

Determinants Of Indo-Pak Wars: Analysing Through Prism Of Waltz Three Images Of War

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Abstract

The rivalry is the unfinished agenda of decolonisation. This research utilises Kenneth Waltz's three images of war, i.e., individual, state, and systemic level, for analysing a detailed study of the major wars between India and Pakistan. Since their liberation from British rule, Indo-Pak relations have been fraught. Both countries have been at odds multiple times, causing South Asia to become unstable. The addition of nuclear weapons to the region has introduced a new aspect to the Indo-Pak conflict, escalating concerns of a potential nuclear confrontation that could destroy all civilisation. Actors in the two nations and foreign strategists have worked to identify the underlying roots of the conflict between these two arch-rivals. Few, however, have attempted to see the Indo-Pak conflict via Kenneth Waltz's three images of war. This article examines numerous wars between India and Pakistan via Waltz's lens, trying to pave the path ahead to avoid an all-out war between two tired neighbours. The article employs a qualitative research method. It conducts historical research to uncover events and links from the past that have ramifications up to the present day. Furthermore, the article attempts to deduce the causes of Indo-Pak wars from Waltz's three images of war and forecast the likelihood of future conflict between India and Pakistan.

Keywords: Wars, First image, Second image, Third image, Conflicts.

Introduction

The relationship between India and Pakistan has been tense since gaining independence from British rule. Multiple wars between the two nations have resulted in destabilisation in South Asia. Additionally, introducing nuclear weapons to the region has added a dangerous element to the Indo-Pak conflict, prompting concerns about a possible nuclear exchange that could endanger the survival of humanity as a whole. Actors in the said countries and foreign strategists have strived to find the root causes of the conflict between these arch-rivals. However, very few have explored the Indo-Pak conflict from Kenneth Waltz's three images of war. These subsequent parts cover wars between both countries from Waltz's prism and strive to give way forward to

prevent an all-out war between these weary neighbours.

Methodology

The article makes use of a qualitative research approach. It does historical research to discover events and connections from the past whose repercussions stretch to the current day. The events that have taken place, beginning with the first war in Kashmir and continuing up to the present situation between India and Pakistan, have had an effect. The annals of history may help with the interpretation of recent occurrences and the prediction of future wars. Secondary data is often used collected through secondary sources.

Indo-Pak Wars from Kenneth Waltz's Three Images

First Kashmir War

Following their independence, India and Pakistan engaged in a war centred around the disputed region of Kashmir. The leader of the predominantly Muslim area was not himself Muslim and thus faced difficulty deciding whether to align with India or Pakistan. While most of the population favoured Pakistan, the ruler hesitated, creating internal conflict in the strategically important territory. This conflict ultimately led to a full-scale war between India and Pakistan, with the United Nations intervening at India's request. The war ended in a stalemate, but the resulting Kashmir issue has strained relations between the two countries and could spark a nuclear war at any time. (Nawaz, 2008).

First Image

Images of war offered by Kenneth Waltz can be used to analyse the 1948 Indo-Pakistani War. From this perspective, we may see the fundamental causes that led India to war with its much smaller and weaker neighbour. Waltz's opening image makes the case that politicians and other political leaders frequently start conflicts. (Waltz, 2001).

Gandhi, Nehru, and Sardar Patel, who is best recognised as an Indian statesman and served as the country's first Deputy Prime Minister, were all powerful political personalities at the time of India's independence in 1947. Nehru and Patel were seen as more moderate than Gandhi, whose opinions were often divisive.

However, both men were prepared to resort to violence to include the princely nations. Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, the leaders of Pakistan, were averse to conflict and opposed to resorting to violence to attain their goals. Since Nehru and Patel took a more

confrontational approach, the 1947–1948 Indo-Pakistani conflict was exacerbated.

Second Image

“In the first image, theorists argue that good and bad men exist. On the contrary, the second image theorists argue that there are good and bad states. It is either because of their formal governmental arrangements (democratic vs autocratic), or their less formal social arrangements who owns the means of production (Weber, 2005).” Waltz's second image contends that the domestic makeup of states causes wars (Weber, 2005). During the war, India received the benefits of stable institutions, a robust industrial base, and a powerful military from its former British rulers. The British had initiated most of the significant infrastructure projects within mainland India.

India's leadership was swept up in a wave of nationalistic fervour, leading them to aggressively annex princely states indecisive about joining India. The Indian National Congress, which was in power, aimed to unify the country under one territorial unit and govern it. Meanwhile, Pakistan struggled with a massive influx of refugees, weak institutions, and a much smaller military than India's. The factors mentioned above resulted in a situation where the government, the military and the citizens were not eager to fight India in a conventional war. The Indian side was aware of this strategic mindset in Pakistan and ready to take advantage of it. Hence, at the state level, the factor contributing to war's causation may be attributed to India's internal domestic structure (Schofield, 2000).

Third image

The passage by Waltz illustrates the connections between anarchy, the actions of states, and conflict. (Weber, 2005).

“In anarchy, there is no automatic harmony. . . A state will use force to attain its goals if, after

assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than the pleasures of peace. Because each state is the final judge of its cause, any state may use force to implement its policies at any time. Resultantly all states must constantly be ready to counter force with force or pay the cost of weakness. In this view, the requirements of state action are imposed by the circumstances in which all states exist (Weber, 2005).”

The third image highlights that the international system’s structure leads to conflict by forcing states to act in a certain way (Weber, 2005). This article argues that the role of a systemic level is to be the greater salience in the context of post-colonial India and Pakistan. The globe was still healing from the effects of the World Wars at the time of this conflict. The beginning of the Cold War saw superpowers vying for global influence. This conflict presented an opportunity for the United States and the Soviet Union to gain a foothold in the region and secure allies, making it beneficial to the world powers.

Furthermore, the world was undergoing decolonisation at the time, and territorial conflicts were not uncommon. As a result, major powers did not view this conflict as a serious concern. One may argue that the world’s conditions were favourable for this kind of territorial struggle and, in some ways, even made the war easier to wage. Hence, the systemic level remained dominant compared to the individual or state level in explaining the conflict outcomes between India and Pakistan.

1965 Indo-Pak War

First Image

Waltz’s first image relates to the contention that wars occur because of the aggressive behaviour of individuals (Suganami, 2001). During the 1965 war, Pakistan was led by the charismatic and able-bodied President Ayub Khan. His economic reforms put Pakistan on a trajectory of progress,

with the country’s economy growing at the fastest rate in Asia. Under his leadership, Pakistan embarked on massive infrastructure projects that revolutionised the country’s industrial and demographic landscapes. Dams, canals, a new capital city, and a road network were all constructed during his tenure. President Ayub started modernising the military to address internal and foreign security issues by reorganising the army, air force, and navy. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the president’s trusted counsellor as the foreign minister. Additionally, President Ayub started the military’s modernisation, reorganising the army, air force, and navy to address difficulties with internal and external security. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the president’s trusted counsellor as the foreign minister.

On the Indian side, the Congress Party was in power, with Lal Bahadur Shastri serving as Prime Minister after taking over from the strong-willed Jawaharlal Nehru. Mr Shastri faced strong opposition from within his party due to his domestic policies and was considered weaker than Nehru. During the events leading up to the 1965 war, Mr Shastri was influenced by his military as he struggled to make decisions due to his weak position. At this level of examination, one may contend that the two state’s leaders had quite different levels of authority and influence. Ayub was likely swayed by his foreign minister to resolve the Kashmir dispute through military means. At the same time, Mr Shastri came under tremendous pressure to redress the Kutch defeat (Lamb, 1991).

Second Image

Waltz’s second image contends that the domestic makeup of states causes wars (Weber, 2005). In 1965, Pakistan was governed by a military leader with immense power. The country was experiencing robust economic growth, and its institutions were effective and well-established.

The military played a central role in decision-making processes. President Ayub established the 1962 constitution, which granted unprecedented power to the presidency. The government controlled the media, and no institutions or authorities challenged its authority. Therefore, when Pakistan decided to intervene in Indian-held Kashmir (IHK), there was no resistance, and the way was cleared for the 1965 war.

Prime Minister Shastri of India was ineffective and faced resistance inside his party. The Indian military needed additional power to reinforce itself since it was still dealing with its setback in the Sino-Indian War of 1962. India's military was bold and keen to regain its dignity and honour after the humiliating setback in 1962, despite its failing economy and weak institutions. Wars frequently divert attention away from subpar economic development and bad governmental performance. The Indian military was ready to use local turmoil in Kashmir to justify a full-scale conflict with Pakistan. As a result, India and Pakistan's political institutions were conducive to war, but India had a reason to attack Pakistan militarily.

Third image

The systemic distribution of power played a significant role in igniting the Indo-Pak War of 1965. At that time, the global structure was in disarray due to rising tensions between superpowers, conflicts in developing nations, and underlying apprehensions in the Arab world. The United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a significant arms race and were also fomenting political unrest within each other's respective areas of influence. The U.S. was deeply involved in the Vietnam War, and the USSR supplied arms to Egypt and Syria to counter Israel's threat. Similarly, India was defeated by China and was assisted by the USSR in its rearmament efforts, while the U.S. aimed to bolster India's power to counter China's

complete military superiority. Both the U.S. and USSR were competing to increase their circles of influence, particularly in the Third World, and were prepared to engage in proxy wars against each other. It leads to a situation where the international environment was conducive to a major conflict in South Asia. As India and Pakistan became major weapons markets, the U.S. and USSR both profited from the war.

1971 Indo-Pak War

First Image

According to Waltz's first illustration, some politicians and political figures are frequently to blame for starting conflicts. Indira Gandhi, who ruled India, was flashy, opinionated, nationalistic, and risk-taking. In the wake of India's defeat in the 1962 and 1965 conflicts, she gained government control. With the assistance of the Soviet Union, she started an ambitious weapons programme and reorganised the Indian Army. Indira Gandhi tended to stop Pakistan's parity. An effort was also made to conquer Pakistan's western neighbour to gain regional domination. However, a political impasse between Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party and Sheikh Mujib-ur-Awami Rehman's National Party left Pakistan in ruins. In United Pakistan, neither party was willing to recognise the Prime Minister of the rival party. The disastrous 1971 war was brought on by these leaders' inflexible tactics and the incapacity of Pakistan's President. An ever-weakening Pakistan was eager to be drawn into a fight and given a bloody nose by strong and dedicated leadership in India. In contrast, Pakistan's leadership was helpless and incapable of thwarting India's plans for hegemony.

Second Image

Waltz's second image suggests that the internal structure of states causes wars (Weber, 2005). Pakistan dealt with many challenges in 1971. The

isolation and dissatisfaction of the local populace resulted from political upheaval in East Pakistan. Government institutions were ineffective, and the Mukti Bahini controlled large parts of East Pakistan. And it challenged the state's authority. The geographical distance between East and West Pakistan was significant, with India posing a belligerent presence between the two wings. Due to this distance, the Pakistani military could not bolster its garrison in East Pakistan. The situation in West Pakistan was also precarious, with an inept military ruler leading to unrest and political violence. Pakistan's military establishment lost public support, and its credibility was undermined. India, in contrast, was politically stable despite facing an economic crisis. Its army was strong and determined to erase the stains of previous defeats at the hands of China and Pakistan.

Third Image

The international system supported India's goals in 1971. Deeply entangled in the Vietnam War, the United States was on the verge of losing. The U.S. was under increasing internal pressure owing to escalating casualties and the ethnic black human rights movement, which was at its height. As a result, the U.S. was forced to put domestic issues ahead of international policy for the first time in decades. Due to the animosity between Arabs and Israelis, the Middle East was incredibly unpredictable, adding to the U.S.'s already heavy workload. The power balance in the area had swung in favour of Israel after the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, leaving the leading Arab nations weak and unstable. Another massive conflict between Egypt and Israel was perhaps on the horizon.

In contrast, the Soviet Union was succeeding in its proxy conflict in Vietnam and was prepared to help India undermine a significant U.S. ally in the region. China could not support Pakistan if India became aggressive since it was locked in an

ideological conflict with the Soviet Union. Due to its anti-imperialist position, the Soviet Union had acquired the upper hand at international fora like the United Nations, allowing it to win support from several vital capitals. This was used by India, who utilised the Soviet Union's clout to defame Pakistan and use the excuse of stopping crimes against humanity in East Pakistan to launch a full-scale war.

India's diplomatic efforts were successful, and Pakistan's alleged breaches of human rights in East Pakistan earned it a bad reputation worldwide. By framing Pakistan's counterinsurgency measures as anti-Bengali programmes and charging it with war crimes, India prepared the ground for the annexation of East Pakistan. When the war started, India quickly defeated isolated pockets of the opposition and took Dhaka. Pakistan felt alone and demoralised due to the United States' failure to help it despite its vows to do so. In West Pakistan, the Pakistani military could fend off Indian offensives, but it could not influence the military environment in East Pakistan. The framework of the international system encouraged India's blatant aggression against Pakistan. Never before has there been such a favourable setting for an Indian attack, and it never would.

The three illustrations of conflict provided by Kenneth Waltz aid in comprehending the causes, effects, and results of this conflict, which resulted in a military catastrophe for Pakistan. The systemic level, however, steadfastly remained crucial in altering the outcome of the conflict. For instance, India had an extremely favourable playing field thanks to the Soviet Union's engagement before and during the conflict. Nixon received a top-secret telegram from the Soviet Union during the conflict in which they sternly warned against U.S. engagement or action (Singh, 2019).

How Will Kenneth Waltz Three Images of War Help Avoid Future Conflicts in South Asia?

Kenneth Waltz, a prominent realist, presented a thorough explanation of the causes of war by introducing three levels of analysis. These levels of analysis help to comprehend why states participate in wars and identify the factors that create a conducive or non-conducive environment for war. The analysis also gives researchers insights into how to minimise the risk of war. The first level of analysis focuses on the characteristics of individuals who lead nations to conflicts. Throughout history, leaders like Hitler, Mussolini, and Emperor Hirohito, who pursued aggressive policies, have triggered wars. These leaders wield significant power and command large armies, making it challenging to prevent them from pursuing their aggressive policies. Hence, it is crucial to identify such leaders, even in contemporary times, such as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and scrutinise their past behaviour and inclinations towards using violence to achieve political objectives. This approach can assist targeted nation policymakers in anticipating their future actions and formulating a collective strategy to prevent them from escalating tensions and starting a war.

The international community did that successfully in the case of Saddam Hussain during the first Gulf War. Saddam Hussain waged an eight-year bloody war against Iran, ending in a stalemate and more than a million deaths on both sides. Once this war ended, Saddam sought another target to quench his thirst for power and land. During the cold war in 1991, the world breathed a sigh of relief. Scholars posited that the world would head towards perpetual peace due to the dominant political and economic system, i.e., democracy and capitalism. Saddam Hussain assumed that the cold war had drained the resources of major powers who would be reluctant and uninterested in the countries of the

third world, especially the Middle East. Saddam predicted that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would be met with mere condemnations and minor sanctions. He could not have been more wrong. The international community analysed that if left unchecked, Saddam would continue to act aggressively against his neighbouring state, which might put the entire region at risk of major wars and instability. Moreover, the Middle East was the hub of global oil supply and could not be left at the mercy of a war-thirsty Saddam. What happened next is history.

Current Status of Indo-Pak Rivalry

After applying Waltz's three images of the Indo-Pak wars, let's discuss the current rivalry between both countries. A situation where Prime Minister Modi is at the helm of affairs. He is the one who resembles Saddam in some ways, but he is much more dangerous and extremist. The fourth-largest force in the world, armed with nuclear weapons, is under PM Modi's command. In addition, PM Modi espouses bigoted, extremist Hindutva ideologies. Using Waltz's first level of analysis, it can be analysed that Prime Minister Modi is willing to flex military muscle to achieve the political objective without considering the repercussions of such an action. For example, after the 'Uri attack' by Kashmiri freedom fighters against an Indian army base, PM Modi boasted of a 'surgical strike' against militants based in Pakistan's administered Kashmir. India provided no proof of such a strike, and the international community also dismissed these attacks as a 'farce'. Pakistan also offered explanations that no such attack happened, which humiliated India. However, even such false claims of an attack inside an area controlled by a nuclear state could escalate into a full-scale war. PM Modi did not consider this eventuality, pointing to his recklessness and chauvinistic attitude.

Moreover, the Indian Government accused Pakistan of the Pulwama attack conducted inside Indian Held Kashmir by Kashmiri youth. This accusation was followed by a violation of Pakistan's airspace by the Indian Air Force. The tensions between the two neighbours escalated to an unprecedented level, where both sides mobilised their armies. Pakistan responded to this aggression by shooting down two Indian aircraft and establishing air superiority. Pakistan's dynamic leadership effectively controlled the further escalation of the crisis; the situation was de-escalated after the release of the captured Indian pilot. This incident showed how irresponsibly Prime Minister Modi was willing to push the world towards a nuclear Armageddon to achieve victory in domestic elections.

On 5th August 2019, India revoked Article 370 of its Constitution, which gave special status to IJK (Pervaiz, 2021). Similarly, the related issues to the Kashmir valley provide an in-depth picture to the study of the challenges posed to human security. This was done at the behest of Prime Minister Modi. India escalated tensions with Pakistan, and the two countries mobilised their forces inside the Kashmir region. The IJK remained under the most extended curfew in world history, and tensions would have stirred up again anytime between India and Pakistan. The first image argues that wars are often caused by the nature of particular statesmen and political leaders such as state leaders (Suganami, 2001). The first image rightly reflects the case of PM Modi. From the Gujarat riots in 2002 onwards, Narendra Modi started characterising his identity, people, ethnicity and religion (Hinduism). It can be stressed that he has taught the ideas of patriotism and loyalty with his identity, which comprises ideology and religion. In the general election of 2014 in India, it can be asserted that he provoked his community (Hindu Community) based on "their" national identity. Even in the recent elections of 2019, the Bharatiya Janata

Party released 'Sankalp Patra' (manifesto). They alluded that India belongs to the Hindu Gods (Hindu Devta) through Ram Temple's making in Ayodhya (Diplomat, 2019).

The distinguished Indian social psychologist Ashis Nandy reiterated that Modi is a "classic, clinical case" of the "authoritarian personality", with its "mix of puritanical rigidity, narrowing of emotional life" and "fantasies of violence (Pankaj, 2015)." The Kashmir issue is still stagnant because of Modi's rigidity as he takes the social identity approach in the decision-making of Indian Foreign policy. Waltz's level of analysis has helped policymakers and strategists in Pakistan to analyse PM Modi's behaviour and predict his next moves. It has enabled Pakistan to adopt a proactive strategy to mitigate the threat posed by Modi.

Waltz's second level of analysis is the states' domestic structure, which often leads nations into wars. For example, in present-day India, the fascist regime of PM Modi has embarked upon anti-Muslim pogroms and anti-Pakistan rhetoric. The human rights violations inside IJK are systemic and structural and perpetrated at the behest of state institutions such as military and intelligence agencies. The Indian media has also shunned any rose of neutrality and is supporting the Indian government to promote war. The Hindu religious institutions, such as the temples, have gained unprecedented influence in modern-day India. The scholars, academicians, and historians who project and promote extremist Hindutva ideology are being encouraged, leading to religious extremism inside India. What type of power will India become? And how will it demonstrate that power? Modi's behaviour is anticipated to be under the Hindutva ideologies in these realms. Religion has been a prime factor that dominates the discourse on international politics globally but not much discussion has ever been held on Hinduism and its influence on Indian foreign policy. BJP has always been

characterised as a Hindu nationalist party than a fundamental religious party. The Hindutva policy has manifested itself in internal politics, such as the beef ban and education policy. The application of Hindutva ideology is less evident in foreign than domestic policy. But what are the prepositions for foreign policy by the proponents of Hindutva? It is usually concerned with having a muscular approach towards the procedure; however, it is much more complex than it seems (Subrahmanyam, 1974).

The proponents of Hindutva believe that since India remained under the control of Muslims and Christians for hundreds of years, India's synonymous with Hindus must be strengthened by consolidating power and social harmony. Various categories exist on the resonating to the current views is offensive. This view argues that since the world is constantly in conflict, any state's ultimate way to ensure its security is to extend its control until a universality is achieved. Therefore, as per the idea of the political philosopher Kautilya (c. 371–283 BCE), the more vital state would look for 'Sarva-bhauma' or 'world-empire. The existing Hindutva outlook is restricted to the idea or creation of 'Akhand Bharat' or 'Greater India', including Bangladesh and Pakistan. Still, it can extend to Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, and Sri Lanka (Singh, 1998). The modern-day Hindutva proponents view the acquisition of nuclear power as synonymous with the material power to counter 'Islamophobia' and a generally strict attitude towards the opponents. Another approach also exists in which the outlook on Hindu nationalism is somewhat controlled. Under this perspective, Kautilya cautioned that unrestrained expansion could bring less than expected results to control the potential to decline; peace would be preferable to conflict or war (Sisson & E Leo, 1991). More significant stress has been given to dharma (roughly, a combination of moral duty and observance of law), being the primary value

incorporated in almost every typical Hindu writing (Fenn, 2017).

Is there a Future, Unlike the Past?

In pursuit of the above discussion, the critical question is whether there is a future, unlike the past? Are the past Indo-Pak wars adequate prognosticators of future conflicts in South Asia? (Ganguly, 1995). The answer, at best, is ambiguous because some of the prominent normative and structural restraints no longer exist in the current scenario between India and Pakistan. Another critical dimension to consider is the type of military leadership on both sides. The military top brass of both countries from previous generations shared perennial and long-standing ties of their early military training tracing back to British rule (Ganguly, 1995). However, the relationship of a similar bond is not connecting the post-independence era of senior military staff.

Consequently, numerous tacit interwar restraints cannot be designed in the post-independence generation's military top brass. When the Cold War ended, and India and Pakistan's armed forces lost their respective superpower patrons, both countries' armed forces became technologically superior to ever before. For instance, the limited ballistic missile capabilities of India and Pakistan. Another way of looking at the entire situation is that a lack of normative restraints could be far costlier to sustain in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, South Asia's weak communications and intelligence structures, compounded by political turbulence, could inadvertently lead to escalation at a nuclear level between two nuclear-armed states. Finally, the systemic forces' role, especially U.S. involvement in South Asian politics, is significant. The U.S. can be influential in strengthening confidence-building measures in South Asia (Ganguly, 1995). The U.S., the sole hegemon, can effectively compel India and

Pakistan to go for a regional arms control regime and ensure that both countries should not cross the nuclear threshold regardless of how odd the circumstances are. Therefore, any confrontation between the armed forces of two countries equipped with modern warfighting military paraphernalia will have far-reaching consequences for South Asia.

Various analysts and practitioners have observed diverging trends. Peace has been witnessed in one region and war in another. It led the scholars of international politics to follow two sets of differences in pursuit of the likelihood of peace and conflict in the Post-Cold War era and the differences within the same region about the propensity toward war between the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. Terms such as “New Europe”, “New East Asia,” and, even more controversially, “New Middle East” highlights this new perspective (Miller, 2007). The literature on territorial conflicts, prevailing rivalries, and civil and ethnic conflicts have focused on the dyadic level. Still, it fails to address issues on regional levels. In the context of factors responsible for the causation of war between India and Pakistan, it is essential to first develop proper conversance with the substantive causes of regional peace and conflict. Secondly, it is important to trace whether these causes are at the global /systemic level or the regional/ domestic level (Study, 2019).

Realist theory factors will shape regional dynamics if the region experiences a high imbalance between states and nations. Similarly, liberal theories will be more influential if states and nations in the region are in balance. It brings the discussion to the point where it can be safely argued that both realist and liberalist approaches lack an adequate explanation of regional actors’ motivation for resorting to violence if such causes are compelled by issues arising from state-to-nation imbalance. Based on the above analysis facts, it can be inferred that the linked factor

influencing wars’ causation is a state-to-nation imbalance (Study, 2019). Therefore, it disposes of certain regions being more war-prone than others.

Conclusion

Given that various wars fought between India and Pakistan were analysed through the lens of three images of war, it is reasonable to conclude that all three images of war have been found responsible for these wars in one way or the other. However, one or more images remained dominant in each case, be it 1948, 1965 or 1971.

When we analyse all major conflicts between India and Pakistan, the 1971 conflict is the most consequential. The regional-level analysis reveals that Pakistani disintegration gave birth to Bangladesh, paving the way for India to become a dominant power in the subcontinent. Application of systemic level image and seeing through its prism highlight that unenthusiastic American help for Pakistan had dire consequences for India and Pakistan. Both sides developed their grievances with the U.S. for their double standards. The Indians were annoyed because of American support for a brutal military regime.

On the contrary, the Pakistani side felt that they were left stranded by their so-called ally in the middle of a conflict with a much bigger power India who enjoyed all-out support of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan. The outcome of the war resulted in the conversion of the Soviet Union into a principal external gainer. Soviet Union’s convergence of interest with India significantly consolidated Indo-Soviet relations. The 1970s era saw a strengthened relationship between the two countries until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

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