

Civil and Military Collaboration in Land Border Security Management

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Abstract

In many developing countries, including Indonesia, the military has an advantage over civilian institutions. This advantage is reflected in the resources that make the military often asked for collaboration in civilian tasks. This study discusses the cooperation between civilians and the military, in this case the Indonesian Air Force in terms of border security between Indonesia and West Kalimantan, especially in terms of the pattern of cooperation and the challenges faced. The method used in this study is a qualitative method, with the informants selected by purposive sampling technique, and the use of the NVivo12 application in processing the data. The results of the study show that collaboration between civilians and the military in terms of securing land borders between Indonesia and Malaysia is still very limited and the opportunity to continue to be developed is wide open, in an effort to better maintain border security.

Keywords— Collaboration, Border Security, Civil, Military.

INTRODUCTION

With a total area of 1.917 million km² (BPS, 2019) and a total population of 270.20 million people (BPS, 2021), as well as rich biodiversity and minerals, Indonesia faces challenges to anticipate all forms of threats that may occur.

Furthermore, five of the 34 provinces in Indonesia have land borders with foreign countries such as Papua with Papua New Guinea, East Nusa Tenggara with Timor Leste, and East Kalimantan, North Kalimantan and West Kalimantan with East Malaysia. In West Kalimantan, there are 1,000 km of land borders, not all of which are within reach to be continuously guarded. This poses a challenge so that border security can be carried out properly.

The Indonesian military is unique in its growth and development. Since its establishment, in 1945, it has grown and developed with the birth of the nation, giving birth to the doctrine of the

Indonesian military as a people's army with its distinctive characteristics, even to its role in the political field (Bradford, 2004).

On that basis, the Indonesian military took a real role in the trajectory of Indonesia's history, including in tasks not related to war. In this case, civil-military relations conventionally refer to the assumption that military organizations are legitimized by the Nation because they were created by the people directly. This is reinforced in historical records that the military in Indonesia created and legitimized the state, not the other way around (Bradford, 2004).

The uniqueness of the Indonesian military is also supported by its superiority in terms of resources. Defining civil-military relations must begin with understanding the definition of the term, but the difficulty of formulating a precise definition of "military" has led contemporary

thinkers to focus on identifying the attributes they consider to be the main characteristics of the military (Bradford, 2004). This can be seen from the depiction of the military as an official bureaucracy legitimized by the Nation (Janowitz, 1977) to referring to the responsibility of the military profession as a servant of the state (Huntington, 1957).

Here, Huntington's conception of military professionalism is proposed. Strictly speaking, he stated that military officers are most effective when they are apolitical, therefore limited to providing advice on security matters. It is even said that the participation of military officers in politics undermines professionalism (Huntington, 1957). Huntington thus argues for military intervention in civilian politics, but the most important cause of military intervention is the political and institutional structure of society (Huntington, 1968).

The Indonesian military has a doctrine to serve the Nation and engage in socio-political affairs, which is contradictory to the Western professional military. This is contained in the ideology, doctrine, and propaganda of the Indonesian military (Bradford, 2004).

Studies have shown about the cooperation between civilian and military. The study of Djuyandi et al, (2019) shows that civil and military cooperation can be useful for example in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) (Djuyandi, Casnoto, & Hidayat, 2019). In Europe, this relates to a major decline in the number and types of military forces available not only for national defense but also for service in domestic contingencies, post-Cold War (Clarke, 2013).

Furthermore, increasing quantity and quality in disasters requires enhanced response and the burden falls on military forces. Expansion of collaboration between civilians and the military, apart from disaster management, but also in border security cooperation. There is even a global trend that in contrast to claims of waning state sovereignty, militarization of borders represents a re-articulation and expansion of state sovereignty into new spaces and arenas (Jones & Johnson, 2016). In Indonesia, although the military's political prerogatives

have been significantly reduced, institutionalized changes have allowed the military to regain some of its position in society and find a new role in defending Indonesia's sovereignty and territorial integrity from foreign and domestic threats (Sebastian & Gindarsah, 2013).

In this study, the focus of the study is on how collaboration between civil and military organizations is in the management of land border security on the island of Kalimantan. To broaden the understanding of border security, this study focuses on two questions:

1. How is the collaboration between civil and military organizations in the management of land border security on the island of Kalimantan in terms of regulatory aspects.
2. Which civil and military organizations have the most role in the management of land border security on the island of Kalimantan.

The first question examines collaboration at the macro level in border security operations and management on the island of Kalimantan. The second question is at the micro level, namely the contribution of civil and military organizations in border security on the island of Kalimantan. The paper will start from the use of methods and continue with presenting discussions and suggestions in collaborative management of land border security on the island of Kalimantan.

METHODS

The study was conducted with a qualitative approach to answer research questions about how collaboration between civil and military organizations is in the management of land border security on the island of Kalimantan. Through a qualitative approach, the author explains how the role of each civil and military organization in collaborating on land border security. Informants were selected using a purposive sampling technique with a focus on leaders of civil and military organizations involved in securing the land border between Indonesia and Malaysia on Kalimantan. Primary data were obtained through in-depth

interviews and focus group discussions (FGD). The results of data collection are processed and analyzed by researchers using the Nvivo12 Plus Software to make it easier for researchers to process and analyze qualitative data effectively and efficiently (Bandur, 2019).

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

1. Conditions of the land border between Indonesia and Malaysia on the island of Kalimantan.

Among the five largest islands in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, Kalimantan Island is the second largest island after Papua Island, with an area of 544,150 square kilometers (Sosilawati, 2017). It is divided into five provinces, namely West Kalimantan Province, Central Kalimantan Province, South Kalimantan Province, East Kalimantan Province, and North Kalimantan Province. Three provinces, namely West Kalimantan Province, East Kalimantan Province and North Kalimantan Province have a direct land border with Malaysia. Indonesia's land border with Malaysia on the island of Kalimantan is the longest border with abundant natural resources, including coal, oil and gas. So do not be surprised if the island of Kalimantan is one of the national energy barns for Indonesia (Sosilawati, 2017).

The challenges faced by Indonesia in border areas have different conditions and characteristics from other regions. Problems that arise in border areas are influenced by various factors, such as geography, availability of natural and human resources, socio-economic, political, and cultural conditions as well as the level of welfare of the people in bordering countries. One of the main problems faced by all border areas in Indonesia is poverty and the lack of basic social structures and infrastructure (DCAF, 2007).

Although initially, it was more associated with efforts to use and control (conventional) military capabilities in dealing with the threat of the use of armed violence from other countries, the understanding of security continues to grow and even the threats faced by a country are always considered to come from outside,

especially influenced by views during the Cold War. However, now these threats can also come from domestic factors and the nature of the threat is even more complicated, because security issues also involve other (non-conventional) aspects such as politics, socio-economics, the environment, human rights, and others. As a result, security issues that arise are increasingly diverse, including issues of economic security, environmental security, health security and so on. Of the many security issues in the border area, it can be categorized into (DCAF, 2007):

1. Management of national borders is an urgent strategic issue related to the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia.
2. One of the things that contribute to the less than optimal outcome of handling border issues is the absence of an institution that specifically manages all aspects of border management, both at the national and regional levels.
3. Security management requires close cooperation between States in the same region. Such cooperation should involve institutions such as the military navy, other law enforcement agencies, ship operators, and port authorities.
4. Issues and problems that often arise and occur with countries bordering bilaterally are dominated by problems in determining border lines between countries, both on land and at sea.

With the land border of West Kalimantan with Malaysia along 1,001 km, currently only 601.26 km are guarded by border security forces while the remaining 399,774 km have not been maintained. This is related to the geographical conditions in the form of protected forests and many rivers. Border guarding that is currently being carried out is still using conventional methods, namely by conducting security patrols

using cars, motorbikes and walking to combing the boundaries of the border area, while the terrain that is traversed and faced is not easy with natural conditions in the form of dense forests, hills, swamps and its kind (Zulkarnain & Roisah, 2018). In addition to natural factors, another reason for the lack of optimal control over the land borders of West Kalimantan is the lack of security personnel in the border areas. Two border security task forces work using limited systems and patterns. This condition clearly shows that security in this border area is still very vulnerable from all threat factors, both military and non-military (Zulkarnain & Roisah, 2018).

This can be further seen from the existence of Outstanding Border Patrol (OBP) along the land border line between Indonesia and Malaysia. The absence of an agreement has raised security issues, including:

1. Violation of traditional borders.

Many illegal border violation activities that occur regularly stem from the common roots of ethnicity, culture, and places of origin in several border areas of West Kalimantan. This encourages frequent illegal border violation activities. The similarity of culture and tradition as well as border violators are border issues that have arisen long ago and have resurfaced along with the management of land border areas in Kalimantan.

3. Smuggling of goods.

Smuggling of goods occurs because of demand factors and easier access and economic value. Whether it's goods from Indonesia to Malaysia or vice versa. From Malaysia, it is usually the goods of basic needs whose prices are cheaper as a result of better access to transportation, which encourages the illegal entry of goods into Indonesia, especially basic needs.

4. Narcotics Trade.

It is known that this type of trade flow uses traditional transportation routes.

5. Smuggling of weapons.

This type of crime originates from the black market which then enters Indonesia using the rat route and other traditional routes. This action is expected to occur around the Indonesia-Malaysia border.

6. Illegal logging.

Most of Indonesia's border areas have abundant natural resources with varied ecosystems. This further encourages criminals to carry out illegal logging. In addition, this is also supported by regulations in Malaysia and Singapore which allow foreign goods to enter their country without any procedures to investigate the origin of the goods. As long as the incoming goods pay customs duties, they are considered legal goods.

Facilities and infrastructure in West Kalimantan, especially those related to security at the Indonesia-Malaysia border, have two things. First, the office and immigration checkpoint, customs office and animal and plant quarantine office. Second, the border security task force posts are scattered throughout the five regencies bordering Malaysia.

From the defense aspect, in these five regencies bordering Malaysia, border security posts have been deployed by the TNI. For the three districts, namely Sanggau Regency, there are 3 Posts, in Sintang Regency there are 12 Posts and in Kapuas Hulu Regency 14 Posts with company-level unit strength. (Subagyo, 2021). Meanwhile, in Sambas Regency and Bengkayang Regency, there are 20 border security posts. In addition, there are also 2 joint posts in the Indonesian, namely in Entikong and Sajingan and 2 joint posts in Malaysia, namely in Lubuk Antu and Biawak. (Purnomo, 2016). Next, it is seen from the security aspect in the five regencies bordering Malaysia, where the actors are the Police.




Figure 1

Map of the fifth PLBN (Cross Border Post) in West Kalimantan and the TNI AD Border Security Post

From a geographical point of view, it appears that the distance between one border security post is far from each other with natural conditions that cannot be closed by traditional border security by relying on civilian border security organizations. Limited human resources and equipment are only a minor challenge compared to the limited authority possessed by the National Border Management Agency (BNPP) as a government agency that manages borders.

2. Regulatory Aspects in Collaboration Between Civilian and Military Organizations.

The issue of state border management has become a strategic issue, especially after the second amendment to the 1945 Constitution, namely the addition of Article 25A which states that the Republic of Indonesia is an archipelagic state characterized by an archipelago with areas whose boundaries and rights are stipulated in law. The policies that support Article 25A of the 1945 Constitution are:

1. Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian National Army (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Year 2004 Number 127,

Supplement to the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Number 4439).

2. Law Number 43 of 2008 concerning State Territory (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Year 2008 Number 177, Supplement to the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Number 4925).
3. Law Number 1 of 2009 concerning Aviation (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia of 2009 Number 1, Supplement to the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Number 4956).

In Law Number 43 of 2008 which regulates the territory of sovereignty and jurisdiction of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia as well as matters related to the management of Indonesia's territorial boundaries. In Article 1 it is stated that the Territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is one of the elements of the state which constitutes a unitary area of land, inland waters, archipelagic waters, and the territorial sea along with the seabed and the land beneath it, including all sources of wealth contained therein. From the statement, it is clear that the management of the territory of the state and the territory of the state's jurisdiction is important in order to realize the ideals of the nation, namely to realize all the people live prosperous and self-sufficient lives. Article 1 is strengthened by Article 5 which is written, The boundaries of the territory of the State on land, waters, the seabed and the land below it as well as the air space above it are determined on the basis of bilateral and/or trilateral agreements regarding land, sea and air boundaries and based on legislation and international law. Thus, the content of the policy, border security management has a strong foundation.

From the policy side regarding the role of the military, from the interviews, it was found that until now there are no other rules or manuals related to military involvement in Presidential

Regulation Number 44 of 2017 concerning National Border Management Agency (BNPP) in the task of supervising and observing border areas. So that the potential of the military that has proven its capabilities and is not owned by members of other ministries is not utilized.

Regulation becomes important as a basis for who and how to act in terms of building border security, mainly related to the use of surveillance capabilities possessed by the military. The regulation in question is in the form of the contents of the TNI law, as well as Presidential Regulation Number 44 of 2017 concerning BNPP which regulates how collaboration can be strengthened.

Still related to policy matters, based on the results of interviews with BNPP which provide an overview based on the mandate of Law Number 43 of 2008, regarding the issuance of Presidential Regulation Number 12 of 2010 concerning the National Border Management Agency as later amended through Presidential Regulation Number 44 of 2017 concerning Amendments to Presidential Regulation Number 12 of 2010 concerning the National Border Management Agency (BNPP). This change becomes the legal basis for BNPP in carrying out its organizational functions and duties. Based on this, to facilitate the implementation of BNPP's duties, especially in areas bordering neighboring countries, the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation Number 140 of 2017 concerning the Establishment of Border Management Agency in the Regions was issued as an effort to optimize border management in the regions.

In its subsequent development there were changes and adjustments in the form of the addition of Ministries / Institutions as members. so that from the previous membership which amounted to 14, it increased to 27 Ministries / Institutions. However, its duties and functions have not changed too much, because BNPP is only a non-structural ministry agency. Consists of the Director, Chair, and Members. The directors are 4 Coordinating Ministers, led by Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, then BNPP itself is chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs as Ex-Officio.

The absence of regulatory products or policies that are mutually integrated between Ministries / Institutions, which are members of BNPP regarding who does what related to border security, makes each BNPP member carry out their duties based on the duties and functions of each organization regardless of whether they are mutually exclusive related or not. This makes the task of building security at the border not optimal, for example the task of border security patrols which is carried out by each Border Security Task Force post every two weeks, making this an opportunity for cross-border violators to take their actions.

In addition, in difficult terrain conditions to be patrolled, it is also an opportunity for illegal border crossers to carry out their actions. Meanwhile, based on the confession from a Cross Border Post (PLBN) informant, that most of the trans-border violators carry out their actions through remote and hidden roads in the interior and this is a special difficulty for PLBN including customs, immigration, police, quarantine centers. animals and plants and health, because they cannot be present and have no capacity there.

If everything mentioned above is reviewed based on Law Number 34 of 2004 which mentions securing border areas, then the tasks of all Ministries / Institutions related to border area security at the West Kalimantan - Malaysia border cannot be carried out optimally, because they still have these limitations and the limitations because they have not cooperated with each other strongly and have not adhered to the full use of technological advances, especially modern surveillance technology. Even though there is CCTV and the like, in remote areas such things do not yet exist. Therefore, the weakness of security oversight at the border is still classified as part of the weakness. This should be overcome if military capabilities can be utilized/involved. In reality, military capabilities are currently only used more for the internal interests of the TNI in carrying out operational tasks according to their capabilities, while the priority for military deployment is to carry out border control,

surveillance and observation operations. In this regard, the military works to:

1. Controlling and supervising the border. This is done through the collection of signal and imagery data in monitoring the situation and conditions on the West Kalimantan-Malaysia border which reaches 1,884 km in length as a form of overcoming human limitations in monitoring the land border manually, so that through this it can prevent all forms of action such as foreign infiltration, theft of natural resources (land and sea) and the others.
2. Reconnaissance and air intelligence operations in the defense area as well as conducting long-range aerial photography over the outer islands, border areas. Through this activity, information on the strength, capability, position, disposition of certain parties who carry out illegal acts has the potential to obscure Indonesian territorial boundaries and harm the interests of the nation, especially in the West Kalimantan border area.
3. Conduct intelligence operations as ordered. Through this activity, information is obtained as needed, so that certain decisions/important actions can be taken immediately in accordance with the guidelines and provisions of national and international laws.

3. The Role of Civilian and Military Organizations in Border Security Management.

The collaborative dimension will look at the extent to which each organization is involved in cooperation in border security efforts. This can be seen from the cooperation that exists between agencies and between institutions.

Collaboration between services explores how each agency or institutions work together

internally to run these services. For example, at the Indonesian Customs Agency, under the Ministry of Finance, there are several regulations from the Minister of Finance that regulate the governance of data and information related to data and information.

Currently, inter-institutional breakthroughs have been made by conducting MOUs or certain cross-institutional cooperation agreements. For example, Indonesian Customs and Excise at the Entikong Border Post routinely submit reports related to surveillance, including those related to border security whose duties and functions are carried out in stages through the West Kalimantan Regional Office.

Thus, in terms of Inter-Agencies, it appears that each agency cooperates between services and its parent agency in accordance with the tasks and functions of the organization that have been regulated in the agency's regulations. On the one hand, this shows a common thread in terms of clarity of tasks and the hierarchy of cooperation. Although in terms of cooperation between institutions is still not visible. In terms of cooperation between services, it seems to be going well. The Military has carried out various operational orders to the Air Force and Army.

Inter-Institutions describes how institutions and institutions with an interest in border security cooperate. Thus, it will be seen how the pattern of cooperation between institutions is built. The cooperation that has been carried out in order to streamline the border area has been going well. It's just that there must be obstacles, especially in terms of achieving infrastructure because each ministry and agency is constrained by the lack of a budget. Indeed, every time there is a budget policy, infrastructure constraints can be seen from the lack of budget absorption. There are obstacles in confirming and maintaining institutional finances with ministries and agencies, especially in the context of development. In fact, the National Border Management Agency (BNPP) should be at the forefront of cross-border management.

The results of the study show that in the field of implementation, cooperation between agencies and institutions has been carried out although it is not optimal, because it is limited to the type

of military operation. However, for the type of cooperation related to border security, it seems that it has not been optimal, moreover it has not been regulated and regulated in laws and regulations, therefore it needs to be immediately strengthened in the form of legislation that regulates the pattern and form of cooperation between agencies and institutions.

4. Cooperation Challenge

Real success in various military operations involving cooperation with other institutions in border security cooperation. The challenge is how to build the necessary framework to form the basis for inter-agency cooperation in border management.

CONCLUSIONS

The results of the study show that in relation to the collaboration between civil and military organizations in the management of land border security on the island of Kalimantan in terms of regulation, it shows that there is no regulation that explicitly regulates one agency that specifically handles border security management, causing collaboration between civil organizations and military is a necessity. The superiority possessed by the military in terms of resources causes the military's role to be advanced in terms of border security management, the impact of which is the weakness of civilian institutions.

In fact, there is no single civil institution that has the most role in the management of land border security on the island of Kalimantan. All organizations move independently according to their respective duties and functions, to the level of the organization above it. In military organizations, the role of the land border security task force originating from the Army shows a more real role, seen from the pattern of border security operations that are carried out continuously, even though geographical constraints prevent all areas from being covered.

LIMITATION AND STUDY FORWARD

The study is limited to the cooperation between civil and military organizations in border

security management and how organizations in both institutions play a role in the management of land border security on the island of Kalimantan. However, collaboration includes many different dimensions, so that further research on resources, patterns of operation and cooperation between civilian and military institutions is expected to be carried out so that an understanding of border security management will be carried out comprehensively.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

We are would like to say thank you to the National Management Border Agency (BNPP), for their contribution as an informant, also to the Ministry of Defense Staff and Universitas Padjadjaran for their support in assisting the research process.

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