

Trends Of Heads Of Syrian Refugee Families Towards Voluntary Return To Their Homeland, Syria: A Field Study Conducted On A Purposive Sample Of The Head Of Families Hosted By Jordanian Communities

Dr. Ali Jameel Al-Sarayrah

Assistant Professor Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordanian 2021-2022

Abstract

The study aims to identify the trends of heads of Syrian refugee families, of both sexes, who reside with host Jordanian communities regarding home return obstacles. The study adopted the descriptive approach conducted on a purposive sample comprising (188) heads of families. A questionnaire was used for collecting data. The statistical package of social sciences (SPSS) was used for data processing. Results of the study revealed that: survival of the current Syrian regime besides absence of security, man-hunting, arrests, and compulsory military conscription all constitute political and security impediments that hamper a safe voluntary return of Syrian refugees to their homeland. The results also unraveled bad service conditions, property confiscation, and absence of accurate information which also represent the foremost cultural and social impediments against refugees' return. As for economic obstacles, they are represented by lack of work opportunities and the absence of work market controlled by regulatory laws that encourage voluntary return of the refugees.

Keywords: Compulsory conscription; Family heads; Jordanian host families; Syrian refugee families; Voluntary return obstacles

Introduction

Several reports issued by international organizations ascertained that the return of Syrian refugees to their homeland in the current conditions is impossible. Such reports added that the refugees, at the same time, never felt that they had a place to be considered a homeland. They feel worried about what the future hides for them and their children. Most of them lost what they used to have and were left to live in miserable conditions in which they suffer from the accumulation of personal debts, lack of safety, and reduction of aid given to the countries that host Syrian refugees (Nebehay, 2017).

Three-fourths of both registered and non-registered Syrian refugees in Jordan want to

return to Syria one day in the future (Morris, 2019). Authorities estimate that (5%) of the refugees in Jordan crossed land borders to Syria (Edwards & Al-Horani, 2019), but it wasn't clear whether such refugees plan to stay or not. Observers pointed out that several returnees had gotten return permits from Jordan. In fact, those returnees escaped from the difficult economic situation despite lack of work opportunities in Jordan (Edward & Al-Horani, 2019). According to international reports, the Syrian refugees return home for several reasons: economic pressure and scarcity of work opportunities in Jordan. Before the financial crisis in Syria, some refugees got economic chances better than those they might get in Jordan, but others returned for personal and family reasons, as they still have social support in

Syria or returned for certain temporary reasons like selling or registering properties. Despite that, the majority of Syrian refugees in Jordan are reluctant to return due to uncertainty of what is waiting for them across borders. Among their concerns are fears of arrest and detention. It is unlikely that the Syrian refugees in Jordan think of a return to Syria in the near future (Vires, et. al., 2020). They feel unsecured, especially with the spread of Covid-19 and distrust in the general Syrian health system which reinforces their stay where they are.

Based on what preceded, the statement of the problem attempts to unravel the trends of Syrian refugees residing in Jordanian communities towards political, security, economic social, and cultural impediments that prevent them from their return to their country. The study also attempts to unravel the differences in the trends of sample members concerning variables of the study. The significance of the current study is incorporated in two tracks: theoretical and practical; the former adds scientific information to the fields of specialization and research interests relevant to refugee affairs. The latter serves the social policy of the state of Jordan, in addition to whatever helps livelihood of the Jordanian citizen. Other societies analogous to the Jordanian counterpart might also benefit from this study about refugees status. The study aims to achieve the goals linked to the political, security, economic, social, and cultural obstacles that hamper voluntary return of Syrian refugees to their homeland, Syria. Therefore, the study attempts to answer the following queries:

- 1- What are the trends of heads of Syrian refugee families towards political and security obstacles that hinder voluntary return of Syrians to their homeland?
- 2- What are the trends of heads of Syrian refugee families towards economic

obstacles that hinder a voluntary return to Syria?

- 3- What are the trends of heads of Syrian refugee families towards social and cultural obstacles that hinder voluntary return?
- 4- Are there differences in the trends of sample members attributed to study variables regarding political, economic, social, and cultural impediments that hinder Syrians' return to their homeland?

Study terminology

- 1- Return impediments: They are the political, security, economic and social factors that hamper the return of refugees to their homeland in an honorable manner.
- 2- Refugee: He is any person who lives outside his original country for a justified reason to avoid persecution due to race, religion, nationality, or for belonging to a certain social sect, or for holding a certain political attitude. Due to all that, he evicts his country of origin to live abroad (Agreement on refugee status).
- 3- Voluntary return: It is an honorable kind of refugees' return to their country of origin.

Livelihood of Syrian refugees in Jordanian host communities

Throughout the Syrian crisis, (641) thousand Syrian refugees entered Jordan according to U.N reports. Life of the majority of such refugees is characterized by incessant weakness in financial, food, and legal securities. It is noted that (86%) of these refugees live below poverty line and that amounts to 68 Jordanian dinars (Jds) per month (about 2.25 \$ US per day). (10%) of them live in extreme poverty, with less than 28 Jds per capita monthly (1.32 \$ US per day). Vulnerable families probably live in urban centers where (80%) of individuals resort to adaptation strategies in

emergency cases; (92%) of them suffer from extreme vulnerability concerning basic needs (UNHCR Jordan, 2015). As for vulnerable refugee communities, (40%) of the total number of Syrian refugee families living in Jordan are headed by women (Care International, 2016). Such families mostly suffer from food security and reliance on aid programs (World Food Program, 2016).

One of the major concerns of Syrian refugees living outside camps is securing a suitable shelter. It is noted that (75%) of them find it very difficult to find shelter. (UNHCR Jordan:2015). The Syrian refugees, very often, borrow money to cover costly rents as they live below the required life level for they might live in overcrowded places where contagious diseases constitute a threat to their life. (Mercy Corps.2018). In cities, both Jordanian citizens and Syrian refugees compete for finding suitable houses with reasonable rents. House rents in Jordan, between 2011-2014, rose 14% (International Monetary Fund, 2016).

The Syrian refugee families in Jordan also face different types of challenges that prevent their children from joining school due to far distances, transportation, and children who were unable to join the school because of the Syrian crisis, etc. Despite such conditions, (79%) of Syrian children of school age go to school, but (97%) of them might seriously not be able to join the school because of low financial resources (UNHCR Jordan:2017). Lack of documents with Syrians in Jordan "Many Such Individuals have lost their identification documents when forced to leave their homelands due to armed conflict" (Arasi, & Faisha,2020)is a source of concern for them as many don't have any documents to confirm their identity nor do they have any civil documents like (marriage and birth certificates or family records). This might be a reason for their inability to register and have access to services. Some studies pointed out that there is a relation

between social violence and lack of documents (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2016).

Corona pandemic complicated living conditions for Syrian refugees as many of those who live outside camps lost their jobs, due to the sudden cut in their daily income they used to get before corona. The labor force of Syrian refugees was involved with a non-official type of business that was spreading and distinguished for low wages, long working days, no social security, bad work conditions, and lack of work contracts (Ilo. 2017).

The epidemic affected all, but for the Syrians, it was a crisis within a crisis (Sewell: 2020). The effects of the pandemic, according to one of the social society bodies, were immeasurable and limitless (Hamou, 2020).

The livelihood of Syrian refugees in Jordan, before, during, and post corona, pushed them to adopt an adaption policy in order to survive. It was estimated that (80%) of them were really living below the poverty line with a high level of food insecurity. According to World Food Program, (65%) were on the verge of food insecurity when Covid-19 pandemic started (OCHA & WHO, 2020).

Despite the deteriorating livelihood conditions of the Syrian refugees in neighboring countries including Jordan, they never think of a return to their country, Syria, due to the collapsed economy, deteriorating health conditions, and insecurity (UNHCR: 2019).

Return obstacles for Syrian Refugees

UNHCR polls indicated that the majority of Syrian refugees still hope to safely return to their country one day even though that day might not be close. Recent data on refugees' intentions reveal that most of them plan to remain in Jordan. Return impediments found in Syria are basically what dictate the return issue, not the desire for return (UNHCR, 2021). The Syrian interior is

still complicated and inflamed. In a study conducted by the Syrian Association (2020) revealed that most of the Syrian returnees felt completely insecure despite the guarantees given by the regime. They felt deceived for being insecure as manhunting and call for compulsory conscription left a negative impact on returnees' decisions. The study disclosed that (40%) of those returnees were unable to regain the original residences they left for the fear of partial or total destruction or for security procedures that hindered their return (Syrian league for citizen's dignity:2020).

International reports pointed out that the pre-conditions for return are safety and security followed by a peaceful sustainable transfer of authority, availability of livelihood, and having access to their original areas, besides getting services. Most refugees see that such conditions are strongly interrelated and that gaining security and safety is unachievable without political change (Yahia, 018: 42).

Another study published in 2018 revealed that property restitution is one of the major conditions that encourage the return of refugees to Syria, which is difficult, due to the regime's stance, and the need of refugees for changes to earn their living, besides the ability to regain their assets represented in arable lands (World Bank, 2020). Thus, refugees' desire to regain their documents is one of the motives behind the decision to return.

A survey conducted by the Karingi foundation (2018) on a sample of Syrian refugees in Jordan revealed that (34%) of them see that one condition for return is securing a livelihood, another one, besides regime change, is the improvement of livelihood with its dimensions, services that correlate with general and economic expenditure with their impact on individuals' life and job opportunities (Yahia, 2018).

The real preference and decision taking for the refugees lie in their assessment of the economic situation in their country after a safe stay and the bad economic situation where they live, taking into consideration differences between refugees in the developed countries and their counterparts in the neighboring ones that suffer from miserable conditions.

Theoretical framework

Schon (2020) assures that before the refugees return, they need to understand how to live safely. Such a thing might be a challenge for those who lived in refuge for long. (Chu, et. al., 2019) found out that halting hostile acts at the homeland may be one of the major reasons for refugees' return. Whenever hostilities halt, refugees might be motivated to return (Crisp, 2019). There are other impediments against return besides war and violence: living in another country for a long time through which refugees adapt themselves to the new place and the desire to stay even with no citizenship status (Camarena & Hagerdal, 2020).

The refugees' decision to return depends on the conditions in their homeland which should be taken into consideration, besides their expectations of how the situation might develop. For example, will violence aggravate? Will that affect their areas in particular? Moreover, will they be subjected to persecution or arrest when they return? Threats that people might encounter are not only confined to armed struggle, but also the possible retribution. Thus, families before returning should take into consideration the violence level in their homeland and their relations with the extant political parties, and their expectations on how long violence and persecution from the government persist.

The study of (Fearon & Shaver, 2020) revealed that there is a strong correlation between intensity of conflict and coercive emigration. Those who experienced violence are more likely to be the target than those who were just

threatened with violence (Adhikari, 2013). The return of those who were displaced by force would be less probable as they might confront more violence in the places of origin. Such a thing agrees with what (Aria, Ibanez & Querbubin, 2014) came up with that internally displaced individual in Columbia who experienced violence before displacement didn't have a strong desire to return, compared to the displaced who were not subjected to violence. Therefore, safety exexpectations should involve strategic considerations relevant to the group identity. Armed groups strategically displace civilians on basis of race, sect, tribe, or political affiliation.

The study of (Burundi & Schwartz, 2019) found out that any government or armed group which targets people who own a piece of land might re-infect a collective punishment on them in the future, especially if post-war political groups draw an optional plan to punish former emigrants. Thus, whenever refugees think of returning, they need to reassess post-war economic conditions to figure out if they can secure basic needs for their families. (Arias, Ibanez & Querbubin, 2014) found out that people who own a piece of land or expect to get jobs in their homeland usually have higher intentions for return.

War might affect people's economic expectations by creating disputes on property rights or by redistributing properties for the sake of ergonomics or allies' rewarding (MeNamee, 2018).

War also very often destroys infrastructure and service distribution systems. Reconstruction models of war aftermath might reflect political and population divisions (Croese, 2017), and that might influence domestic livelihood and options related to return.

Literature Review

The current study differs from previous ones, though it shares with them the same subject. The difference is noted in that it tackles political, economic, social, and cultural impediments that were not tackled before regarding refugees' return.

The researcher lists down the foremost studies relevant to the issue the current focuses study on.

The study of Omari (2021) aimed to detect the influential factors on Syrian refugees' decisions in Jordan pertaining to their return. The sample comprised (357) Syrian refugees (18) years of age and above. The results revealed that the foremost political and security factors that influence return decisions are lack of security, fear of death, and torture, in addition to the absence of a clear protocol that secures a safe return.

The study of (Mustafa, et.al., 2021) aimed to identify the social and economic determinants of Syrian refugees' return. The study found out that restoring assets "property rights" is one of the most important social factors that motivate return. According to the study, the absence of infrastructure makes the idea to return more difficult. The study also found out that the pre-conditions for return were: regime disintegration together with its military and security corpses, besides economic motives needed for voluntary return.

The study conducted by Karingi (2018) aimed to detect the stance of Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon towards return. The results revealed that despite the aggravating challenges the Syrian refugees in Jordan encounter, they still don't like to return before any political change occurs to guarantee their security and safety. The results also showed that though job opportunities and decent housing were provided, they were not priorities of return for them.

Alrababah (2022) conducted a study on the dynamics of refugees' return. The sample comprised (3003) Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The study concluded that conditions in the refugees' homeland are the major motive for return. What affects their decision are safety and security in their original country, in addition to economic potential, services, and personal connections. The study also disclosed that it is unlikely for Syrian refugees to return unless a drastic improvement occurs in their homeland.

Murad et.al. (2018) conducted a study on the prospects of return for Syrian refugees in Turkey. According to qualitative and quantitative analysis of data, the return preconditions for them

were: ensuring security, regime change, and providing livelihood opportunities.

Study methodology

Study population and sample

Population of the study comprised all Syrian refugees residing outside refugee camps in northern governorates of Jordan where high accumulations of them are found. According to Jordanian official assessment, they amount to (659.000) refugees. The sample comprised (183) family heads of Syrian refugees of both sexes. The purposive sample opted for conditioned that years of refuge should not be less than (7). The study sample was distributed by demographic variable as presented in table (1).

Table (1): Distribution of sample members

Variable	Category	Frequency	Percentage
Gender	Male	127	67.6
	Female	61	32.4
Age	Less than 26 years	6	3.2
	26-35 years	46	24.5
	36-45 years	71	37.8
	46- years	65	34.6
Number of family members	4 members and less	46	24.5
	5-8 members	110	58.5
	9 members and more	32	17.0
Years of residence in Jordan	7-9 years	6	3.2
	More than 9 years	182	96.8
Do you work?	Yes	158	84.0
	No	30	16.0
Income	Less than 100 Jds	127	67.6
	300-600 Jds	45	23.9
	600-900 Jds	8	4.3
	More than 900 Jds	8	4.3
Do you like a return to your homeland?	I like	106	56.4
	I am reluctant	12	6.4
	I don't like	70	37.2
Total		188	100.0

Tool of the study

A questionnaire with two axes was designed to collect data for the study. The first axis is the independent variable which covers: gender, age, number of family members, years of residence in Jordan, work, income, and desire to return; the second is the dependent variable which covers:

political security, economic, social, and cultural hurdles.

Validity of the study tool

Study tool validity was verified by using Cronbach Alpha Coefficient as presented in table (2).

Table (2): Cronbach Alpha Coefficient to test study tool validity

Dimension	Cronbach Alpha Coefficient
Political and security return impediments	0.83
Economic impediments	0.87
Social and cultural impediments	0.85
Total	0.88

Virtual values in table (2) show that they are valid for study purposes. Results of the scale are acceptable when the value of Cronbach Alpha is more than (0.60) (Sekaran, 2013). The closer the value to 100% is, the higher the degree of validity becomes.

Statistical social package of social science (SPSS) was adopted to encode the data and import them to a computer for analysis and answering questions of the study. The following statistical methods were used (Descriptive statistical measures) to check arithmetic means and standard deviations to determine the degree of study sections acceptability which was calculated through the following formula:

Adopted statistical process

Period length =	Maximum – minimum	=	$\frac{5-1}{3}$	= 133
	At levels			

The level will be as follows: low (1-2.33) medium (2.34-3.67), and high (3.68-5). (One Way ANOVA) was also used for (Independent Sample T-test), and (Cronbach Alpha Coefficient to test study validity).

Analysis of results and answers to study questions

In answering the first question “what are the trends of heads of Syrian refugee families towards political...”, arithmetic means and standard deviations were calculated as presented in table (3) as follows:

Table (3): Arithmetic means and standard deviations pertaining to impediment dimensions of return to Syrian

Impediments	Arithmetic mean	Standard deviation	%	Degree
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Political and security	4.27	.635	85.4	High
Economic	3.40	.981	67.9	Medium
Cultural and social	4.32	.619	86.4	High

The table reveals that: political and security impediments ranked high with a (4.27) mean, economic impediments ranked medium with a mean (3.40), cultural and social impediments ranked high as well with a mean (4.32). Such a result reflects that the attitude of refugee Syrians was high pertaining to political, security, social

and cultural impediments, while their attitude towards economic impediments was medium.

The answer to the second question “Are there differences in attitudes...”

Table (4) sums up the issue through (t) test of independent sample

Table (4): (T) test of the independent samples.

Variable	Impediments	Group	No.	Mean	Std	T value	Degree of freedom	Level
Gender	Political and security return impediments	Male	127	4.10	.674	-5.614	186	.000*
		Female	61	4.62	.349			
	Economic return impediments	Male	127	3.38	1.054	-.404	186	.687
		Female	61	3.44	.815			
	Social and Cultural return impediments	Male	127	4.38	.568	1.819	186	.070
		Female	61	4.20	.705			
Work	Political and security return impediments	Male	158	4.21	.661	-2.792	186	.006*
		Female	30	4.56	.365			
	Economic return impediments	Male	158	3.42	.979	.783	186	.435
		Female	30	3.27	1.000			
	Social and Cultural return impediments	Male	158	4.35	.616	1.703	186	.090
		Female	30	4.14	.619			
Years of residence in Jordan	Political and security return impediments	7-9 years	6	3.75	.091	-2.053	186	.041*
		More than 9 years	182	4.29	.638			
	Economic return impediments	7-9 years	6	2.33	.000	-2.741	186	.007*
		More than 9 years	182	3.43	.978			
	Social and Cultural return impediments	7-9 years	6	4.00	.183	-1.289	186	.199
		More than 9 years	182	4.33	.626			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Functional at the level ($\alpha \leq 0.05$) 								

The preceding table reveals that there are differences among Syrian refugees, pertaining to political and security impediments at the level ($\alpha \leq 0.05$), attributed to gender and work variables in favor of females and unemployed people. There are also differences in the trends pertaining

to political, security, and economic impediments at the level ($\alpha \geq 0.05$) attributed to years of residence in Jordan in favor of those who stayed more than seven years as demonstrated in table (5):

Table (5) ANOVA Test

Variable	Impediments	Group	No.	Mean	Std	Degree of freedom	F value	Function level
Number of family members	Political and security return impediments	4 members and less	46	4.47	.462	2	14.589	.000*
		5-8 members	110	4.33	.636			
		9 members and above	32	3.77	.609			
	Economic return impediments	4 members and less	46	3.39	.919	2	1.190	.307
		5-8 members	110	3.47	1.017			
		9 members and above	32	3.16	.933			
	Social and Cultural return impediments	4 members and less	46	4.33	.585	2	.210	.811
		5-8 members	110	4.33	.637			
		9 members and above	32	4.26	.621			
Family income	Political and security return impediments	Less than 300 Jds	127	4.33	.665	3	3.275	.022*
		300-600 Jds	45	4.04	.594			
		600-900 Jds	8	4.63	.077			
		900 and above	8	4.25	.199			
	Economic return impediments	Less than 300 Jds	127	3.46	1.043	3	1.255	.291
		300-600 Jds	45	3.17	.922			

		600-900 Jds	8	3.71	.342	3	4.650	.004*
		900 and above	8	3.33	.418			
	Social and Cultural return impediments	Less than 300 Jds	127	4.31	.676			
		300-600 Jds	45	4.16	.455			
		600-900 Jds	8	4.79	.077			
	900 and above	8	4.83	.000				
Desir to return to Syrian	Political and security return impediments	Want	106	3.99	.670	2	32.227	.000*
		Reluctant	12	4.53	.186			
		Don't want	70	4.65	.350			
	Economic return impediments	Want	106	3.15	.958	2	8.361	.000*
		Reluctant	12	3.67	.376			
		Don't want	70	3.72	.987			
	Social and Cultural return impediments	Want	106	4.21	.653	2	6.392	.002*
		Reluctant	12	4.81	.065			
		Don't want	70	4.40	.569			
Age	Political and security return impediments	Less than 26 years old	6	4.56	.344	3	18.163	.000*
		26-35 years old	46	4.62	.397			
		36-45 years old	71	4.38	.707			
		46-55 years	65	3.87	.492			
	Economic return impediments	Less than 26 years old	6	3.94	.848	3	43.406	.000*
		26-35 years old	46	3.75	1.031			
		36-45 years old	71	3.91	.622			
		46-55 years	65	2.53	.649			
	Social and Cultural return impediments	Less than 26 years old	6	4.06	.848	3	10.238	.000*
		26-35 years old	46	4.53	.507			
		36-45 years old	71	4.48	.669			
		46-55 years	65	4.02	.483			
• Functional at the level ($\alpha \leq 0.05$)								

The results presented in table (5) show that there are differences in the trends pertaining to political and security impediments at the level ($\alpha \geq 0.05$) of family member numbers. The differences were between the family member numbers of 9 and above on one hand, and families whose members range between 5-8 in favor of the latter and those of less than (5) members. There are also differences in the trends pertaining to political and security impediments at the level ($\alpha \leq 0.05$) attributed to income variable. The differences were between those with incomes less than (300) and their counterpart whose income was 300-600 Jds in favor of those with less than (300). In addition, there are differences in attitudes pertaining to social and cultural impediments at the level ($\alpha \geq 0.05$) attributed to family income.

The differences were between those with incomes 900 and more and their counterpart of 300-600 Jds income in favor of those with more than 900. There were also differences in attitudes pertaining to political and security impediments at the level ($\alpha \geq 0.05$) attributed to the variable of desire to return. The differences between those who like to return besides those who don't on one hand and on their reluctant counterpart don't who want. There were also differences pertaining to return economic impediments at the level ($\alpha \geq 0.05$) attributed to the return desire variable. The differences were between those who like to return on one hand and those who don't like to on the other, in favor of those who don't. There were differences, as well, pertaining to social and cultural impediments at the level ($\alpha \geq 0.05$) attributed to the desire variable. The differences were between those who like to return and the reluctant counterpart in favor of the reluctant. Moreover, there were differences in the attitudes pertaining to political, security, economic, social, and cultural impediments at the level ($\alpha \geq 0.05$) attributed to the return desire variable; the differences were between those of 46-55 years of

age on one hand, and those of less than 26 years of age on the other, in favor of the latter group.

Discussion of results

The results presented in table (3) show that the collective return of Syrian refugees sounds to be less probable, taking political and security factors into account. The data revealed that the foremost impediments of return were: regime survival, fear of arrest, torture, security manhunting, conscription, absence of security, and guarantees of non-accountability. The arithmetic mean of such factors ranked high (4.27). This result agrees with the study results of (Mural, et. al., 2018) and Omari (2021).

The data also revealed that the economic impediments rated medium with (3.40) mean. Economic improvement is automatically associated, in the minds of refugees, with political and security improvement irrespective of independence of this factor in destroyed economies. Therefore, lack of job opportunities, rising costs of living, poverty, unemployment, etc. all induced a medium level of this variable. Such a result agrees with that of Karingi (2018) who confirmed that despite the available economic chances and decent housing, yet they were not among the priorities for return. It also agrees with one of the results of Mustafa et. al. (2021) which concluded that change of the current regime with its security and military corpses might be economic motives that encourage return.

The social and cultural impediment ranked medium with (4.32) mean. Thus, as presented in the discussion, political, security, social and cultural impediments ranked high medium for the Syrian refugees while economic impediments ranked medium. Social impediments were manifested in bad service conditions, property confiscation, and the

absence of accurate information about what was going on inside Syria which affected the return decision for many family heads of Syrian refugees in Jordan.

The preceding results also agree with those of Mustafa, et. al. (2021) with regard to property restitution as one of the social conditions that encourage return. The absence of infrastructure makes return even more difficult.

In accordance with the preceding results the study came up to, the researcher proposes the following:

- 1- To provide international support to achieve security and stability in Syria.
- 2- To guarantee a safe and voluntary return for Syrian refugees who want to return through assurances provided by the Syrian government.
- 3- To provide job opportunities for refugees in the host countries in order to secure suitable decent life in case they don't like to return.
- 4- To provide accurate information for those who are willing to voluntarily return by intensifying contacts with the Syrian government.
- 5- To restore confiscated documents and properties in order to encourage refugees to return and start reconstruction.

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