

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN PEACEMAKING IN YEMEN

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Abstract

The United Nations has intervened in Yemeni affairs since the beginning of the crisis after the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions that affected several Arab countries, including Yemen. The 2011 revolution took place against the government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. There was a political settlement under the auspices of the United Nations and a Gulf initiative by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that facilitated the transfer of power to new government led by President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. Yemen enjoys a distinct and vital geostrategic location that affects the movement of navigation and international trade, which makes it the focus of the international community, as Yemen overlooks Bab al-Mandab, which is a route for oil trade between the Middle East and European countries, and any threat to this sea lane is considered a threat to global trade in general. Therefore, it was expected that the international community represented by the United Nations and the Security Council would not allow any threats that would affect the global economy and the movement of trade exchange between its countries, or a coup against state authorities and institutions, and plunge Yemen into a devastating war. Evidence for this is that the Security Council held an extraordinary session in Sana'a in 2013 attended by the President and members of the Council, which carried multiple messages locally and internationally, which reflected the international community's interest in Yemen's security, unity and stability, and its direct sponsorship of a political settlement and the peaceful transfer of power as stipulated in the Gulf Initiative. After the coup of the Houthi group against the legitimate government in 2014, the Security Council issued several binding decisions under Chapter VII, the most important one is Resolution No. 2216, which condemns the coup and supports the legitimate government, and imposes sanctions against anyone who had a hand in this coup. Several UN envoys exchanged on the Yemeni's issue. Therefore, the vision becomes more ambiguous where the researcher or observer of the Yemeni situation tries to understand the role of the United Nations and Security Council in Yemen.

Keywords: The United Nations, Yemen, Peacemaking, Gulf Cooperation Council, Arab Spring.

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations has not been absent from the Yemeni scene since the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011. Since the link between the principle of peaceful resolution of international disputes, the prevention of war and the preservation of international peace, is a strong and inseparable link, we cannot imagine

the establishment of peace and security in the international community without ensuring the resolution of differences that erupt by means away from the use of force (Hassan Chalabi, 1970), and that One of the first purposes of the United Nations mentioned in Article 1 of the Charter is to achieve international peace and security, and to achieve this end, the organization invokes peaceful means to settle

international disputes in accordance with the principles of justice and law (UN Charter).


The Gulf Cooperation Council presented an initiative called (the Gulf Initiative and its Executive Mechanism). The conflicting Yemeni parties initially agreed to this initiative, and it was signed, and power was transferred to the new government, and presidential elections were held. The Security Council was present and observing this, and it welcomed the peaceful exit of Yemen from its crisis. But things were not successful and stable (Abdulsamad AlJabri, 2016), as the legitimate government was unable to control the situation for reasons beyond its control, and the reason for this was that the previous regime, with its hidden hands, worked to destabilize matters in the country and create economic problems that hinder the work of the nascent government. In this regard, the Security Council issued Resolution No. (2204) under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in which the Council decided to extend the punishment of some previous political figures until February 26, 2016, of the asset freeze and travel ban imposed under Resolution 2140 (2015) to help stop the It threatens the peaceful transition of power, and yet it has not deterred the obstructionists.

One of the most important solutions proposed in the Gulf initiative is the call for a comprehensive national dialogue in which all political spectrums are invited to discuss the main issues in the country. Indeed, this dialogue took place, and they came out with outcomes that all parties agreed on, and solutions were developed for all major issues. However, the Houthi group turned against what had been signed by besiege the Yemeni capital

(Sana'a). After that, the legitimate president and his government were besieged and placed under house arrest. In this regard, the Security Council issued Resolution No. (2201) on February 15, 2015, which demanded that the Houthi group withdraw its armed men from government institutions and denounced the use of violence to achieve political goals, and demanded them to engage in the peace negotiations, but they did not comply with the decision of the Security Council and did not withdraw. The Special Representative of the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Jamal bin Omar, tried to formulate a new road map called the Peace and Partnership Agreement, which obligated the legitimate government to sign it, but the coup authority (the Houthi group) did not implement any of its provisions, but rather continued its revolution project and the foreign agenda that served the interests of some foreign countries.

After that, the president and his government submitted their resignations, which made the coup forces in a state of political confusion and have a problem constitutional legitimacy of their coup action. The legitimate president sought the assistance of neighboring countries, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In fact, the request was responded to and international intervention was carried out by the countries of the Arab coalition, and its legal basis was Article (51) of the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter article 51). This research will explore the role of the United Nations in making peace in Yemen and the stages of its work during the period 2011 to 2021

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK



INTERNAL FACTOR

The most prominent of the political factors that led to the occurrence of the Arab Spring revolutions in Yemen and another countries were the absence of the concept of the peaceful transfer of power while moving forward towards the principle of succession by creating the necessary means for this, the rule of one party and the absence of real partisan pluralism that guarantees active participation of all political parties, in addition to the absence of free and fair elections that secure access to the most qualified through the ballot boxes. This required exerting more pressure, exclusion, marginalization, silencing and imposing strict control on all groups of the people. These political factors were accompanied by the deterioration of the economic situation. With the development of media and social media, most notably Facebook, in addition to the impact of the WikiLeaks leaks, which contributed to the exposing of tyrannical regimes and publicly referred to the scandals of these Arab regimes at a time when these regimes were claiming the principles of freedom and social justice. (Nazim Maatouk, 2012)

Murad Shahmat and Lubna Jassas (2013) conducted research aimed at explaining the internal Arab reality. It relied on the political development approach as an explanation for the

reasons for the current transformations in the Arab region. The research concluded that the revolutions witnessed by Yemen and some Arab countries cannot be considered an exceptional and surprising situation, but rather a natural result of the internal political, economic and social conditions, especially in light of the spread of means of communication and information, which made it easier for the peoples of the Arab region to compare their situations with the situations of the rest of the regions in the world. And revealed the issues of rampant corruption in various government institutions, which affected the development within these Arab countries, which prompted the peoples of this region to revolt against their regimes and demand change.

Despite the importance of development efforts made during successive governments, economic programs, administrative and institutional reforms, and medium and long-term plans and strategies, development indicators resulted in a state of development failure in achieving the development goals and aspirations of Yemenis. Yemen is still classified at the global level among the list of least developed countries, where the average annual per capita income does not exceed about \$1,200, which is one of the lowest incomes at the regional level, and the poverty rates that affected more than 54% of the population,

which in one aspect mean the deprivation of a decent living life and access to basic services in education, health and welfare. Muhammad Al-Hauri (2013) concluded that these conditions in Yemen and the life of society have provided sufficient justifications for the people's revolution against the regime of Ali Saleh, in addition to other justifications related to the absence of law and order, the state of institutions, the spread of corruption, the monopoly of power and wealth and the attempted to inherit the verdict, all these factors led to revolution .

Research entitled "Arab Spring: Quantitative Analysis" aimed at quantitative analysis of the events of the Arab Spring countries and Yemen, one of these countries, where the difficulties related to these events are linked to a variety of factors affecting social, political and economic stability in the region. The results of the research argued that social and political instability in the Arab Spring countries was the result of a complex set of factors, and the most important factors that led to the reduction of social and political instability during the Arab Spring appeared as follows: the government's ability to reduce social tensions and the existence of "immunity" to internal conflicts, and the level of internal contradictions, however, emerged indicators such as structural, demographic and external influences less important in the context of the Arab Spring. It should be noted that the importance of the external impact index increases, in particular, when using a model to calculate the number of deaths caused by anti-government protests (Korotayev et al., 2014).

The Arab Spring revolutions in Yemen and other countries were classified within the framework of the revolutions that erupted following the end of the Cold War in several regions of the world, but they belong to what can be called the negotiated revolutions that differ from the modern revolutions in several differences, the most important of which are:

1: It is the result of a partial crisis within the state regime and is not the result of a crisis that requires a comprehensive change in the political, economic and social systems of the

state, 2: the beginning of these revolutions is demonstration in order to achieve demands, meaning that they depend on negotiation as a means to deal with the existing regime, and they did not It relies on direct military confrontations. 3: The new revolutionary forces reject the guardianship of the previous local revolutions. 4: these revolutions led to an increase in the weakness of the state and did not lead to an increase in its strength. Lawson (2014) believes that focusing on the political issue in the Arab revolutions without the social issue, means that they are revolutions of limited scope, similar to the ones that erupted from 1989, after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but differ in their results until this moment .

After the Houthis were defeated and expelled from southern Yemen by the UAE-led military campaign, the UAE pressured President Hadi to appoint Aidarous al-Zubaidi as governor of Aden. Al-Zubaidi brought many southern nationalists associated with him and appointed them to several positions. After President Hadi dismissed Aidarous al-Zubaidi from his position for his repeated anti-government abuses, he formed the Southern Transitional Council with direct support from the United Arab Emirates, which in turn transformed many militias into the Security Belt Forces in Aden and the neighboring southern governorates. These belts have proven to be effective in combating the threats of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The rise of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council is threatening Yemen's unity. However, the council's claim to speak on behalf of the south is in doubt. Where southerners demonstrated in Abyan and elsewhere against the Transitional Council, and parts of the Southern Movement reject the leaders of the Southern Transitional Council. The writer believes that the UAE's support for the Southern Transitional Council is that it has a long-term interest in controlling the sea and trade routes in the Gulf of Aden, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, and it also wants to ensure the leadership of its ports, as it considers the port of Aden of particular importance to it . (Brehony, N.,2020).

EXTERNAL FACTORS

As part of Iran's efforts to expand its sphere of influence in the region, Iran has escalated its interventionist activities in Yemen since 2011, taking advantage of the vacuum and instability that resulted from the faltering of the political transition after the overthrow of Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime. Iranian interventionist activities have been launched in Yemen, as in other regional neighboring countries, based on a general strategy that relies mainly on bypassing official political frameworks and establishing partnerships with non-state actors, especially groups close to Iran in doctrinal terms or agreeing with it in orientations. And providing support to these groups, up to employing them to serve Iranian interests and goals in the region. In this context, Iran has worked to strengthen its partnership with the Houthis and sought to turn them into a political and military force that dominates the political process in Yemen, and then exploited them to achieve its goals related to seeking to enhance its regional position and gain more influence and dominance, and to confront the influence of competitors or supposed opponents, especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia and the United States of America. In order to achieve these goals, Iran has employed a combination of tools, some of which are related to soft power, such as the tool of political Shiism, through which Iran has worked to enhance its ideological influence on the Houthi movement, and the media tool that Iran has employed to spread its political propaganda regarding the conflict in Yemen on a wide scale from In order to influence public opinion in the region, as well as the tools related to hard power represented in military support to the Houthis, whether through the supply of weapons, or through the provision of training and military expertise, which contributed to strengthening the ability of the Houthi militias to continue their military activities, which led to the prolongation of the conflict . However, Iran's efforts to activate its role and achieve its full goals in Yemen collide with many obstacles and restrictions that reduce the effectiveness of this role and limit the

possibility of its expansion. The most important of these obstacles and limitations are:

In general, the researcher believes that there are constraints and obstacles such as the complex nature of the Yemeni arena, which is characterized by fluctuating political orientations and loyalties, the Houthi movement's lack of expanding its sphere of influence on the Yemeni arena, and the lack of material and human capabilities that would enable it to strengthen its control over Yemen or preserve its military gains. Especially in the long term, and the rejection of these interventions by many Yemeni political forces and elites, and large tribal sectors, limits the effectiveness of the Iranian role in Yemen, as it becomes unlikely that Iran will be able to influence long-term Yemeni internal politics. This makes Iran's desire to consolidate its position and gain more influence in Yemen difficult to achieve. (Mohammed H. al-Qadi, 2017)

the Houthis embody what Iran seeks to achieve across the Arab world: that is, the cultivation of an armed non-state, non-Sunni actor who can pressure Iran's adversaries both politically and militarily (Riedel, 2017) . Well before the current conflict began in 2015, Saudi Arabia supported the central government of Yemen in various military campaigns against a Houthi insurgency which began in 2004 (Salisbury, 2015).

Saudi leaders expressed growing concern about the Houthis' advance when they seized the capital city Sana'a in 2014 and violated many power-sharing arrangements. After President Hadi in March 2015, who fled to Saudi Arabia, called for international intervention. Saudi Arabia quickly mobilized an international coalition and launched a military offensive aimed at restoring Hadi's rule and expelling Houthi fighters from the capital and other major cities. The Saudi-led coalition began conducting airstrikes against Houthi-Saleh forces and imposed severe restrictions on sea and air movement into Yemen (Sharp and Brodnick, 2015).

Niaz Ahmed (2019) Argued that the civil war in Yemen is a result of the failure of Yemeni society to control popular anger and address the effects of the collapsed economic situation, marginalization and political exclusion caused by the corrupt regime. These factors led to the occurrence of political unrest and the outbreak of civil war after that. It is clear that Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Sunni and Shiite powers in the Middle East, play an important role in the Yemeni conflict. The failed transition of power in 2011 led to the fall of the government of President Hadi, and the Houthi group seized the capital, Sanaa, in 2014, due to the use of Yemeni armies to protect the security of the regime instead of protecting the people and their gains. Foreign powers such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the United Nations have intervened to try to find a compromise to end the Houthi group's control of the capital, Sana'a, through the Peace and Partnership Agreement, but all of these solutions failed. The United Nations led several rounds of negotiations between the legitimate government and the Houthi group, but they were unsuccessful due to the unwillingness of the parties to the conflict to make concessions. At the moment, the situation has become more complicated due to the internal divisions of the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia, where Saudi Arabia provides support for President Hadi, who is based in Riyadh, while the United Arab Emirates largely supports the separatists in southern Yemen .

The deterioration of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen caused by the Houthis will increase if the international community does not intervene to prevent it, as well as the rebel groups will increase, destabilize the region, overthrow the legitimate government and attack the neighboring sovereign states. The Houthi threat to peace and security must be eliminated through the support of the Yemeni government and the Saudi coalition. Therefore, financial aid to the Houthis must be stopped and all operations such as arms transfer and training provided to them by any country must be faced with strict measures by the Security Council. On the other hand, the US interventions in Yemen must be stopped under false pretexts

such as fighting terrorism, and instead must help countries with the necessary funding, weapons and qualitative training to be able to combat any terrorism if any and end the rebellions in those small countries such as the Houthi rebellion if the United States really wants to eliminate these groups. However, all those who commit war crimes in Yemen, whether the Saudi coalition or the Houthis, must be held accountable so that the rights of innocents are not violated, peace is restored, and rights are preserved (WASEEM, A. Q., 2020) .

After the Houthi group took control of the capital, Sanaa, and a number of Yemeni cities, and chased President Hadi to Aden, the Saudi army and its coalition partners provided advice and military support to Yemeni forces loyal to Hadi inside Yemen, while at the same time launching a continuous air campaign against the Houthis and their allies. The Saudi ground forces and special forces carried out limited cross-border operations. The Saudi naval forces limit the entry and exit of ships from Yemeni ports. Separately, the United Nations Verification and Inspection of Ships to Yemen Mechanism (UNVIM) has been operating since May 2016 to help verify commercial sea and air traffic in support of the arms embargo imposed by Resolution 2216 (Sharp & Brudnick, 2015).

Saudi leaders noted that the weakening of the central authority in Yemen contributed to the growing power of the Houthis, who have ties to Iran. Therefore, the expansion of influence in the country by terrorist groups will have negative security consequences for Yemen and Saudi Arabia. As a result, Saudi Arabia sought to achieve political and economic stability in Yemen. This will only be possible through a strong central government. (WA Rugh, 2015) argues That is why Saudi Arabia supports President Hadi and aims to restore Hadi to power through its direct military intervention in Yemen (Rugh, 2015, p. 151).

The United States closed its embassy in Yemen in March 2015 after the fighting and the Houthi group's takeover of the capital, Sanaa. The United States has supported the Saudi position

in the Yemen war for several reasons: One of them is that the Hadi government enjoys international support and is the legitimate government in the country. In addition, Washington aims primarily to confront Islamic extremists, and this requires a strong central government in Yemen that acts as a partner for the United States. It is just as important to the United States at the regional level. There are different views between Saudi Arabia and the United States, as Saudi Arabia criticized the American role in Iraq and Syria and its negotiations with Iran. Therefore, US officials stated that they are providing limited logistical and military support and some intelligence to Saudi Arabia in its war in Yemen, and supplying Saudi warplanes with aerial refueling, in order to reassure Saudi Arabia on other non-Yemeni issues. The United States has deployed warships in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea as a warning to Iran to stay out of the conflict in Yemen (WA Rugh, 2015, p. 150) .

UNITED NATIONS IN YEMEN

Global variables do not happen suddenly, cumulative and comprehensive contain it, as the collapse of the Soviet Union was the most prominent incident in the world during the nineties, when the results of this collapse overturned everything (Basil Al Bustani, 1992: 5), and the role of the United Nations was affected by this event that affected in one way or another its performance of its duties in Various fields, including the settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political, the world has become under one pole, where the United States of America sits at the head of the most powerful and hegemonic regimes.

There is another point of view that says that the term “Third World” is the harsh expression used by Western countries when they want to punish a country from this world, as some countries of the pure world are still suffering at the hands of the major powers, and although the United Nations Charter may succeed in preventing small countries from attacking Each other, but at the same time, he is unable to

prevent the major powers from inflicting harm on the smaller ones, so this charter has become a means through which the weak countries is flogged (Thmbasono, 2001: 22). But from my point of view, the researchers did not address the role of the United Nations and the Security Council and its resolutions in the internal conflicts of countries, which are supported by other countries.

Scholar Kirsten Jungberg spoke in his scientific article entitled (An in-depth analysis of the conflict in Yemen: the latest developments, 2016), where he briefly touched on the stages of the conflict in Yemen and the contribution of the United Nations from the beginning of this conflict since the events of the Arab Spring and the appointment of UN envoys and touched on Security Council resolution 2216 in April 2015 and also touched upon the rounds of negotiations sponsored by the United Nations in Geneva in April 2015 and the negotiations failed and a second round of negotiations in Swiss in December 2015, where this negotiations also failed, and then the Kuwait negotiations in April 2016, but the scholar did not address the reasons for the failure of these negotiations nor the role of the United Nations in Implementation of its relevant resolutions, the most important of which is Resolution 221, according to which Yemen was placed under Chapter VII, through which the Security Council can bind the obstructing party to peace.

(Francesco Mancini, 2016) argue that, following the Arab upheavals in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, his report drew a set of lessons from the UN's first attempts at mediation in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, and he found two crucial caveats, though. First, the setting in which these mediations took place had a significant impact on the success or failure of diplomatic efforts; it is frequently difficult to separate the individual mediator's responsibility for a specific outcome from the larger conditions. Secondly, he pointed out, when attempting to generalize these lessons to other political transitions and mediations in general, caution should be exercised. Despite the fact that these mediations all took place in the Middle East during relatively similar periods of

political transition, the uniqueness of each context had a drastically different impact on the mediations. Independent variables such as the local and geopolitical environments, as well as the level of violence, varied dramatically from case to case, severely limiting the mediators' ability to effect change. Despite the complexity of these conflicts, lessons must be learned from their resolution, both as part of ongoing mediation efforts in all three nations and in contemplating how to respond to future conflicts with comparable characteristics.

In Yemen case, C. Murthy 2018 argued that The Security Council seemed to be united in its response, but that did not assist because the sanctions imposed were aimed solely at the Houthi side. The UN envoy's ambitious nonpartisan mediation had hoped to create an inclusive democratic and accountable constitutional framework, but it fell apart due to the opposing factions' desire for political dominance rather than conciliation. Finally, he argues that, as evidenced by its experiences in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, the UN was unable to capitalize on the opportunities created by the Arab Spring.

There are three reasons for the failure of the United Nations in Yemen. The first reason is that Resolution 2216 recognized only two parties to the conflict (the legitimate government led by President Hadi and the Houthis), while there are several other entities that were not included within the framework of this resolution, and all components must be involved, and their concerns addressed in order for these negotiations to succeed (Helen Lackner, 2018). Secondly, these two parties mentioned in Resolution 2216 are not satisfied with making any concessions that would help in finding common ground to reach a solution.

Third, the United Nations is restricted because it deals with the governments of countries (international recognition of the Hadi government), and this made the Houthis believe that the international envoy is biased against them.

Parisa Abbasian et al (2021) argue that, in internationalized civil wars such as the war in

Yemen, this war is not limited to regional states, but there is an indirect participation of the permanent members of the United Nations, and thus these great powers indirectly impede effective decisions that need to be taken, which prevents the United Nations from achieving its primary objective of protecting international peace and security.

The efforts of the United Nations in Yemen have not yielded tangible positive results, as is the case in Syria and Libya, despite the multiplicity of UN envoys to these countries, and this is due to the intervention of international actors who provide support to local actors to serve their agenda (Hassanein Ali, 2021). This failure can also be explained by the limited resources available to the United Nations and the differences and divisions within the Security Council, which made the United Nations unable to implement its resolutions issued in the Yemeni issue.

CONCLUSION

The Yemeni crisis is witnessing twists and turns that can be described as zigzags of the developments of events in Yemen. It predicts that Yemen stands at a crossroads with diverse outcomes and the possibilities of its fluctuations, which makes anticipating the scenarios that will be resolved in the short term something that cannot be described as easy. Where several local, regional and international factors overlapped in this conflict. This research explores the role of the United Nations in ending the war and rebuilding peace in Yemen and the internal factors that caused and prolonged this war. This research also explores the role of external forces such as Iran's role in supporting the Houthi group and the Saudi-led coalition in the war and conflict in Yemen also the role of the United States which supports the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which recently appointed a special envoy to Yemen to help end the conflict in Yemen.

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