

An Analysis Of Muttahidamajlis-E-Amal's Government In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2002-2008) In The Light Of Its Election Manifesto

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Abstract: The politics in Pakistan have been influenced by Islam since its creation. Islam has been considered the *raison d'être* for the birth of Pakistan. Therefore, the religious parties have always performed a vital role in the politics of Pakistan. Prior to the general election of 2002, the religious political parties had not captured such a glaring electoral victory. In the general election of 2002, the conglomeration of six religious political parties swept the polls of 2002 under the umbrella of MMA with an affective election manifesto. The MMA emerged as third largest alliance in the National Assembly by securing 59 in the house of 342. Moreover, the MMA got mandate to establish government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) while to be coalition partner with PML-Q in Baluchistan. In this research paper, the author aims to emphasis the MMA government's accomplishments in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the light of its election manifesto.

Key Words: Islam, religious political parties, General elections 2002, election manifesto

INTRODUCTION

Since the creation of Pakistan, the Religio-Political Parties had been working in close coordination on multi religious and political issues. These parties always tried to gather their vote bank for an electrical alliance, but sectarian clashes always stood as a main obstacle in the way of the alliance (Gardezi, 1994). Rather than becoming allies of secular political parties, religious parties focused their efforts on forming a viable electoral alliance (Azhar & Muhammad, 2015). The religious political parties formed different electoral alliances to contest the general elections of 1993. JUI (F) and JUP (N) succeeded to form an electoral alliance, Islami Jamhoor-i-Mahaz (IJM), and agreed to formulate seat adjustment with other political parties. Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the chief of JIP established the Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF) to contest the general elections

of 1993. Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, chief of JUI-S, constituted an electoral alliance, Muttahida Deeni Mahaz (MDM) with twenty four religious parties. Another attempt by religious parties to improve sectarianism and electoral coherence was the establishment of the Milli Yakjehti Council (1995) (Afridi, Ullah, & Gul, 2016). Qazi Hussain Ahmad (Late) wanted to make it a political organization and electoral alliance in the future. But soon sharp differences emerged between the two major parties in the council, JUI (F) and JUI(S) over the distribution of portfolios. In early 2000, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, the leader of JUI (F), left the alliance and founded Islami Muttahida Inqilabi Mahaz (AHMED, 2015)

The incident of 9/11, followed by the American attack on Afghanistan in October, 2001, led the religious parties and Jehadi

organizations in Pakistan to react severely against the US aggression on Afghanistan (Akram, 2002). The reaction was further heightened by General Pervez Musharraf's decision to support the US in war against terrorism (A. U. Khan, 2005). After the US aggression on Afghanistan, 35 religious parties and Jehadi organizations formed the Pak-Afghan Defense Council (PADC) to demonstrate solidarity with the government of Taliban. The PADC harshly criticized General Pervez Musharraf's policy of unconditional support for the United States in war against Afghanistan (Jamal Shah, 2008a). In January, 2002, four months after the US attack on Afghanistan, General Pervez Musharraf announced that the general elections would be held in October, 2002 (Stephen Philip Cohen, 2002). After the declaration of the general elections of 2002, the six religious political parties, Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (JI), Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI-F), Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI-S), Jamiat Ulama-e-Pakistan (JUP), Jamiat Ulamae-Ahle Hadith (JUAH) and Islami Tehrik Pakistan (ITP) in PADC, formed Muttahidda Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) as an electoral alliance in May, 2002 to contest the elections of October 2002 (K. A. Khan, 2011b).

General Elections of 2002

The constitutionality of coup d'état of October 12, 1999, followed by the proclamation of Emergency October 14, 1999 was challenged in the Supreme Court of Pakistan through various petitions under Article-184(3) of the Constitution of 1973 in November, 1999 (Khalil & Ahmed, 2020). All the petitions were argued before the bench of 12 judges chaired by Chief Justice Irshad Hassan Khan on May 12, 2000, and the Court validated the military takeover on the basis of the Doctrine of State Necessity (Syed Zafar Ali Shah vs General Pervez Musharraf) (Sughra Alam, Bhatti, & Alvi, 2020). The court gave to General Pervez Musharraf three years to

complete its agenda before handing over power to elected representatives of the people. The Court further authorized General Pervez Musharraf to amend the constitution without jeopardizing the fundamental features of parliamentary democracy, independence of the judiciary and the Islamic articles of the constitution (Faqir, Islam, & Rizvi, 2013). In the light of the verdict of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, announced in July, 2002 that for the general elections would be held in October, 2002 (A. Shah, 2002).

The Election Manifesto of Muttahidda Majlis-E-Amal

The MMA released its well-defined fifteen point election manifesto for the general elections of 2002 which encompassed the overall political, social, economic, and religious programme of the alliance. The MMA's election manifesto was divided into four parts. The first part was related to the Islamization of laws and protection of the due rights of the minorities (Shah, 2008). The second part was related to good governance, the creation of better liaison between the government and the public, making ministers responsible to the public, and the struggle for provincial autonomy. The third section of the election manifesto focused on Pakistan's economic development, calling for strict adherence to fiscal responsibility and reductions in non-developmental expenditures, encouragement of the private sector, growth of the tax base, and the abolition of feudal systems with the forfeiture of illegal wealth and its distribution among the poor. The fourth section of the platform addressed the alliance's social policy (I. Khan, Khan, & Quresh, 2021). The fifth part was related to the independent foreign policy and extending moral, political, and diplomatic support to all suppressed nations, with special stress on the issue of Kashmir,

Palestine, Afghanistan and Chechens (Mohammadzai, 2004).

4.8. RESULTS OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS 2002 AND ITS ANALYSIS

The electoral alliance of Religious Political Parties (Mutahidda Majlis-i-Amal) made a remarkable victory in general elections of 2002. It fielded 183 candidates for 272 constituencies of the National Assembly out of which 45 were returned successful. The MMA won twenty nine seats out of 35 from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and secured 46.6 % of the polled vote of KP. After computing the women and minority seats the total strength of the MMA raised to 59 in the house of 342 in National Assembly (Akhtar, Ashraf, Ali, & Gull, 2019). It was expected that the MMA would sweep the elections in Southern Pakhtunkhwa (A stronghold of JUI-F) and Dir Upper, Dir Lower, Chitral and Bunir (Stronghold of JIP). However, the surprising factor was the outstanding performance of the alliance in the Malakand Division and Peshawar valley including Mardan, Charsadda and Swabi districts. Traditionally these areas were strongholds of the secular political parties, ANP and PPP. The MMA even performed well in the Hazara region where traditionally PML-N had held control (Wilder, 2004). The MMA won four seats in Punjab from urban areas while its performance was not well in rural constituencies which were considered more pliant to be influenced by the slogan of Shariah. The MMA made a surprising inroads in the urban politics of Sindh. In Karachi election results manifested a surprising change by getting 5 seats out of 20 to give the blow to MQM dominance (Verkaaik, 2007). It remained a close runner-up in the remaining 15 constituencies. The MMA's anti US strategy played a seminal role in wooing the voters elsewhere in the country was less effective in its strategy in Karachi. Here

their campaign centered on issues like education, health and other civic concerns. By this strategy the MMA managed to penetrate into those constituencies which were once considered a stronghold of MQM. It is interesting to note here that the MMA got all seats from Pakhtun dominated areas. In Balochistan, the MMA captured 6 seats out of 14 and all these seats belonged to Jamiat ulama-i-Islam-F (Ansari, 2003). The MMA captured 48 general seats out of 99 from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Its strength raised to 68 after computing independent MPAs, reserved seats for women and minorities. The MMA emerged as a largest electoral alliance in the Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (ZUBAIR, 2015). The MMA also emerged a second largest alliance in the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan with 13 seats. After adding the reserved seats for women and minorities, the total strength of the MMA in Balochistan raised to 18. All these winning candidates belonged to Jamiat ulama-i-Islam-F. The alliance won most of the seats from Pakhtun areas. The defeat of ethnic parties like Baluchistan National Party (BNP) and Jamhoori Wattan Party (JWP) was also an exceptional change (K. A. Khan, 2011a). In the Punjab Provincial Assembly, MMA won eleven seats out of which seven belonged to Jamaat-i-Islami while in Sindh Provincial Assembly the MMA captured ten seats. In these elections, JUI (F) and Jamaat-i-Islami emerged as the dominating parties of MMA. These two parties won 50 seats and all other parties won only three seats in the National Assembly. JUI-S won two seats and JUP won only one seat in the National Assembly. JamiatAhl-i-Hadith won no seat (Khan, 2011).

Election 2002 was a landmark in the growth of religious political parties in the country especially in the province of KP and Baluchistan. Beside the unity of religious parties, the MMA was not itself expecting

so encouraging response from the voters (K. A. Khan, 2011a). General Pervez Musharraf also could not comprehend the growing support of the MMA, he guaranteed to senior US officials that the Islamist alliance would not be able to get more than five percent of popular vote. The MMA was an unwelcome phenomenon to the West and especially in the U.S. in the context of Taliban factor in Afghanistan. At the same time, the U.S administration continued to build up a pressure upon Pakistan for not strapping Taliban and their supporting forces within Pakistan, regardless the fact that they also in the past, had been supporting the Taliban (Haqqani, 2004).

Formation of Government in Khyber Pakhtumkha

In the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Muttahidda Majlis-i-Amal emerged as the single largest electoral alliance with 68 seats in the house of 124. The inaugural session of the Assembly was held on November 25, 2002, in which the members of the Assembly took oaths of their seats. Bakht Jahan of JIP and Ikram Ullah Shahid of JUI-S were elected as Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Assembly, respectively. Akram Khan Durrani of JUI-F was elected as the 18th Chief Minister of the Province on November 29, 2002. Initially, the provincial cabinet was comprised of twelve ministers, and later on it was expanded to eighteen (Shah, 2008).

North West Frontier Province Shariah Act, 2003

The MMA, after assuming office on November 29, 2002, in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, reaffirmed its firm determination to fulfill its election promises regarding the introduction of Shariah (Kanwal, 2019). On January 21, 2002, a meeting of ten ulema from different schools

of thought was held at Jammia Uthmania, Peshawar. They after thorough discussion agreed on the proposal for the formation of a council of Constitutional experts and ulema to give recommendations for the Islamization of laws in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Rehman, June, 5, 2003). Following that, they established the 21-member Nifaz-e-Shariat Council (NSC), which included Maulana Mufti Ghulam-ur-Rehman and Maulana GulNasib Khan as chairman and secretary general, respectively (Mohammadzai, 2004). The members of the council arranged several meetings with various constitutional experts to draft detailed recommendations. They finally submitted their report to the central leadership of the alliance on April 8, 2003, in the KP House (J Shah, Shah, & Shah, 2021). The Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Malak Zafar Azam presented the recommendations in the form of a bill to the Provincial Assembly, which was unanimously passed with an absolute majority on June 02, 2003 followed by the assent of Governor, KP, on June 12, 2003 ("Frontier Assembly Passes Shariah Bill", June 3, 2003). Shariah was declared the supreme law of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, whereas the bill would not affect personal laws, religious freedom, traditions, customs and the way of life of non-Muslims in KP (June 03, 2003). The government also constituted the Finance Commission on October 8, 2003, under the chairmanship of Dr. Fida Muhammad to present its recommendation for Islamization of economy in the province. According to Article -38 of the Constitution of 1973, the commission was given the authority to recommend suitable alternatives for establishing an Islamic economic system in the province. The Commission was given the authority to eliminate riba from all fields of economic activity as soon as possible (Shaheen Ali, 2003). The provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa also designed a twelve-member Education

Commission in December 2003, headed by Maulana Mufti Ghulam-ur-Rehman, to plan the current educational system into conformity with Shariah (Shaheen Ali, 2003). However, the Shariah Act, 2003 did not address the problems of the general public, and it was just a face-saving-device, basically, it was a duplication of the 1991 Act (Mohammadzai, session 2002-2004).

Hisba Bill

The Shariah Act, 2003, was followed by the Hisba Bill in July, 2005 to establish the offices of ombudsman (Mohtasib) at the provincial, district, and tehsil levels (Waseem & Mufti, 2009). In the case of a written or oral report, or in response to the direction of the High Court, Supreme Court, or Provincial Assembly, the Mohtasib had the authority to plan an inquiry against any government agency or its employees. The Mohtasib had the mandate to take suo-moto action against any illegality in the province. The office was also made responsible for protecting Islamic values in any sphere of the province. Mohtasib's mandate was limited to not interfering in judicial, military, naval, or air force matters (M. N. Khan, 2019). The Hisba Bill recommended that Hisba Force be allowed to enter any office of the government for investigation and have the right to take documents with a receipt as a token of possession ("Text of Hasba Bill ", July 16, 2005).

Prior to its presentation before the K.P. Assembly, the MMA government submitted the proposed Hisba Bill to the Governor of K.P. for approval. The bill was returned by the Governor with certain reservations and a recommendation to seek the opinion of the Council of Islamic Ideology under Article-230 of the Constitution of 1973 (Muhammad Riaz, 2005). The council declared the Hisba bill unconstitutional, and further, the President of Pakistan referred the bill to the Supreme Court on the advice

of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, according to Article-186 (Masud, 2015). The larger bench of the Supreme Court, chaired by Mr. Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, C.J., in its judgment on August 5, 2005, declared the Hisba Bill as vague, overbroad, unreasonable, and parallel to the judicial system of the country. Even the Governor of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province did not assent the Hisba Bill, which was declared parallel to the Constitution of Pakistan (Gul, Jamshid, Yunas Khan, Ismail Khan, & Ali, 2022). The bill was criticized for creating a dual system in administration and judiciary. The moderates dubbed it a step towards Talibanization in the province. The MMA, on the other hand, was expected to minimize public problems through the provision of speedy justice in the Hisba Bill. But they could not succeed in the implementation of the bill due to the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan (M. A. Khan, 2004).

The Sector of Education in the Tenure of MMA

Every government attaches great importance to education because it is the main source of social development. The MMA contested the general election of 2002 with symbol of book, which shows the importance of education to its attached election manifesto (Sayed Amjed Ali Shah, 2005). When they took over the power, the literacy rate in KP was very low in comparison with other provinces in the country. After taking over the power, they established an education commission under the Shariah Act of 2003 to identify the approximately 1,400,000 children who were not attending school. The commission showed its deep concern over the low literacy rate of the province, which was 41% and it also pointed out the drawbacks in the education system (J. Khan, 2014).

The MMA government took several initiatives to improve education, with a special focus on girls enrollment in primary schools even the incentive of a cooking oil container was introduced from 1 to 5 grades, and a stipend of Rs 200 from 6 to 10 grades for each female student to encourage their more frequent admission (Nazish Brohi, 2006). In the very first year of its tenure, the MMA government launched free education system in the province which was a step towards a welfare state. In this regard, in the second year of its administration, the government began to provide free books to students of primary schools (Zafar & Ali, 2018). The government first offered this facility to female students up to the secondary level in the third year, and then to male students up to the secondary level in the fourth year. The gross enrolment ratio rose from 63% to 73% under the MMA government's "Education for All (EFA)" policy. In order to prepare teaching and management cadres for their respective sectors, the government also divided them (Haqani, February 5, 2021.). The government also initiated the "Basic Education Improvement Project" at a cost of Rs. 580 million for a period from 2003-2008 to improve basic and religious seminaries. Parents and Teachers Association (PTA) was formed with aim to discourage child labor, and training kits were also given to PTA to create awareness about child labor (Mufti, 2009). The MMA government also established Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Women University Peshawar in 2005, which is the First Public Sector Women University in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Following its establishment, the Chief Minister of the NWFP took the initiative to establish a second women's university in his hometown of Bannu in 2005-40 (Sajid Ali & Tahir, 2009).

Health

The MMA government also took in top priority the health system of the province. It started its mission towards healthy society under the program "Treatment for All". The campaign of different vaccination was launched under Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI). The government also established provincial task force for the total eradication of polio and other diseases such as HIV/Aids. It set up Anti-Retroviral Therapy Center (ARV) in Hayatabad Medical Complex (Jamal Shah, 2008b) and "Mother Baby Care" project with the assistance of DFID in 17 districts of the province. It also established kidney center in Peshawar and cancer hospitals in Swat and Bannu. The government also designed Khyber Medical University Peshawar in January 2007, Peshawar Institute of Cardiology and Khyber Institute of Child Health followed by Health Regulatory Authority to ensure quality health facilities (Shah, 2008).

Social Welfare

Being a part of the society, physically and mentally handicapped people are deserved of special attention. The MMA government has taken adequate measures through Department of Social Welfare and Women Development for the welfare of such people. The MMA government paid special attention to this sector and allocated Rs.57.10023 million for 23 ongoing and 5 new schemes in ADP of 2003-04 (Mufti, 2009). Beggary is another big social problem. The main reasons for beggary are poverty, illiteracy, high population, unemployment and unjust distribution of wealth. It not only creates problem for public but also portray a bad picture of the social environment of any society at national and international level. For this purpose, the MMA government established Darulkifala at Peshawar, Mardan and Swat at the cost of 35 Million for male beggars in August 2004, where they were kept for

specific time and given technical education (Khan, 2019). The Department of Social Welfare launched an anti-beggary drive and arrested a number of beggars from various places and sent them to Darulkifala. The government also established Women Crisis Centre (WCC), where they were given technical education, in order to make them self-dependent. The government of the MMA also paid special focus of handicapped people. An amount of Rs. 2 million was allocated as a rehabilitative aid to the disabled persons (Khan, 2019).

Good Governance

The government of MMA focused on the sector of governance to bridge the gap between the government and the public. The ministers were directed to maintain proper link with the public and solve their problems at their door steps. The government's vision was to set an example for others by encouraging simplicity, austerity, and merit-based decisions (J Shah et al., 2021). The financial authority of the District Development Committees was increased from Rs 10 million to Rs 40 million, and provincial ministries were permitted to redirect funds to underdeveloped regions. Districts received development funding from the Provincial Finance Commission (Shabir Alam, 2007-09.). For the establishment of peaceful society, intensive steps were taken to ensure the rule of law and access to speedy justice. Police reforms were introduced to empower the police force to discharge their duty without any fear and pressure. "Shuhada Package." was introduced under which the families of martyred police officers were granted full pay until their retirement date, and three hundred kanals of land were specified for police Shuhada (J Shah et al., 2021).

The government implemented reforms in the prison sector by providing prisoners

with food, clothing, medical treatment, education, residential facilities and religious instruction. The prisoners, sentenced to jail from 5 to 25 years, were allowed to live with their families for three days each month in jail (Shabir Alam, 2007-09.). After assuming power, the government paid special attention to poverty alleviation. A loan of Rs. 5–7 billion was obtained from the World Bank, and the fund was utilized under Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC) to eliminate poverty (Shah, 2008). Three major projects of regional development, including the Malakand Rural Development Program, the Dir Area Support Project, and the Barani Area Development Project, were launched to reduce the poverty level and for this purpose small loans were provided through Khyber Bank and Khushali Bank. The programme of "Drought Emergency Relief Assistance" (DERA) was launched in consortium with the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank to reduce the effects of the drought (Ayaz, 2002-04). .

The government of the MMA arranged the first ever KP International Investment Conference on March 14–16, 2005 in Peshawar which was attended by more than 200 local and foreign delegate including delegations from countries such as Sweden, Italy, China, Malaysia, and the United Kingdom. It was a very productive conference, in which a number of investors from different countries showed their keen interest in investment in the sectors of minerals, hydro, and tourism (Muhammad Waqar, 2007) The MMA government issued the province's first industrial policy, which offered an alluring package to domestic and international business owners and opened up the mining, tourism, water resources, hydropower, agricultural, and all other natural resource sectors to investment. Following the Investment Conference, the government received \$20 million in investment, boosting the export industry. A number of the commercial training

facilities, including the Commerce Colleges at Nowshera, Haripur, Charsadda, Karak, and Lakki Marwat, were upgraded. Producing skilled labour was the industrial sector's primary goal because it was crucial for the industrialization of the province (SAREEN, 2004).

Failure of the MMA

Initially, the MMA was able to maintain its unity and work toward achieving its election promises made on the eve of general elections 2002. As Stephen Cohen opines that the alliance exhibited substantial unity on different occasions till 2005, and even powerful agencies have been unable to weaken the coalition (Stephen P Cohen, 2004). With the passage of time, differences emerged among the component parties of the MMA over different issues. These parties belonged to different schools of thought who did not accept each other's interpretations of Islam. Soon after the formation of the K.P. government, the smaller constituent parties of the alliance complained about the alliance's larger units (Shah, 2008). There were serious political and personality clashes among the coalition partners. Maulana Fazalur Rehman of JUI-F and Maulana Sami-ul-Haq of JUI-S had a deep-rooted personality clash. After the formation of the cabinet, the smaller parties of the alliance were not happy with the distribution of portfolios and have been agitating for their thin representation in the cabinet. The JUI-S and JUP had even publically warned that they would quit the alliance if they were not given their due share in the cabinet. They also accused the two largest components, the JUI-F and JIP, of dominating the provincial government while giving less importance to their coalition partners (Mohammadzai, 2004).

Prof. Sajid Mir, head of Jamiat-i-Ahle Hadith, was a close ally of Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and opposed any

deal with Pervez Musharraf. The MMA's compromise with General Pervez Musharraf on the Legal Frame Work Order. Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman was an arch supporter of the deal with General Pervez Musharraf to save his governments in KP and Balochistan, while JIP strongly opposed it (K. A. Khan). Finally, the MMA struck a deal with General Pervez Musharraf on LFO and supported him in the passage of the 17th constitutional amendment. The MMA also supported Musharraf on Two Post Act, 2005, which allowed General Pervez Musharraf to remain Army Chief in addition to the President of Pakistan. The deal with Musharraf greatly damaged the image of the MMA in the eyes of the common people as an anti-establishment and anti-Army alliance (K. A. Khan). After the passage of the 17th amendment, the gulf between the major components of the MMA, JUI-F and JIP increased on the question of the participation of the leader of the opposition and the Chief Minister of KP in the meeting of National Security Council (Askari-Rizvi, 2006). The JUI (F) had been pushing for Akram Khan Durrani to attend the NSC meetings as the chief executive of the province to prevent any form of federal government arm-twisting on fiscal and other governmental issues. Even Qazi Hussain Ahmad (Late), the president of the MMA strongly opposed to join the NSC ("Tracing Steps: The rise and fall of MMA," October 19, 2012). The alliance's partners did not have good working relationships. The JIP, JUI-S, and JUP members of the cabinet complained to the Chief Minister about the lack of consultation. They charged Maulana Fazalur Rehman with directing Akram Durrani not to consult the allies on important decisions in the province (K. A. Khan, 2011b). Akram Khan Durrani undertook major developmental projects in Bannu, for which he was criticized both by his allies and rivals. The constituencies of Maulana Fazalur Rehman and Siraj-ul-Haq

also got lion's share of the annual development programme. (Cheema, Gazdar, Naseer, & Sayeed, 2008). The general public had complaints about the inability of the MMA to implement its election manifesto of 2002. The MMA focused on ensuring an Islamic society through measures such as the Hasba bill, ban on music in public places and so on, but these failed to address the basic problems of the common people. The MMA had a sour relationship with the federal government over several issues, due to which the provincial government failed to get developmental projects from the federal government (Goodson, 2008).

Conclusion

Since Pakistan's inception, religious political parties have worked closely together on a variety of political and religious issues. These parties tried to form a workable electoral alliance to combine their electoral strengths, but the sectarian differences proved to be the main hindrance in the way of an evolving alliance among them. The electoral history of Pakistan since 1970 indicates that the religious parties contested the elections, sometimes, as separate entity or as allies with secular alliances. After the fatal incident of the 9/11, the US shifted its foreign policy especially towards the Muslim world around the globe. Pakistan under intense pressure followed the US foreign policy objectives of eliminating terrorism across the world. Pakistan under General Pervez Musharraf took a U-turn and provided logistic support to the US attack on Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. The religious parties reacted against the US attack on Afghanistan under the platform of the Pak-Afghan Defense Council. Before the elections of 2002, six religious parties of PADC formed an electoral alliance, of the MMA. These parties participated in the general election of 2002 under the banner of MMA with the election symbol "Book."

They used the anti-American card as an election campaign, and, consequently, they secured an overwhelming majority in the province of KP and secured 68 seats in the house of 124. The MMA government passed the Shariah Act, 2003 and the Hisba Bill but it never implemented it because of the reverse judgment of the Supreme Court. At the same time, the MMA government addressed the core issues of poverty, equality, security, and justice of the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

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