by the final proposition of the Tractatus is accompanied by a suggestion of repose, of stillness, of pause, of discretion and caution. Is this not what comes to the Pyrrhonian after suspending judgment? The Pyrrhonian does not seek to suspend judgment or ataraxia in order not to be accused of incoherence, it is something he arrives at after being shown the impossibility of a choice. Wittgenstein shows an intentionality that is accepted as affirmative and positive, it is an activity of clarification that must be complete. The Pyrrhonian suspends judgment and arrives at stillness leaving behind a multiplicity of irresolute dogmatic theses and Wittgenstein arrives at stillness and calm, showing a multiplicity of dissolved and clarified "philosophical problems", which implies a partial silence and when he refers to all the problems, a total silence. In my opinion, this is what is suggested by the invitation to silence and mutism presented by the Tractatus 2001 in its final proposition.

The strong view is that Wittgenstein and Sextian Pyrrhonism share a family resemblance. There is a family resemblance, which is highlighted in the way Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonists understand philosophy, and it would not be consistent to subsume Wittgenstein in a philosophical system, since

it seems to be what he rejects. this is also emphasized by (Reinoso, 2018, 114)

> "From my reading, while I find an air of family between the ways in which Wittgenstein and Sextus Empiricus critique the more traditional way of practicing philosophy and share an exploration of methods to prevent or dissolve the emergence of dogmatic disease, I find their therapeutics to have significant differences"[4] Translation mine

One might ask in what does this air of family consist, it seems to show a distant relationship and there are elements to sustain a closer kinship. On the one hand, the expression, when taken in a Wittgensteinian sense, would serve to make a critique of the essentialist perspective, which pretends to look for something common to all language games, a question that Wittgenstein would reject with his metaphor of air and family resemblance. On the other hand, if one takes the expression family resemblance to analyze the relationship between Wittgenstein and Sextian pyrrhonism, one could consider all the common elements to draw conclusions in a more express and categorical way, and thus pronounce more clearly on the absence or presence of pyrrhonism in Wittgenstein.

In the reflections on neo-pyrrhonism (Smith (2019), he shows on a more interesting level the parallel between Wittgenstein and Pyrrhonism, and gives elements of judgments to show a greater closeness between Wittgenstein and the old Pyrrhonian skeptics. The paradigmatic example used is perceptual knowledge and shows that while the dogmatist insists on two kinds of verdict, the affirmative (there is perceptual knowledge), and the negative (there is no perceptual knowledge), the Wittgensteinian and Pyrrhonist refrains from assenting to either verdict, and shows the

inappropriateness of assuming either of the dogmatist's positions.

> "A Wittgensteinian feature of neo-Pyrrhonism is the insistence on the inquisitive character of philosophy, especially when it comes to clarifying the very meaning of philosophical questions, rather than on the search for an affirmative or negative answer to those questions")[5]

This perspective shows an important feature before the possibilities of the dogmatic verdict, the Wittgensteinian does not agree, he only agrees before the possibility of agreement and consensus, agreements are agreements in the form of life. In the forms of life related to common sense there are no disagreements that are irresolute, on the part of the Pyrrhonists in what is related to how phenomena appear there is no disagreement either; the Pyrrhonist can commit himself to descriptive empirical arguments, which would serve to live without dogmatizing. "It seems to me that the sun is hot", "it seems to me that the lemon is sour", "it seems to me that honey is sweet". There are a number of descriptions that are used in everyday life in a functional and consensual way, what is the point of forcing a verdict on each of them? At first glance it seems impossible and unnecessary.

In a theory of truth with respect to perceptual knowledge, the different dogmatic positions prescribe a concept of truth that is far removed from the concepts of truth of everyday life. A legitimate philosophical activity should be in consonance with everyday life, i.e. philosophy should not split off from everyday life with its reflections and theoretical demands, but be a continuity of it. For example, a reflection on the criteria of truth about the senses as proposed by Descartes or another dogmatist, ends up modifying the criteria of truth offered by the senses. In this respect, Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonists are in agreement.

> "In the first place because the ordinary criteria of truth are restricted to the manifest world that we perceive by means of the senses, and he proposes another criterion of truth that allows us to apprehend a hidden reality. And secondly because the ordinary criteria would not be universally valid, and what philosophers expect from a criterion of truth is that it be infallible, for a fallible criterion would not be a good criterion"[6] Translation mine

We see here two illustrative conceptions: the disagreement that the pyrrhonist claims to the dogmatist, that the limit of the evident is transgressed, and the metaphysical dispute that Wittgenstein claims to the theoretical philosopher, is a sign that the significant limits of language are being transgressed. A panoramic view of the different theories of knowledge as true and justified belief has unleashed great epistemic disputes, which are nothing more than the historical opposition of dogmatic positions, with the aggravating factor that, in most cases, the uses that speakers make of epistemic categories in the different language games are not considered. For the Wittgensteinian and the Pyrrhonist, the attempt to formulate in an a priori way a theory of knowledge that accounts for the multiplicity of perspectives and nuances that constitute reality is unacceptable. Wittgenstein rejects it because of the reductionism to which it leads the games of language and all the misunderstandings it would generate, and the Pyrrhonist would suspend judgment because of the conflicts of opinion that such a notion of knowledge entails.

Traditional philosophical research and its exacerbated dogmatism have subjected the ordinary criteria of truth, knowledge and certainty to a systematic attack and, therefore, set aside their everyday use. It is here that

Wittgenstein's proposed exercise of clarification begins.

> "When philosophers use a word - "knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition/sentence", "name" - and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home? - What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use". FI 116

This means that the philosopher creates a theory about the world, looks for independent and unconditioned objects, principles, essence and natures and forgets how objects appear and how we use different expressions to account for knowledge, truth and certainty in ordinary life. The history of philosophy seems to show that in philosophical inquiry every philosopher has striven to create a theory that gives a verdict on how reality is or ought to be, or on what perceptual knowledge is based. This verdict, depending on the type of dogmatist, can be affirmative or negative, for example, with respect to knowledge. A positive dogmatist would give reasons to support that knowledge is possible, and a negative dogmatist would give a series of arguments to support that it is not possible. Skepticism would be a variant of the negative dogmatist, and would assert that we cannot attain knowledge, that there is no truth, that there are no certainties. There is a type of skeptic who is not a negative dogmatist because he has not issued any verdict.

> "Neopyrrhonists are philosophers who have not, at least so far, reached any verdict on any philosophical question regarding "reality beyond appearances" or "reality absolutely independent of us." For them, the philosophical question remains open, for they have not been able to decide

where truth resides."[7] Translation mine

Neopyronism keeps the investigation open, it still investigates. As Smith,2019 proposes, Pyrrhonism once updated and adapted to our present time, in order to avoid anachronism, would be neo-pyrrhonism. This way of conceiving Pyrrhonism makes it clear that the parallel between Wittgenstein and the Sextian Pyrrhonists is much more than an "air of family". Indeed, the dogmatist claims to have found the truth, but this does not imply that he has actually found it; seriously, the only thing he has achieved is to open up more possibilities for generating conflicts.

The similarity or family resemblance between Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonists shows that, once the two philosophical positions are taken in context, the closeness becomes more noticeable. The dogmatist's strategy for sustaining perceptual knowledge, and the whole conflict of competing perspectives, shows that they themselves do not have a final verdict on this kind of knowledge. The assent to a verdict on knowledge again puts Wittgenstein on the side of the Pyrrhonian. A definition of knowledge without consideration of the uses of the expression "I know" in language games is clearly unacceptable to Wittgenstein.

> "The positive dogmatist would say that we start from an evident truth, this would be a partial verdict. This would be a partial verdict. Wittgenstein would assert that we start from a basic certainty that is neither true nor false, the neopyrrhonist proposes that we must begin with everyday life."[8] Translation mine

Note that the basic beliefs of which Wittgenstein speaks, and which resist a dogmatic epistemic analysis, are beliefs of everyday life that underlie language games and make forms of life possible. Wittgenstein

as a neopyrrhonist would accept that philosophy, as an activity, must start from everyday life and, what is more, must remain in it. What is outside it, is the non-obvious and the theoretical deputations and both, as we have seen, are not interested in that. In everyday life our beliefs about knowledge, perception and truth are useful and functional and do not require philosophical theories to support them. To go a little further, philosophy as a way of life, as an ethical activity is close to everyday life, in the basic way of acting and believing, as shown by Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonists. In these two ways of understanding philosophy, there is a background that does not obey epistemic valuations and would state, so to speak, that a showing, a seeming to me, is more in accordance with our basic ways of life than a theoretical reflection that seeks general and unquestionable truths.

One could see that Wittgenstein takes the side of life forms and shows that there is a basic certainty that does not follow criteria of justification. In the same way the Pyrrhonists take the side of everyday life and show the problems of justifying basic beliefs about the way in which phenomena appear.

> "In that sense, what Wittgenstein says is fully compatible with neopyronism. It is quite another thing to assume a hypothesis as a reason to justify a verdict about a philosophical question. Wittgenstein never intended to suggest that, by accepting basic certainties, we would be committing ourselves to a reason that serves to justify a verdict. If anything, Wittgenstein did not think that the relation of some certainties to empirical propositions about the world was a relation of justification. To think so is to misunderstand Wittgenstein. In my opinion, the following comparison could be made:

just as the neopyrrhonists stand alongside everyday life and its practices, so Wittgenstein draws attention to the fundamental role of our forms of life".[9] Translation mine

According to the Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy, philosophy leaves everything as it is, it is a hallucinatory and clarifying activity.

> "Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. - Since everything lies open to view, there is nothing to explain. For whatever may be hidden is of no interest to us. The name "philosophy" might also be given to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions". IF 126

This would imply that after conducting a philosophical investigation no reason has been found to change our beliefs, nor criteria to abandon the beliefs from which we start. Beliefs are changed according to the flow of life and the dynamics of life forms. The journey that leads the Pyrrhonist from disagreement to equipollence and in turn, to the suspension of judgment generates a subjective change in the life of the Pyrrhonist, perhaps he becomes more skillful, perhaps he learns more dogmatic perspectives. This transformative experience affects the Wittgensteinian in a similar way, although at the epistemic level they seem to be at the starting point. But of course, after an exercise of grammatical clarification to dissolve metaphysical disputes and difficulties, the life of the Wittgensteinian and Pyrrhonian philosopher changes and is not the same, both have acquired peace and tranquility. At the epistemic level philosophy leaves everything as it is, but at the level of subjective experience there are some changes. Just for a moment consider the way in which we resignify, people, places, objects, experiences, although

they are the same, as life goes by we are no longer the same.

> "There is a sense in which philosophy does not leave everything as it is. I think that sense is compatible with the position of Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinians, even if they do not develop it. Like anyone else, neopyrrhonists can improve, change, or abandon their initial beliefs, especially those beliefs that depend basically on dogmatic assumptions. Everyday life includes many such beliefs, and neopyrrhonism helps us to expunge those dogmatisms. Neopyrrhonic activity can lead us, by suspending judgment on all theories that defend theses, to abandon beliefs that depend on these.")[10] Translation mine

Philosophy essentially seems to alternate the life of human beings and their relationship with the various forms of life. The life and beliefs of human beings go, on the one hand, and philosophical reflection on the other. Human beings do not live according to the theoretical explanations of the philosophical, everyday explanations are more basic and practical. Philosophy, like our life, must be subjected to a permanent self-examination, either to dissolve difficulties and generate clarity, or to avoid that the hidden and non-manifest is the exception and the rule.

3. ataraxia and etic sense in Wittgenstein and the pyrrhonists

By taking Wittgenstein's philosophical reflection and drawing a parallel with the Sextian Pyrrhonists, a tendency is marked, a common thread that has to do with the ethical sense of understanding and doing philosophy. In Wittgenstein, this ethical sense is enunciated in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 2001. There he presents the conditions that a representation must fulfill in order to represent something, and in passing, he delimits what can be said with meaning, although the propositions he uses to say it do not have meaning. To achieve this task, Wittgenstein enunciates from the first propositions of the Tractatus 2001 the criteria and basic conditions of a representation and restricts everything that does not fulfill these conditions. Philosophy, for example, is repositioned in a new function, it is no longer a systematic search for truth but an intensive exercise of clarification. Philosophy, thus understood, takes a small turn, it is no longer a theoretical activity, but a practical activity dedicated to dissolve the irresolvable disagreements produced by a dogmatic and theoretical exercise. The ethical sense is enunciated from the Tractarian epoch and continues throughout later philosophy, or what specialists call the first and second Wittgenstein.

The ataraxia also reveals the ethical sense of the Pyrrhonian skeptic, to which he arrives as if by chance after suspending judgment due to the lack of a criterion to dissolve the conflict of opinions. It is, moreover, the point of an ethical stance that allows one to have a tranquil life, without being whipped by the worries involved in assuming a negative or positive dogmatic stance. In Wittgenstein's works I have not found a direct mention of ataraxia, but when Wittgenstein speaks of having a control over the activity of philosophy and bringing philosophy to rest by dissolving difficulties, this shares a resemblance with the Pyrrhonian ataraxia.

> "We don't want to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways. For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear. The real discovery is the one that enables me to break off philosophizing when I want

to. - The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question. - Instead, a method is now demonstrated by examples, and the series of examples can be broken off. - Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem". IF 133

This shows that there is a sense of tranquility that can be defended without much difficulty and that is comparable to the ataraxia of the Pyrrhonian. To the Pyrrhonian, peace and tranquility ensue once he has suspended judgment; it is perfectly conceivable and possible that this peace and tranquility presents itself to a Wittgensteinian when doing a grammatical clarification exercise to dissolve a philosophical riddle. In both the Pyrrhonian skeptic and Wittgenstein, there is a sense of philosophical activity as tranquility; the Pyrrhonian skeptic achieves tranquility after avoiding dogmatization, not taking sides with any of the conflicting opinions and following basic criteria of action such as the natural guidance of feeling and thinking, following his passions to eat and drink, respecting laws and customs to assume what is good, and learning arts to be useful. (Cfr, HP 1, 23-24)

In Wittgenstein's case, the tranquility in philosophy or the peace to which it should aspire is achieved and has a different meaning; although Wittgenstein insisted on philosophy as an activity of ethical character, this can be defended if the very activity and function of philosophy is elucidated. Since the Tractatus, philosophy falls from the pedestal of science, which implies that it cannot pronounce on truth, reality, facts, explanations, justifications, in short, nothing that implies theory. In a rigorous sense of the term, in philosophy there should be no theories because there is no way that those theories refer to any fact, and are meaningful. At most it would be an accumulation of nonsense, knots, grammatical entanglements due to the misuse of language. If the traditional conception of philosophy, as a science that makes theories, is the cause of the illusory philosophical problems, it is acceptable that this bad way of doing philosophy must change and do it in a radical way, this implies, from the base, to rethink what philosophy should do and the new approach is none other than to constitute methods and therapies to solve problems and remove difficulties.

Philosophy, Wittgenstein proposes, is not a science, it is a practical activity. A practical activity that must imply clarity and refinement in the effective use of language. Philosophy as a source of clarification has a sense that is based on showing, on describing, on seeking ways out of difficulties. The result of this new conception of philosophy is the dissolution of the puzzles that have philosophy questioned and in a quagmire. The change of approach that Wittgenstein proposes for philosophy allows it to recover it as a practical activity, and that it itself develops a procedure to dissolve philosophical problems and that it itself achieves tranquility by solving philosophical problems or linguistic entanglements. Now, the root of the crux and confusion is in the misuse of language and to dissolve a philosophical problem it is necessary to take it, to divide it into its fundamental parts until finding the root of the confusion, of the misunderstanding that must be in a badly posed question, in a badly focused doubt, in a badly used expression, in confusing the use of psychological verbs, in transgressing the criteria of meaning of a language game, in confusing philosophy with a science, in trying to make theories, in asking for justifications of fundamental propositions. The exercise of clarification must lead to the basis of confusion, that basis of confusion must be clarified and dissolved and we will have a tranquility, at least in Wittgenstein not precisely by chance. The new philosophy is a unity of life, it grounds and elucidates human actions.

It is to be noted that in considering ordinary life or, failing that, common sense, there is a set of beliefs that are the basis of a way of living and seeing the world. One might think that that basic worldview in both Wittgenstein and the skeptic is dynamic and changing, and in it a Wittgensteinian and a Pyrrhonian are comfortable. What generates disagreement for the Pyrrhonist is the dogmatist's attempt to try to question that basic worldview and subject it to epistemic analysis, which ends up rejecting the basic truths and certainties that constitute the ordinary and common way of seeing the world. In Wittgenstein something similar happens, the vision of the world constituted by the language games and the forms of life with which the world, culture, customs are represented, do not lose their meaning because a dogmatic philosopher, by means of a theoretical exercise, tries to change the way in which epistemic expressions are used and understood in the language games. So, what should one do, play along with the theorist? If we are before a dogmatist, he will inevitably play along with the theorist, proposing an alternative theory, so that if one dogmatist says P is the case, the other dogmatist replies, P is not the case. Wittgenstein's proposal is to stop and change the way of looking at the theoretical disagreement and begin, as already stated, an exercise of clarification and dissolution. The other possibility is to take all the dogmatist's disquisitions and show that they collide and cancel each other out and get nowhere.

4-Conclusions

Throughout the text several aspects became clear. In Wittgenstein, philosophy cannot be defended as a theoretical and explanatory activity since, ultimately, there is nothing to explain, since there are no facts or state of affairs in philosophy, the basic beliefs and truths of language games and forms of life do not require any philosophical explanation, they are fine, just as they are and function. In the Pyrrhonists philosophy would not be possible as a science either, for it would

involve an attempt to go from the apparent to the non-apparent by assuming a causalist or inductivist stance, and this would imply that, faced with the two situations as the source of irresolvable disagreements, the Pyrrhonist would suspend judgment. Where the strong connection between Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonists must be shown to eliminate anachronism is in the understanding of philosophy as a practical activity engaged in as a therapeutic exercise that cures the illness produced by theorization and dogmatization. It is possible to appreciate that neither Wittgenstein nor the Pyrrhonists renounce the basic way of seeing and accepting a worldview close to the basic ways of living, although the dogmatist insists on questioning this worldview, each one with the elements at his disposal has defended himself very well, and have made the final verdict of the dogmatist an illusion.

Wittgenstein assumes philosophy as a therapeutic activity in the sense that, by means of it, one must have the tools and methods to dissolve the difficulties proposed by the philosophical theorist. Wittgensteinian philosophy functions as a medicine that helps to see, in a new way, the difficulties in order to clean and unmask the sinuous origins of the confusions. That is, whenever a philosophical problem arises, philosophy must put into operation a strategy to dismantle and clarify that problem. On the side of the Pyrrhonists, what causes the difficulty and what breaks the tranquility is the dogmatist's eagerness to dogmatize, that is, to break the manifest of the appearance and try to go beyond the evident. We have seen that in this situation the skeptical therapy contrasts the affirmations and creates a conflict of opinions and, in the absence of the criterion of resolution, suspends the judgment. The trial is suspended, the trial returns to the beginning and everything adduced is thrown out, the Pyrrhonist is reaffirmed in his criterion of being guided by appearance while waiting for another challenging dogmatic position, then another

dialectical opportunity opens up to put skeptical medicine into operation.

Skeptical therapy is given to the dogmatist to cure him of his eagerness to dogmatize, and once cured, he should stop worrying about the search for truth and or going beyond appearance and thereby attain tranquility. This notion of tranquility, of not worrying about theoretical questions, is defensible in Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonists. The philosophical conception of both Wittgenstein and the Sextian Pyrrhonian can be supplied to a dogmatist today as a medicine against dogmatism, and this shows that the relationship between Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonists is more than just an air or family resemblance. In both cases, the full meaning of everyday life is affirmed and assumed, and philosophy is exercised as an activity. It is

evident that there is an ethical line of living, of acting, of tranquility, of not theorizing, of not demanding criteria of truth, of showing, of not assenting, of being happy, of being calm that unites Wittgenstein with Pyrrhonism, perhaps this is enough to conclude that there is an area of Wittgenstein's philosophy that well deserves to be called neopyrrhonism.

Finally, I leave this reference, which highlights the closeness between Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonian ataraxia

> "... I just want to add to this that Wittgenstein considered the attainment of a certain tranquility, calmness, or what the ancients called ataraxia, to be an important end of his philosophy."[11] Translation mine

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